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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines attitudes expressed towards German prisoners of war (POWs) and 
their treatment in Britain between 1939 and 1948. The original contribution of this 
thesis is to highlight the importance of British values, particularly the notion of fair-
play, in public discussions of the treatment of POWs. In so doing, this thesis brings 
together three historiographical areas which had usually been dealt with separately: 
German POWs held in Britain, British national identity, and Anglo-German relations. 
Chapters two and three are concerned with the wartime period (1939-45), and chapters 
four, five, and six are concerned with the post-war period up to 1948, when the last 
German POWs were repatriated. While it is structured chronologically, each chapter is 
thematic. Chapter two examines the period between the outbreak of war in 1939 and the 
end of 1942 and explores the legacy of the Great War on discussions of captivity. 
Following chronologically, chapter three is concerned with the period between the D-
Day landings on 6 June 1944 and the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. 
The effect of the disclosure of atrocities committed by Nazi Germany on discussion of 
captivity is explored. Breaking from the chronological structure, chapter four takes up 
the theme of employment. Chapter five then considers the debates on the fraternisation 
regulations and the marriage ban between British women and German POWs. Finally, 
chapter six examines the campaign to repatriate German POWs. Throughout the war, 
the treatment of POWs was a marker of cultural difference between Britain and the 
German enemy. In the context of the emerging Cold War, the treatment of POWs was 
given new significance in that it was contrasted with the Soviet Union. Amongst others, 
this thesis concentrates on three principal sources: newspapers, newsreels, and Mass 
Observation material. Focusing on these sources, this thesis considers how the narrative 
of captivity was presented to the British public and the variety of responses which 
challenged representations of POW treatment.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On 14 August 1940, the Daily Express reported that a downed German pilot had asked 
two women who approached him near the crash site, if they were going to shoot him. 
'No', Mrs Betty Tylee said in response, 'we don't do that in England. Would you like a 
cup of tea?'1 In this anecdotal article of a chance meeting between British civilians and a 
German POW—it can be assumed that the pilot would have been formally captured 
soon after—the interplay between civilian/POW encounters, attitudes towards captivity, 
and British (the terms English and British were often used interchangeably) self-image 
is evident. Mrs Tylee and her accomplice would not execute an enemy captive as this 
was simply 'un-English'. Reflecting on the relationship between the treatment of enemy 
POWs and Japanese national identity, Rotem Kowner concluded that:  
 
The treatment of POWs appears to be an excellent indicator of one's identity 
since it reflects self-images, the identity of one's reference group and the attitude 
towards it, as well as the national priorities and ambitions in times of constraint.2 
 
 In this thesis, following Kowner's suggestion, public opinion and individual 
attitudes expressed towards the treatment of German POWs in Britain between the 
outbreak of war in 1939 and the completion of their repatriation in 1948 are surveyed. 
The social, cultural, and political significance attached to the treatment of captured 
enemy POWs within the changing wartime, post-war, and emerging Cold War context 
is examined. In so doing, the intersection between the discussions of the captivity of 
German POWs and debates on wartime and post-war notions of British national 
character, attitudes towards Germany and the Germans, and wartime and post-war 
aspirations are highlighted. Policymaking and diplomacy have been the lenses through 
which the captivity of German POWs in Britain has been viewed in recent literature. In 
other words, the treatment of POWs has been explored 'from above', with the 
administration and negotiation of the POW issue being examined from the perspective 
of policymakers and officials. In contrast, this thesis approaches the captivity of 
German POWs 'from below', in that the documents analysed were read or related to by 
the 'common people', and it is their attitudes which are focused on. This thesis is not 
concerned with the intricacies of policies developed towards German POWs, but rather 
                                            
1
 Jeremy Paxman, The English: A Portrait of a People (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 87.  
2
 Rotem Kowner, 'Imperial Japan and Its POWs: The Dilemma of Humaneness and National 
Identity', in War and Militarism in Modern Japan: Issues of History and Identity, ed. by G. 
Podoler (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009), pp. 80-110, p. 102. 
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popular comprehension and individual reactions to the real and imagined presence of 
captives on the home front and the standard of treatment afforded them by the British 
authorities. Accepting that a complete examination of attitudes and opinions is an 
impossible task, this thesis concentrates on a close reading of individual responses to 
gain insight, even though fragmentary, into what attitudes circulated in society. In 
focusing on public opinion and individual attitudes of the common people this thesis 
addresses three historiographical fields usually dealt with as separate: German POWs in 
Great Britain, British national identity, Anglo-German relations, and the changing mood 
as the war and then the Cold War developed. The following research questions are 
addressed:  
  How were German POWs and the standard of their treatment in British hands 
represented in popular media? Did individuals support or challenge the 
dominant narrative they were presented with? Was the government's handling of 
German POWs criticised?   To what extent was the treatment of POWs a marker of cultural difference 
between Britain and Germany during the 1939-45 conflict?   What social, political, and cultural values were invested in the treatment of 
German POWs during and after the Second World War? Did the treatment of 
POWs reflect a liberal self-image?   Were values and attitudes deep-rooted and constant or did they change over time 
in response to the shifting wartime, post-war, and emergent Cold War context? 
 
German POWs in Britain  
 
Between the outbreak of war in September 1939 and the opening of the Second Front in 
June 1944, there were few German POWs held in Britain. During the eight months of 
phoney war, beginning with the declaration of war by the western Allies and roughly 
ending with the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940, 
Luftwaffe pilots and Kriegsmarine crew were sporadically captured in and around the 
British Isles. By 18 December 1939 there were 250 in British hands.3 Before being 
transported to camps, POWs were interrogated. The Combined Services Detailed 
Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) was initially established at the Tower of London, before 
                                            
3
 CAB 67/3 WP (G) (39) 157, German Prisoners of War in Great Britain, 18 December 1939. 
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moving to Cockfosters and later Beaconsfield in Buckinghamshire. Over the course of 
the war, information gathered from POWs became increasingly valued by intelligence 
services.4 Pre-war planners anticipated only a small number of enemy POWs would be 
held in Britain and two sites were initially requisitioned by the War Office to act as 
POW camps. Officers were held at Grizedale Hall in the Lake District, Cumbria while 
other ranks were accommodated at Glen Mill, a disused cotton mill in Oldham, 
Lancashire.5 Policy was altered in light of the catastrophic military defeats resulting in 
the Dunkirk evacuation between 26 May and 4 June 1940 followed by the fall of France 
on 25 June. The decision was taken, suggested by the newly established Home Defence 
(Security) Executive, to remove enemy aliens. POWs were also shipped to camps in the 
Dominions including Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand as they too 
were considered a security threat at a time when invasion was feared. 6  While the 
practice of transporting enemy aliens was stopped after the Arandora Star sinking, 
consignments of POWs continued to sail for the Dominions. 7  Transported to the 
extremities of the British Empire, the number of German POWs held in Britain 
remained small.  
 In contrast to the flow of German POWs away from Britain, there was a steady 
influx of Italian POWs from 1941.8 It is worth briefly discussing policy towards Italian 
                                            
4
 Kent Fedorowich, 'Axis prisoners of war as sources for British military intelligence, 1939-42', 
Intelligence and National Security, 14: 2 (1999), 156-78; Kevin Jones, 'From the horse's mouth: 
Luftwaffe prisoners of war as source for Air Ministry intelligence during the Battle of Britain', 
Intelligence and National Security, 15: 1 (2000), 60-80; Falko Bell, ''One of our Most Valuable 
Sources of Intelligence': British Intelligence and the Prisoner of War System in 1944', 
Intelligence and National Security, 31:4 (2015), 556-78. For an analysis of the transcribed 
covert recordings of German POWs collected by British intelligence see, Sönke Neitzel and 
Harald Welzer, Soldarten - On Fighting, Killing, and Dying: The Secret WWII Transcripts of 
German POWs, trans. by. Jefferson Chase, (New York: Aldred A. Knopf, 2012). 
5
 On the development of the camp system see, Antony Hellen, 'Temporary settlements and 
transient populations: the legacy of Britain's prisoners of war camps', ErdKunde. Archiv fur 
wissenchaftliche Geographic, 53: 4 (1999), 191-219. On the history of Glen Mill see, Bob 
Moore 'Glen Mill: The International History of a Local POW Camp During World War II', 
Manchester Region History Review, 10 (1996), 48-56. 
6
 CAB 67/7 WP (G) (40) 170, Internees and Prisoners of War, Memorandum by the Lord 
President of the Council, 2 July 1940.  
7
 CAB 66/12 WP (40) 379, Sending Prisoners of War Abroad, Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for War, 20 September 1940. CAB 65/9 WM 257 (40) 7, 24 September 1940. CAB 67/9 
WP (G) (41) 75, Transfer of German Prisoners of War to Canada, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for War, 8 August 1941. CAB 65/19, WM 79 (41) 3, 11 August 1941. 
8
 On Italian POWs in Britain see, Lucio Sponza, 'Italian prisoners of war in Great Britain, 1943-
6' in Prisoners-of-war, ed. by Fedorowich and Moore, pp. 205-26. Bob Moore and Kent 
Fedorowich, The British Empire and its Italian Prisoners of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); 
Marco Giudici, 'A "Positive Displacement?: Italian POWs in World War II Britain', in War and 
Displacement in the Twentieth Century: Global Conflicts, ed. by Sandra Barkhof and Angela K. 
Smith, (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 89-102. A notable work which has unfortunately not 
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POWs as their fate was intertwined with their German equivalents. On 10 June 1940, 
Italy joined the German invasion of France during the latter stages of the campaign. 
Benito Mussolini's decision to declare war subsequently expanded the conflict into the 
Mediterranean theatre. In North Africa, British forces successfully repelled initial Italian 
advances into Libya. The copious numbers of Italian POWs made for logistic and 
administrative problems. At the same time, labour shortages in Britain were becoming 
acute. In an effort to alleviate both these problems, Italian POWs were shipped to 
Britain and set to work in agriculture. While German POWs were perceived as bellicose 
fanatical Nazis, Italian POWs were considered docile.9 An almost insatiable demand for 
their labour soon followed; noting the British 'addiction' to their labour, Wylie quips 
that the Italians were 'more useful to Britain's cause in the wheat fields than the 
battlefields'.10 The number of Italian POWs employed increased steadily to 108,000 by 
D-Day and peaking at 162,000 in June 1945. With the capitulation of Italy in September 
1943, the use of Italian POW labour was complicated. Although the flow of Italian 
POW labour was cut, Italian POWs already in Britain would not be immediately 
repatriated. In order to continue to employ them, a 'co-operator' status was introduced. 
Italian POWs were offered this status, and in exchange for their continued 
employment—their remit being expanded beyond agriculture to work directly 
associated with the war effort—co-operators were offered increased freedoms and 
payment.11 At the same time, Italian co-operators were billeted directly onto farms, 
reducing transport costs. Furthermore, removing them from camps created space for 
prospective POWs taken during the forthcoming invasion of Normandy.  
                                                                                                                                
been translated is but draws upon Italian sources: Isabella Insolvibile, Wops: i prigionieri 
italiani in Gran Bretagna (1941-1946) (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2012). On the 
Italian community in Britain during the Second World War see, Terri Colpi, The Italian factor: 
the Italian community in Great Britain (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1991) and Lucio Sponza, 
Divided Loyalties: Italians in Britain during the Second World War (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000). 
9
 CAB 67/9 WP (G) (41) 6, Italian Prisoners of War for Land Reclamation Work, Memorandum 
by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 13 January 1941. CAB 65/17, WM 7 (41)8, 16 
January 1941.CAB 66/16, WP (41) 114, Military Policy for East Africa, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for War, 29 May 1941. CAB 66/16, WP (41) 120, Proposal to bring 25,000 
Italian Prisoners of War to this country, Report by the Lord President of the Council, 4 June 
1941, CAB 65/18 WM 57 (41)9, 5 June 1941 On perceptions of Italian POWs see, Bob Moore, 
'British Perceptions of Italian Prisoners of War, 1940-7’, in Prisoners of War, Prisoners of 
Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II, ed. by Bob Moore and Barbara 
Hatley-Broad (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 25-39. 
10
 Neville Wylie, 'Prisoners of War in The Era of Total War', War in History, 13:2 (2006), 217-
33, (p. 224). 
11
 Kent Fedorowich and Bob Moore, 'Co-belligerency and prisoners of war: Britain and Italy, 
1943-1945', International History Review, 18 (1996), 28-47; Sponza, 'Italian Prisoners', pp. 210-
15.  
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 During the Normandy Landings on 6 June 1944 and the subsequent breakout 
substantial numbers of German POWs were taken by Allied forces. Initially, with no 
space to hold them in France, POWs were shipped across the Channel to Britain. 
Having already agreed to share captures between them under the August 1943 50:50 
agreement, a number of the German POWs were quickly shipped from Britain to the 
United States.12 In June 1944 the possibility of employing German POWs was explored, 
an experimental group being put to work in agriculture in two counties. The need for 
labour outweighed security concerns and German POWs were increasingly employed 
from summer 1944. Demand for labour would not recede with the end of the war 
against Germany, and British-owned German POWs were transported to Britain from 
camps in Canada, the US, and Belgium to bolster the workforce. 13  The security 
restrictions which had hampered the productivity of German POW employment were 
scratched in May 1945 after the unconditional surrender of Germany, and in August 
1946 the number employed in the UK peaked at 381,000.   
 At the Potsdam Conference (17 July to 2 August 1945) the aims of 
denazification and democratisation were agreed by Allied representatives. In Britain, the 
need to design a programme of political re-education for German POWs was made clear 
early on in a cabinet memorandum circulated on 18 December 1939.14 However, with 
the priority being winning the war, the issue was by and large set aside until September 
1944 when a scheme was approved by the cabinet. POWs were interviewed to assess 
their political sympathies, a process known as 'screening', and accordingly segregated 
into one of three groups: 'white' (anti-Nazi), 'grey' (in-between), and 'black' (ardent-
Nazi). Re-education sought to re-orientate German POWs along democratic lines. The 
programme included discussion groups, lectures, films, and other activities which 
provided a space in which the POWs could challenge their pre-existing beliefs rooted in 
Nazism. In September 1946 the German POW population peaked at 402,200. At that 
time a scheme of general repatriation was introduced at a rate of 15,000 POWs per 
                                            
12
 In August 1943 Britain and the United States agreed that captures in joint operations from 12 
May 1943 should be equally divided in the theatre after the POWs captured by a third power, 
such as France, had been deducted. Furthermore, up to a maximum of 175,000 British owned 
POWs could be sent to the US, a figure reached by February 1945. See, CAB 66/61 WP (45) 
89, Disposal of Prisoner of War in Captured in North-West Europe, Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for War, 10 February 1945.   
13
 27,000 German POWs were transferred to Britain from the Channel Islands after their 
liberation on 9 May 1945 while 3,200 were retained for work. On the fate of these captives see, 
Charles Cruickshank, The German Occupation of the Channel Islands (Stroud: Sutton: 2004), 
pp. 311-31. 
14
 CAB 67/3 WP (G) (39) 157, German Prisoners of War in Great Britain, 18 December 1939. 
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month later rising to 20,000. In July 1948, apart from escapees still at liberty and 
serious infirm cases, the repatriation of German POWs was completed. 
 
Historiographical trends  
 
The product of conflicts from antiquity to the present day, Pieter Lagrou reminds us that 
POWs 'are a universal phenomenon of warfare'. Changing military tactics which saw 
increased mobility led to a substantial rise in the number of military prisoners taken 
during the two World Wars. 15  Over time, popular imaginings of POWs centred 
predominantly on heroic tales of escape have been demystified. For decades after the 
Second World War this image was perpetuated in Britain by the 'Colditz industry', but 
as Simon Paul Mackenzie has demonstrated, the realities of British POWs in Nazi 
Germany were far more complex.16 There is now a vast literature on the experiences of 
POWs in different contexts during both World Wars. In general, it is accepted that 
German POWs held in Britain between 1939 and 1948 were treated by and large in 
accordance with international law and fared far better than their counterparts, notably 
those in Soviet hands. 17  In their memoirs, ex-German POWs look back on their 
captivity in Britain with fond memories, a time when they forged friendships and 
rebuild their lives after the devastation wrought by war.18  
 Academic attention has concentrated on policymaking and the handling of 
POWs by the British authorities. In his chronological overview of British policy 
towards German and Italian POWs, Bob Moore pinpoints the turning points which 
transformed the demographic of the POW population in Britain. Moore argues that the 
                                            
15
 Pieter Lagrou, 'Overview', in Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace, ed. by Moore and Hately-
Broad, (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp. 3-10, p. 3. 
16
 S. P. Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi 
Germany (Oxford: OUP, 2004).  
17
 Richard Garrett, P.O.W. The Uncivil Face of War (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & Charles, 
1988), pp. 166-84; Chris Christiansen, Seven Years Among Prisoners of War , trans. by Ida 
Egede Winther, (Ohio: OUP, 1994), pp. 151-74. Bob Moore, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of 
War in the Western European Theatre of War, 1939-45', in Prisoners in War , ed. by Sibylle 
Scheipers (Oxford: OUP, 2010) pp. 111-126. Rüdiger Overmans, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of 
War in the Eastern European Theatre of War, 1941-56', in Prisoners, ed. by Scheipers, pp. 127-
140. 
18
 Stuart Crocker, Foreign Shores: A True Story (Leicester: Matador, 2010); Werner Braun and 
David Coakley, Is the War Over? The Memoir of Werner Kurt Braun (Milton Keynes: 
AuthorHouse, 2010); George Gebauer, Hitler Youth to Church of England Priest: My 
Autobiography (George Gebauer, 2014).  
18 
 
usefulness as a labour source was a primary factor shaping British POW policy. 19 
Examining the employment of German and Italian POWs, Johann Custodis 
demonstrates that both groups 'made significant contributions' to wartime and post-war 
agriculture. 20  In Group Captives, Henry Faulk outlines the British re-education 
programme. Examining the results from a sociological perspective Faulk deems the 
policy successful.21 
 Diplomacy has been placed at the forefront of recent studies of POWs. In 
Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War , Richard B. Speed surveys the treatment of 
POWs during the 1914-18 conflict in Europe and the United States. He conceptualises 
the 'liberal tradition' of captivity, the view that captured enemies are not chattel property 
but protected persons. This view was codified in international law, notably in the two 
Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907. Despite the unforeseen pressures of total war, 
Speed contends that Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, treated their 
POWs reasonably well. 22  Commitment to the liberal-tradition of captivity was 
demonstrated by the ratification of the 1929 Geneva Convention.23 As in the 1914-18 
conflict, the stipulations of the international law were interpreted differently and 
negotiations between belligerents sometimes broke down. Comparing their treatment 
across the theatres of war during the Second World War, Simon Paul MacKenzie asserts 
that the 'mutual hostage factor' was an important restraint on POW mistreatment in the 
western theatre. 24  This influential essay inspired subsequent studies to adopt a 
comparative approach, exploring negotiations between governments in an attempt to 
pinpoint the factors governing POW treatment. MacKenzie's argument that reciprocity 
was a key influence in POW relations has been nuanced accordingly. In Confronting 
                                            
19
 Bob Moore 'Axis Prisoners in Britain during the Second World War: A Comparative Survey' 
in Prisoner of War and their Captors in World War II, ed. by Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 19-46. 
20
 Johann Custodis, 'Employing the enemy: the contribution of German and Italian Prisoners of 
War to British agriculture during and after the Second World War', The Agricultural History 
Review, 60:2 (2012), 243-65. 
21
 Henry Faulk, Group Captives: The Re-education of German Prisoners of War in Britain 
1945-1948 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1977), pp. 175-97.  
22
 Richard B. Speed III, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of 
Captivity (London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 3. Brian Feltman has problematized Speed's 
evaluation of Britain's adherence to the liberal-tradition, demonstrating that a noteworthy 
minority of soldiers and officers showed little concern for observing the law. Brian Feltman, 
'Tolerance As a Crime? The British Treatment of German Prisoners of War on the Western 
Front, 1914-1918', War in History, 17 (2010), 435-58. 
23
 Neville Wylie, 'The 1929 Prisoner of War Convention and the Building of the Inter-war 
Prisoner of War Regime', in Prisoners, ed. by Scheipers, pp. 91-110.  
24
 Simon Paul MacKenzie, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II', The Journal of 
Modern History, 66:3 (1994), 487-520.  
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Captivity, Arieh Kochavi suggests that racial considerations played a role in Germany's 
treatment of captives. Notwithstanding times when it was breached, the observance of 
the 1929 Geneva Convention regarding Anglo-American POWs contrasts sharply to the 
brutal extermination policies carried out in concentration camps. While Kochavi's 
analysis of diplomatic correspondence is sound, a deeper consideration of the cultural 
context of policymaking is required to explain the disparity in the treatment of different 
captive groups.25 Vasilis Vourkoutiotis similarly argues that the sufferings of Allied 
POWs in Germany hands were not deliberately caused. The German High Command 
was committed to the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, but individual 
commanders, administrative breakdown towards the end of the war, and Hitler's 
personal involvement resulted in violations.26  Drawing on the field of international 
relations, Neville Wylie analyses the intricate diplomacy Britain and Germany played to 
safeguard their servicemen in enemy hands. He has shown that reciprocity could also 
mean an escalation in POW mistreatment. 27  In their assessments of the 1942-3 
Shackling Crisis both Kochavi and Wylie note that the British authorities had to be 
mindful of public opinion during the reprisal cycle, and a public distaste of meting out 
punishments upon defenceless captives eventually led Churchill to unchain German 
POWs. This suggests that innate cultural aversions played a role. Although not 
concerned with POWs, Jeffrey Legro has argued that the restraint shown between 
Britain and Germany during the war was due to deep-rooted cultural beliefs which 
raises new questions about POW treatment.28 Both Kochavi and Wylie suggest this in 
their assessments of the 1942 Shackling Crisis whereby the British authorities had to be 
sensitive to public opinion which would not condone the chaining of German POWs in 
retaliation for the manacling of British POWs in German hands.   
 The phenomenon of captivity was not confined to the wartime period, and 
extended beyond 1945. Homecoming, reintegration, and memory are themes central to 
the essays in Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace edited by Bob Moore and Barbara 
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Hately-Broad.29 Immediate repatriation was just one of 'the spectrum of possibilities' 
POWs faced at the end of hostilities.30 In contrast to the immediate liberation of Allied 
POWs, the repatriation of German POWs was not completed until 1948. During this 
time their continued employment intersected with the post-war migration and the 
recruitment of foreign labour, notably the arrival of European Voluntary Workers.31 
German POWs featured in Inge Weber-Newth and Johannes-Dieter Steinert's socio-
historical exploration of German migrants in post-war Britain.32 The authors shed light 
on attitudes expressed by the British public and non-governmental organisations 
towards German migrants. After outlining British policy towards German migrants in 
the context of post-war labour needs, the study is primarily concerned with the migrant 
experience. Having interviewed ex-POWs and migrants, the authors examine 
conceptions of self and others as well as recollections of their reception. They discuss 
the eventual relaxation of the fraternisation regulations near Christmas 1946 which 
created the opportunity for ex-enemies to meet one another and forge relationships 
beyond the workplace, noting that Christians and ex-military persons were two 
particular groups which reached out to their ex-enemies. Focused attention is paid to 
gender issues in relation to encounters between POWs and British women. In this 
dissertation, these themes are explored further.  
 Recording the encounters between British civilians and German POWs has been 
primarily conducted by amateur historians who usually have some sort of personal 
connection with the captives. Pamela Howe Taylor, author of Enemies Become Friends 
and The Germans We Trusted, chronicled the friendships made between British 
civilians and German POWs, her father having been a British priest providing service to 
a POW camp near their home in Lancashire. 33  Studies of the POW presence in 
particular counties and certain camps also offer some insight into the attitudes of the 
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locals to their POW neighbours, usually drawing on the memories of local people.34 Of 
particular note is Matthew Sullivan's Thresholds of Peace. Sullivan, himself having 
worked with German POWs in post-war Britain, recounted the attempt of the captives 
to confront the political and moral trials borne out of defeat in 1945. While focused on 
the re-education programme and the key individuals involved with it, Sullivan also 
described the actions of British civilians who involved themselves with welfare and aid 
for German POWs. He drew upon the philosophy of Iris Murdoch to explain what he 
describes as 'the myriad threads of peace' knitted between the British people and 
German POWs in post-war Britain. In The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch deemed 
courageous good deeds people perform against heroic odds a mystifying and central 
question in moral philosophy. Following Murdoch, Sullivan suggests that those that 
sought to do good for German POWs 'did not see it as an act of will nor a moral task'. 
That there were individuals and organisations in Britain that concerned themselves with 
the treatment of Germans POWs out of enigmatic inner virtuousness alone is not 
refuted. However, further interrogation is required of this issue and its place within 
British histories.  
 There are few works which centre on public opinion and attitudes towards 
German POWs during and after the Second World War. Their time in Britain sits 
awkwardly with the conventional wartime/post-war chronological divide.  German 
POWs, for instance, are absent in Paul Addison's The Road To 1945 while they are only 
mentioned fleetingly in Angus Calder's The People's War .35  In regards to post-war 
histories of Britain, their presence complicates narratives of the 1945-51 Labour 
government. The retention of German POWs as forced labour does not fit with the 
image of Britain moving towards a properly constituted welfare state and work-force. 
Neither does this fit well with the memory of the war. In his effort to dispel the 'myth of 
the good war', James Hartfield remains us that Britain, like the USA, 'made defeated 
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German [POWs] slaves'.36 Furthermore, in studies of post-war labour and migration, 
POWs are of secondary consideration.  
 
Britishness 
 
'Wars', Judy Giles and Tim Middleton note, 'are obvious occasions when ideas about 
national identity become particularly visible'.37 The 1939 and 1945 conflict, in particular 
the events of 1940—Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz—is considered a time 
when British cultural awareness was at a highpoint. The Second World War, Richard 
Weight and Abigail Beach write, 'heightened national consciousness in Britain by 
creating the potentially inclusive, democratic sentiment of the "People's War" and in 
doing so, it prompted a thorough examination of what constituted British national 
identity'.38 Often, as Barbara Korte and Ralf Schneider indicate, the idea of national 
unity needs to be cultivated even after the fighting has stopped so that the involvement 
of the nation in that conflict can be justified and the survivors can be comforted by the 
idea that their losses were not in vain.39 The Second World War, Korte notes, 'has 
engendered its own myths of Britishness'.40 These mythological elements of the British 
Second World War narrative—particularly 'standing alone' against Germany in 1940, 
Britain's 'finest hour' according to Churchill—have been interrogated by historians, 
most notably Angus Calder.41  The unravelling of British national identity with the rise 
of nationalism in Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England has been a central 
concern in studies of Britishness.42  
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 The image of Britain as a liberal and tolerant society has been questioned in 
studies of civilian internment. For a time, unable to reconcile mass internment with the 
narrative of liberal Britain defending democracy, it remained a marginalised subject.43 
Former Isle of Man internee Ronald Stent and journalist Miriam Kochan offer positive 
interpretations of the experiences of the captives. 44  However, the greater part of 
literature has been critical of internment policy. Brian Simpson disparages  the system 
of detention without trial, while Neil Stammers has gone so far as to argue that with the 
suspension of many civil liberties following the introduction of the Defence 
Regulations, including 18B and the internment of aliens, Britain ceased to be a liberal 
democracy. 45  The internment of enemy aliens sat uneasily with British notions of 
justice, and the episode has been explored by historians to complicate British self-image 
during the Second World War. As the title of the collection edited by Richard Dove 
suggests, the internment episode was and is considered "Totally Un-English".46  While 
internment has been regularly used as a controlling measure during times of conflict 
between The South African War until today, it is consistently seen as 'un-British'.47 
Historians of military captivity in Britain during the two World Wars have suggested 
that similar cultural forces were at play in debates concerning the treatment of POWs. 
 Heather Jones's study of violence against POWs in Britain, France, and 
Germany during the First World War highlights deep cultural differences between the 
belligerents in their treatment of military captives. In regards to the radicalisation of 
POW treatment which Jones charts, she observes a British exceptionalism: 
 
Yet if there is a Sonderweg to emerge from this study, it is actually Britain, 
where, throughout the war, violence against prisoners remained far less 
acceptable than in France or Germany and where cultural constraints acting 
against radicalisation proved particularly powerful.48  
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Assessing a letter to The Times criticising the lenient treatment of German POWs in 
October 1918, Jones comments: 
 
Yet, significantly, even in a letter demanding harsher prisoner treatment, such as 
this, there is still a strong cultural disapproval of beating German prisoners or 
starving them; the language is very much the high Edwardian rhetoric of 'fair 
play', closer to the cultural ideals of British honour espoused by the famous 
poem 'Vitai Lampada' by Henry Newbolt than the rhetoric of wartime 
extremes.49 
 
 The young cricketer of Newbolt's poem, by the second stanza a solider, is stirred 
to heroic action through schoolboy memories. The line 'Play up! Play up! And play the 
game!' symbolised the view that the same sporting spirit should inform the battlefield as 
much as the cricket pitch. 'In European history', James Mangan remarks, 'war has served 
sport and sport has served war'. 50 During the First World War, Colin Veitch argues that 
'Sport was to maintain its ascendancy in the forefront of British thought and expression 
throughout the remaining years of the conflict, and continued to be used to typify the 
genetic strength of British manhood'. 51  Assessing the place of sport within British 
society, Derek Birley argues that the Newbolt spirit which Jones alludes to persisted 
beyond the First World War.52 In this thesis, the notion of fair play in connection with 
the treatment of POWs is explored further. 
 The importance of everydayness and ordinariness in the construction of British 
national identity during the Second World War has been emphasised. Sonya Rose 
observed that 'those who best represented Britain at war were not exceptional 
individuals but rather were everyday, ordinary people; those who were 'doing their 
bit'. 53  John Baxendale similarly argues that in the midst of all the destructiveness 
witnessed on the home front, 'the minutiae of ordinary life [became] all the more 
precious, a source of national pride, and just as much as democratic instructions, under 
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Nazi threat'. 54  Following the notion put forward by Rose and Baxendale, that 
everydayness and ordinariness were central to representations of what it meant to be 
British, the physical gestures towards German POWs recorded in newspapers and other 
materials can be read as important symbols of British national identity. While donating 
a packet of Woodbine cigarettes, cup of tea or piece of cake to a German POW might 
well be mundane at first glance, important messages are codified within them which, 
when unpacked, can further understandings of the viewpoints held by the ordinary 
citizen in wartime and post-war Britain. 
 
Images of the Germans  
 
An examination of how the treatment of POWs reflected British self-image during and 
after the Second World War must also concern itself with the counterpart entity which 
also defines the self: the other. 'Britishness', Paul Ward notes, 'has always been in a 
process of formation'.55 Acknowledging the complexity of national identity, whereby 
numerous ongoing processes result in conceptions of what it meant to be British being 
in a state of flux, this thesis is concerned with the creation of Britishness in relation to 
the German enemy. This is not to suggest that national identity is solely constructed 
against 'the other'. The contributors in the recent publication Fighting For Britain? have 
highlighted the internal construction of national identities during the Second World War 
between the various nationalities which make up Britain, as well as those who arrived 
from the Empire. These differences are not disputed. However, against Nazi Germany 
the British, Paul Addison states, 'fought as one nation'.56 While he acknowledged that 
'the so-called races of Britain feel themselves to be very different from one another', 
George Orwell argued that the differences between two Britons, say English and a 
Scottish, quickly evaporated when they were confronted by another European.57 As 
Wendy Ugolini and Juliette Pattinson note, 'much of British national character was also 
being constructed in opposition to the humourless and militaristic Nazi, with the 
perceived British characteristics of tolerance, cheerfulness and stoicism being widely 
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celebrated'.58 While the Axis also included Italy and Japan, it was Germany which was 
the foil to Britain. Certainly, hatred was directed to the former two nations, poet A. P. 
Herbert famously calling to 'Sock the Wops, and knock their blocks'. Yet it was 
Germany which was, Angus Calder notes, 'first and always, the real enemy'.59 The 
German people came to represent all that Britain was not: malevolent, degenerate, 
vicious, deceitful, cold, dishonourable, and mechanical.  
 
Sources 
 
The administration of German POWs in British hands produced a vast amount of 
official material. While the focus of this thesis is not policy formation, the records of the 
Cabinet Office were read in order to understand the executive decisions taken by the 
successive wartime and post-war governments towards German POWs. More 
importantly, Hansard, the transcripts of parliamentary debates, was read to understand 
the public face of policy. To gauge public opinion and explore individual attitudes, three 
sources were central: newspapers, newsreels, and Mass-Observation material. The 
collection and limitations of these sources will now be discussed, with a particular focus 
on the issue of digitisation. 
 In understanding popular opinion regarding German POWs in Britain, 
newspaper content is a vital source. As the first draft of history, newspapers are one of 
the 'most important published primary sources for the historian', as John Tosh writes.60 
This is particularly true of twentieth century Britain, a time when, George Orwell 
observed, the typical Englishman would settle down with the News of the World after 
his Sunday lunch.61  Adrian Bingham has furthered the picture Orwell paints. Mid-
twentieth century Britain, offered perhaps the most competitive newspaper market 
across the globe. The daily circulations of the Daily Mirror and Daily Express—over 
four million copies—were unmatched. In all, around three-quarters of the population 
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read a paper every day. 62  Digitisation has allowed the systematic exploration of 
newspaper content. Online databases have made searching newspapers quick and 
convenient. In regard to twentieth century publications there is a rich, if fragmented, 
collection of digital archives which present the opportunity to explore them. While 
studies of German POWs held in Britain during and after the Second World War have 
used newspaper content to provide anecdotal colour, digitisation has enabled 
newspapers to be rigorously collected and analysed, and this thesis uses newspapers as a 
principal source to construct the narrative. Newspapers not only brought captivity into 
the everyday lives of the British public, relaying information regarding the presence of 
German POWs in Britain and the policies adopted towards them, they provided a space 
in which discussions of their treatment could be had and attitudes towards them could 
be expressed.  
 Inspired by the model of distance reading advocated by Franco Moretti, the first 
digital methodology employed to collect material on German POWs was a macro 
approach, quantifying the newspaper content retrieved from keyword searches to 
identify broad patterns.63 Databases consulted included: The Times (1785-1985), the 
(Manchester) Guardian (1821-2003), The Observer  (1791-2003), the Daily Mail (1896-
2004), and the British Newspaper Archive, which contains a wealth of pages from 
regional newspapers up to the 1950s.  While the digital archives of leading daily papers 
contained all issues of the time period 1939 to 1948, the regional newspapers on the 
British Library's British Newspaper Archive database were incomplete runs. Therefore, 
before any searches were conducted, the available issues of newspapers held in the 
database were noted. For instance, while the Aberdeen Journal was available in a 
complete run between 1939 and 1948, the Bury Free Press was only available for the 
year 1948. Therefore, the limitations of the database—missing issues which had not 
been digitised—were considered. Having done so, a number of keywords and phrases 
were typed into search engines to retrieve newspaper content, the first, rather blunt 
phrase, being "German prisoners of war". This search provided tens of thousands of 
results in each database, as did "German prisoners". Two other phrases were also keyed 
into search engines: "Nazi prisoners" and "Hun prisoners". Furthermore, these words 
were then paired with abbreviation of prisoners of war: "German POW", "Nazi POW", 
and "Hun POW". The abbreviated searched produced far fewer results. Another set of 
                                            
62
 Adrian Bingham, 'Reading Newspapers: Cultural Histories of the Popular Press in Modern 
Britain', History Compass, 10: 2 (2012), 140-50, (p.141). 
63
 Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary Theory (London: 
Verso, 2005).  
28 
 
searches were also conducted. Rather than phrases, keywords were used: "German AND 
prisoner", "Nazi AND prisoner", "Hun and prisoner", also searching for the abbreviated 
variant "POW". An example of the search results taken from the British Newspaper 
Archive is provided below.  
 
 
Table 1 Full-text searches in regional newspapers 
 
On the one hand, these searches revealed that the subject was within the content of 
newspapers. On the other, sifting through such as mass of results was an immense task. 
The collection and analysis of newspaper content was therefore conducted at time 
period intervals. Rather than using the date parameter of 1939 to 1948, specific years 
were then searched, i.e. 1939, also certain periods, i.e. June 1944 to May 1945. Interval 
searches made collecting and analysing newspaper content far more manageable. 
Moreover, other content was occasionally retrieved during these specific time period 
searches. Finding the right keyword is imperative to successful database searches.  
 The quantitative data collected from search results should be assessed with 
caution. There are two pitfalls in particular. First, the terminology keyed into search 
engines may not retrieve results of any relevance to that topic in hand. For instance, 
search results for the phrase "German prisoners" or "German prisoners of war" could 
mean one of several things: the results could have been content regarding the subject of 
research—German prisoners of war held in Britain. 'German prisoners' could also refer 
to German civilian internees. Equally, the phrase could also refer to prisoners of war in 
German captivity, i.e. Allied prisoners, civilian internees, or perhaps concentration 
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camp inmates in German hands. Secondly, the scanning process, i.e. the method by 
which the physical item is transformed into a digital form, must be considered. While 
relevant content is certainly picked up by search engines, other relevant content is 
equally missed due to the inadequacies of the process. Therefore, the results gathered 
from digital archives are not infallible. With such a crude methodology, it is unwise to 
place significant interpretative weight on the results. However, what quantifying the 
results and visually displaying them in a graph has done is to point out possible time 
periods of significant interest, which can be explored through the second digital 
methodology. While digitisation has enabled new quantitative/distance readings of 
newspaper content, it has enabled rigorous qualitative/close reading as well. The time 
saved in searching for relevant contact is invested in reading the material gathered.  
 During the 1940s, Mass-Observation studied the attitudes of readers towards 
their newspapers. Between 1940 and 1948 the M-O panel was periodically asked to 
rank a number of opinion forming influences in order of their significance (see, Table 
2).64 Rankings demonstrated that over eight years the influence of the press declined. In 
1940, the influence of newspapers was lesser only to books and personal judgement. A 
year later the panellists were clearly more wary of opinions in the press, with personal 
experience also considered more significant, and by 1944 the opinions of friends and 
family joined these three factors—books, personal judgement, and personal 
experience—in being considered more influential on opinion formation than the press. 
It was not only the reliability newspaper content which came into increasing doubt over 
the period, similar patterns of changing opinion were found with radio and films. In the 
view of M-O, the war had a clear impact on attitudes towards the press which was 
thought to be biased and often regarded as sensationalist. As a result, there was an 
increased wariness towards newspaper content. Despite the trustworthiness of the press 
being bought into account, this was considered a minority group and M-O still regarded 
newspapers as a powerful former of public opinion in 1949. The power of the press to 
shape opinion lay in the subtle absorption of opinion by readers who engaged with the 
content uncritically. 
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Table 2 Mass-Observation Panellists ranking of opinion-forming influences 
 
While the majority of newspaper content is written by journalists, columnists, and 
editorials, newspaper readers also contributed in the form of letters. In their research 
into the attitudes of newspaper readers, M-O assessed the readership of correspondence 
columns, also known as letters to the editor. It was found that the popularity of letters 
was proportionate to their light-heartedness. In general, beyond the Daily Mirror  and 
Sunday Express which took advantage of this relationship, only a small proportion of 
newspaper readers admitted to reading the correspondence columns.65 Certainly, the 
subjects who write letters to newspaper editors are not representative of the wider 
readership. They are often more engaged in the subject of their letter than others—or 
with newspaper reading more generally—and had the time to spend composing their 
letter(s). In some cases an individual may have written only once on topic that irked 
them, others were habitual letter writers. Debates between two or more occasionally 
broke out, with replies and rebukes exchanged over several weeks, sometimes months. 
All letters were subject to the scrutiny of the editor they addressed, and ultimately the 
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 1940 1941 1942 1944 1946 1948 
Personal 
experience 
5 2 2 2 1 1 
Own 
opinion 
1 1 1 1 2 3 
Books 2 3 3 3 3 2 
Friends and 
family 
4 6 5 4 4 4 
Newspapers 3 4 4 5 5 5 
Recent 
travel and 
history 
6 7 6 7 6 6 
Radio 7 5 7 6 7 7 
Meetings 9 11 8 9 8 8 
Pamphlets 8 8 9 8 9 9 
Films 10 9 10 10 10 10 
Posters 12 12 12 12 11 12 
Public 
information 
and leaflets 
11 10 11 11 12 11 
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majority sent were thinned out through selection.  Yet, as a source they are still 
important despite these considerations. Within them are insights into how certain 
individuals responded to the stories they read and the events in their everyday lives. 
They engaged with broader issues, speaking to political, social, and cultural debates 
then in progress. The frequency and quantity of letters indicates the importance to 
newspaper readers of the particular topic they are concerned with.66   
 Like their printed counterpart, newsreels are also records which can be read to 
understand the narrative of events presented to the public. A product of the growth of 
cinema construction in the early twentieth century, newsreels—a collection of selected 
news items on a single film reel—were released twice a week in Britain between 1910 
and 1979. Typically, they were broadcast prior to feature films at cinemas and in 
dedicated newsreel theatres in major cities. The five major newsreel companies all 
imitated each other to a considerable degree, and the style and delivery of newsreels 
mimicked newspapers. In regards to their audience, statistical surveys suggest that by 
1940 the average weekly attendance at the 4618 cinemas open—a small number were 
closed during the Blitz—exceeded 21 million and that around half the population 
watched newsreels. In the late 1930s, the highest concentration of cinemas was in 
industrial areas of Scotland, the North of England, South Wales and the Midlands, while 
the lowest was in the Eastern Counties, Home Counties and the West of England. The 
availability of relatively cheap tickets—around 1 shilling at most—and the kind of 
programmes shown fostered a special relationship with the working class. During the 
war years, there was an increased middle class acceptance of the cinema, but this special 
relationship continued. The regular cinema attenders were from lower income groups.67 
Newsreels, as a source of primary information about the events they portrayed, are of 
peripheral value. However, as records of what a very large, socially important, and 
relatively little documented sections of the public saw and heard, they are of historical 
significance. Newsreels document popular obsessions, and are a useful barometer of 
social change and popular awareness.68 Historical understanding and value is also found 
when the production process is considered. It is not just the content that can be 
examined: assignment and commentary sheets, as well as shot lists survive which 
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illuminate editorial practice.69 During the war, they were indeed censored. The Ministry 
of Information recognised that newsreels, like short films and documentaries, were 
useful, more so than feature films, for direct, immediate, short-term information and 
instruction, particularly on the home front. As negative propaganda, that is the control 
of information, newsreels are comparable to other news media such as newspapers and 
radio.70 The Ministry controlled footage, shooting, editing and censoring the material 
provided newsreel companies. However, the newsreel companies could interpret the 
footage to a degree, which the different commentary for the same footage testifies. 
 The Mass-Observation (M-O) archive located at the University of Sussex and 
accessible through a searchable online database provides an essential source base for 
historians of Britain. 71  M-O generated a vast amount of material. There were two 
principal sources from which material was gathered. The first source was the volunteer 
panel, the 500 or so individuals who sent off their diaries and responded directly to 
questions in M-O directives and day surveys. These diaries were scoured for entries 
concerning attitudes towards and encounters with German POWs. Some diarists made 
only one passing mention of German POWs. Others regularly wrote of those they had 
befriended. The second source of material was collected from the M-O investigators 
who were paid to visit a variety of places to observe people's behaviour and eavesdrop. 
The material gathered was analysed and then summarised, written up as File Reports. 
These reports formed the basis of M-O publications. This thesis also made use of the 
Topic Collections, the material arranged by investigators by theme such as Air Raids 
and Demobilisation. There are limitations to the material gathered from M-O.  
 Material held at the Modern Records Centre located at Warwick University was 
consulted in relation to the employment and welfare of German POWs. The files of the 
Trades Union Congress provided insight into the attitudes of the various affiliated trade 
unions as well as discussions between the trade union movement and the British 
authorities regards the employment of German POWs. The papers of Victor Gollancz 
are also held at the MRC. Chairing the post-war pressure group Save Europe Now, 
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Gollancz campaigned on issues relating to the treatment of German POWs, notably their 
repatriation.  
 
Chapter outline 
 
This thesis is composed of five main chapters, divided into two parts. Chapters two and 
three discuss the wartime period, while chapters four, five, and six deal with the post-
war years, ending in 1948. Although broadly chronological, the framework is also 
thematic, reflecting the changing wartime, post-war, and emerging Cold War context as 
well as the variety of debates connected with German POWs and their treatment.  
 Chapter two explores attitudes towards German POWs and their treatment 
between September 1939 and December 1942. The period before D-Day is often 
considered insignificant and is rarely discussed in detail. This chapter demonstrates 
there was interest in the capture and conditions afforded German POWs, particularly 
during the phoney war. The treatment of German POWs was compared with that of 
British POWs in Germany during the First World War. Further, as this chapter 
examines, the recapture of British POWs from the German tanker Altmark provided 
some excitement during the 'Bore War'. Reportage underwent a significant change 
whereby distrust and danger characterised the landing of German POW captures, 
replacing the cordial reception during the months of phoney war. There were two 
episodes after the decision to remove German POWs was taken when the POW issue 
resurfaced in public discussion: a mooted exchange of POWs in October 1941 and a 
reprisal cycle known as the Shackling Crisis beginning in October 1942.      
 Continuing the survey of attitudes chronologically, chapter three examines the 
period between the Normandy landings in June 1944 and the unconditional surrender of 
Germany in May 1945. In contrast to the period examined in the previous chapter, the 
war against Germany had swung in favour of the Allies. This 'second wave' of German 
POWs entering Britain marked a departure from the earlier period. Yet, this period is 
characteristically different in another more important way. Two atrocities which were 
disclosed to the British public bookend the period: the execution of escapees from 
Stalag Luft III in June 1944 and the treatment of concentration camp inmates following 
the liberation of Belsen in April 1945. The latter had a profound impact on attitudes 
towards the treatment of German POWs. Breaking from the chronological survey of 
wartime attitudes, the second part of the thesis examines three interconnected debates 
regarding the treatment of German POWs in post-war Britain.  
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 Chapter four examines the employment of German POWs. Fond memories of 
German POW labourers were shared at the outbreak of war but calls to employ them 
were dismissed given that there were too few to be of real benefit to the economy. Calls 
to employ them were often not made out of retribution but of practicality: it gave 
something for the POWs to do, and would help plug labour gaps. The tone would 
radically alter in 1945; setting German POWs to work was seen as a legitimate form of 
reparations after the devastating conflict they had caused. Morality and justice aside, 
from the perspective of cabinet ministers German POWs were an essential post-war 
labour source, particularly in agriculture. With the repatriation of Italians, Germans 
were increasingly employed. The reasons why certain sections of the trade union 
movement resisted the employment of a useful labour source are explored.  
 Chapter five examines attitudes towards what is broadly defined as 'interactions' 
with German POWs. The employment remit of German POWs progressively widened 
from the initial experiment in 1944. Although a significant number were employed in 
the agricultural sector, directed into a variety of jobs by WAECs, German POWs could 
be found working in a number of sectors on a variety of tasks, as well as performing 
odd-jobs at private homes. Interactions between employers and their German POW 
labourers were policed by fraternisation regulations. Fraternisation regulations were 
criticised as petty, a continuation of hostile mentality mobilised to fight the war against 
Germany. What becomes apparent in the letters sent to newspaper editors and 
parliamentary questions is a desire for what John Horne initially coined as 'cultural 
demobilisation'.72 Studies of German POWs have focused on fraternisation regulations 
and re-education policy examining how German POWs, ignorant and sceptical of the 
workings of democracy, were re-orientated onto democratic lines. Seeking a new 
outlook, chapter four examines the broader desire for German POWs to participate in 
civil society as a means to mitigate the tedium routine and mental stress of captivity as 
well as fostering understanding between former enemies within the emerging context of 
the Cold War.  
 The final theme, which out of the three examined vexed the British public the 
most, is the repatriation, or rather lack of a progressive repatriation scheme for, German 
POWs. In tandem with the calls to relax fraternisation regulations and allow German 
POWs to participate in British life were appeals to draw up a progressive scheme of 
repatriation. As with confining them to camps, detaining German POWs indefinably 
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was thought to be endangering future Anglo-German relations and, in the emerging 
Cold War context, undermining the British image, pushing German POWs and/or their 
families at home towards communism. Chaired by the charismatic left-wing publisher 
turned philanthropist Victor Gollancz, Save Europe Now, a post-war campaign which 
developed into a pressure group, took concerns over the continued indefinite detention 
of German POWs straight to the Attlee administration. The chapter explores the 
arguments for the drawing up of a repatriation scheme, the presentation of a petition to 
Prime Minister Attlee by SEN, and the cabinet discussion and response. 
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Chapter 2: 1939-1942 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the period between the outbreak of war in September 1939 and 
the unchaining of German POWs in December 1942—this event will be explained 
below. The first section assesses news coverage of the capture of German POWs and 
the conditions afforded them in British camps during the period of 'phoney war'. 
Through a reading of newspaper and newsreel content, a picture of the reception of 
German POWs is sketched. The cordial relationship between captor and captive which 
emerges in the media is explained by considering the cultural connection of sporting 
attitudes in wartime, the lack of militarist spirit, and the portrayal of the Nazi leadership 
as Britain's principal enemy. Drawing on the work of Heather Jones, it is suggested that 
fair play was a recurring cultural factor in discussions of POW treatment, one which 
will be traced throughout this dissertation. Despite being a divisive issue, both praise 
and criticism of the treatment of German POWs drew upon the rhetoric of fair play and 
decency. The second section examines the Altmark incident. On first reading, this 
incident had little to do with German POWs and their treatment. Yet, understanding that 
British self-image was in part constructed against the German enemy, the treatment of 
British POWs aboard the Altmark is worthy of consideration. In contrast to the fair 
treatment of German POWs, reportage of the treatment of British POWs aboard the 
Altmark exaggerated the horrific conditions they were subjected to and the malevolent 
behaviour of the captain. The third section examines news coverage of German POWs 
during the 'fifth column' scare and after, when, under the new Churchill administration 
it was decided to transport German POWs along with enemy civilian internees to the 
dominions. During this time a hostile tone was adopted towards German POWs which 
had emerged during the Altmark affair. Media interest in German POWs and their 
treatment declined after the decision was taken to transport to the dominions. This is not 
to suggest they disappeared from newspapers and newsreels, as occasional articles 
continued to appear in newspapers and newsreels. Furthermore, there were two 
flashpoints when the POW issue aroused public interest again during this period. The 
fourth section examines the mooted exchange of POWs in October 1941 before and 
after it was cancelled. Here, hopes that British and German POWs would be repatriated 
were dashed at the last minute. The fifth section examines attitudes towards the 
manacling of German POWs in October-December 1942, during the Shackling Crisis. 
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As will be seen, while Churchill made a defiant stance by retaliating, by and large the 
British public were uncomfortable with the manacling of German POWs. Parallel 
attitudes are drawn with the bombing of German cities.   
 Studies of German POWs in Britain during the time period considered in this 
chapter have focused on the development of British POW policy and Anglo-German 
relations regarding the POW issue. British authorities showed little interest in both 
German and British POWs during the phoney war. 1  Indeed, POWs were rarely 
discussed at cabinet meetings. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and 
Kingsley Wood, and Secretary of State for Air, informed ministers of sporadic captures 
of Kriegsmarine from U-boats and Luftwaffe pilots. 2  Only one memorandum was 
circulated at cabinet level in December 1939 on German POWs. Prepared by the 
Department of Enemy Propaganda it discussed the 250 German POWs then held in 
Britain. Although their morale was 'high and their attitudes inclined to be defiant', they 
were not 'hostile'. Given the ignorance of the POWs of events outside Europe and their 
'exaggerated admiration for Hitler', some sort of future political re-education was 
recommended.3 While German POWs aroused little interest in official circles, their 
capture and arrival prompted public discussion. With little actual fighting, the treatment 
of POWs became an early means to discuss British self-image and the image of the 
German enemy.  
 
2. The 'phoney war', September 1939 to January 1940  
Contrary to apocalyptic expectations, inaction followed Neville Chamberlain's 
broadcast on 3 September 1939 that a state of war now existed with Germany. Richard 
Overy overstates the despairing prognosis for civilisation touted by British intellectuals 
and scientists during what he terms 'The Morbid Age'.4 Yet, when the thoughts of mass-
observers turned to a recurrent major war in late August and early September 1939, 'one 
is', a file report summarised, 'deeply aware of the sense of doom that lay over the 
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country [and] the feeling that the end of all things is at hand'.5 With the upheaval of 
'total war' having already been experienced, the public in 1939 had, Robert Mackay 
argues, a 'fairly clear idea of what a major war would be like'.6 After the Zeppelin raids 
during the First World War the distinction between combatant and civilian, home and 
fighting fronts was blurred. The experience demonstrated the vulnerability of the British 
civilian population in a future conflict.7 Cinemagoers could envisage the destruction 
wrought on British cities in another war, having witnessed the razing of Madrid and 
Guernica during the Spanish Civil War and Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War in 1937 newsreels. The 'next war' was imagined in literature and film, most notably 
the 1933 novel The Shape of Things to Come by H. G. Wells. The 1936 film adaptation 
opened with the levelling of 'Everytown', an obvious parody of London, in 1940. 8 
Orwell also forewarned of the imminent arrival of enemy squadrons overhead through 
his protagonist George Bowling in Coming Up for Air .9 In the actual event, reality did 
not match end of the world expectations. Air raid sirens blared unnecessarily and 3.5 
million were evacuated to escape the anticipated devastation. Evacuees slowly returned 
home as the reality of the Bore War set in.10 Masses of enemy aircraft loaded with an 
incendiary and poison gas payload that would unleash Armageddon on British cities did 
not materialise. Instead, eight months of 'phoney war' ensued. 'The whole country', M-O 
reflected, 'had been keyed up to the highest pitch of tension and had undergone 
tremendous emotional and material upheavals to meet a catastrophe which did not 
come'.11  
 Sporadic captures of German POWs in late 1939 provided an indication of 
ongoing conflict between Britain and Germany. The arrival of a group of U-boat 
captives at a British port was, as Pathe newsreel commentator Bob Danvers-Walker 
declared, 'living proof that once more an enemy vessel of war has been destroyed'.12 
Reprinting a Ministry of Information statement, newspapers reported that the first 
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German POWs arrived on 21 September.13 The short article noted that POWs 'laughed 
when a woman in a small group of spectators at a station shouted, "Hard luck, mate," to 
which a prisoner replied "Not so hard."'14 Subsequent articles in late 1939 portrayed a 
similarly cordial reception and relaxed atmosphere between captor and captive, with 
POWs smiling and waving to spectators which had gathered to inspect them at ports, 
railway stations, and the roadside.15 Curiosity over the captured Germans was evident at 
Glen Mill in Oldham, Lancashire where the resident POWs quickly became a local 
attraction. Accommodating the 'other ranks', Glen Mill was one of two initial POW 
camps; the other being Grizedale Hall in Ambleside which held officers. Shortly after 
the arrival of the first POWs, on 24 September, a Daily Mail journalist reported that 
they had 'joined the hundreds of people who climbed the slopes overlooking a disused 
mill in the hope of seeing 40 German prisoners of war'. Since the arrival of the POWs, 
the crowds had scaled the vantage point each day to view the captives.16 Reportage 
suggests that the dominant reaction of the public towards German POWs was curiosity 
rather than demonstration. As well as being a novelty during an uneventful conflict, the 
German POWs were perhaps the first 'real' Germans the voyeurs on the Lancashire 
hilltop had seen in the flesh.   
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 The scenes at Glen Mill echoed those at Frimley Common twenty five years 
before, where, in 1914 German POWs were watched marching to the camp. Assessing 
the reception of German POWs in Britain during the Great War, Panayi notes that the 
dominant reaction of the public was curiosity.17 According to Brian Feltman British 
civilians were generally 'rather indifferent' to German POWs, although some 
'occasionally received an unexpectedly warm welcome to the U.K.'. In contrast, POWs 
met 'frenzied excitement that sometimes erupted into violence' in France and 
Germany.18 This is not to suggest violence was totally absent from the home front. Anti-
German riots occurred in the wake of the sinking of the Lusitania .19 Yet, as Jones 
contends, powerful cultural factors acted against the radicalisation of POW treatment 
witnessed in France and Germany. She suggests that it was the British notion of fair 
play, epitomised by the poem 'Vitai Lampada', which acted to constrain POW abuse.20  
 The continued relationship between war and sport was observed by M-O. The 
outbreak of war resulted in general disorganisation for most sports, with limitations set 
on crowd capacity, the requisition of premises, and the calling up of professionals being 
the main difficulties faced. 21  At the end of November 1939, M-O asked 'sports 
followers' if the war had altered their interest in sport: 48 per cent answered that the war 
had lessened their interest in sport; 9 per cent answered that it had increased their 
interest; and, 43 per cent stated that they retained their peace-time interest. 22  'The 
people', M-O suggested, 'brought up on mass sports (where they sit and watch without 
taking part) look to the war for a similar show'.23 Furthermore, Harrisson and Madge 
speculated that:  
 
If the war had immediately become more dramatic, and displayed the same 
elements of contest and conflict between two sides or moieties, which is the 
dominant interest in most sports (where the spectator also identifies himself with 
one particular side), then the sport habit might have been even much more 
seriously reduced.24  
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This evidence suggests that the relationship between war and sport continued into the 
Second World War, and the notion of fair play returned in discussions of the treatment 
of POWs. Understanding that the treatment of enemy POWs was an expression of 
internal values, a Yorkshire Post journalist argued that: 'Our reputation for good 
treatment of prisoners of war is too valuable to lose. Were we to abandon it, we should 
be renouncing those ideals of humanity and fair play which we have gone to war to 
defend'.25 In February 1940, the Yorkshire Post quoted the Chairman of Grimsby Health 
Committee who stated: 'I am informed by the doctor that the sportsmanship of the 
Englishman is so apparent that the third hand of the trawler which rescued them has 
visited the hospital and presented the wounded pilot with cigarettes'.26 Fair play was a 
central cultural consideration in the treatment of enemy POWs in 1939 as it had been in 
the last war.  
 Violence meted out on enemy POWs in 1914, according to Heather Jones, was 
fuelled by xenophobia. With hatred of the enemy being an integral part of national 
mobilisation and the development of war culture, it in turn motivated violence against 
POWs.27  In 1939, Chamberlain's declaration of a state of war was not met with a 
patriotic outpouring. 'Never before in the whole history of mankind', M-O reflected, 'can 
a people have embarked on a  major war with such total absence of martial spirit as was 
displayed by this country on September 3rd 1939'.28 While Arthur Marwick quipped, 
that 'Other countries had revolutions; Britain had a Coupon Election', there was 
significant fear that the First World War had brutalised society. 29  Rioting in 1919, 
violent crimes committed by ex-soldiers and the ferocity of the Black and Tan war all 
provided evidence of a process of brutalisation. Yet, anti-militarist attitudes prevailed 
and, in contrast to German, violence was not legitimised in post-war Britain. 30 
'Paradoxically', Jon Lawrence argues, 'apocalyptic postwar visions suggesting that 
civilisation had been undone by the brutality of war served only to strengthen mythic 
views of Britain as a uniquely peaceable kingdom'.31 Rejecting the militarism of the 
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Great War, 'the British—rulers and ruled alike—found reassurance in the belief that 
they were a uniquely peaceable people'.32 The watchword of the 1930s was 'Never 
Again', as David Reynolds reminds us. 33  Even with the outbreak of war, the 
commitment to finding a peaceful solution remained, evidenced by 2,435 joining the 
Peace Pledge Union in September 1939, followed by another 2,280 in October.34  
 In conjunction with the rejection of militarism, the inter-war period witnessed 
the cultivation of a more courteous British self-image. Charting the reformation of 
interwar English national character, Mandler argues that the image of John Bull was 
unsuited to the modern Englishman. Strube's 'Little Man', appearing in the Daily 
Express, exemplified a new national character which was less aggressive and more 
gentlemanly.35 Stereotypical masculine representations of the nation as great heroes and 
adventures in foreign places tapered as the home and ordinariness became pillars in the 
construction of national identity.36 During the Second World War, a tempered British 
masculinity of was contrasted to the hyper-masculine Nazi Other.37 Attempting to pin 
down their national characteristics in 1941, George Orwell wrote that 'The gentleness of 
the English civilization is perhaps its most marked characteristic'.38 
 In addition to the ideal of fair-play and the lack of marital spirit, a final factor 
helps explain the cordial reception of German POWs in 1939. Reportage of the 
reception of German POWs aided the differentiation of the ordinary German from the 
Nazi leadership, Hitler and his cronies being the principal enemy rather than the 
German people. The atmosphere was amiable at the Scottish port where five officers 
and 38 crew of the U-35 disembarked a British destroyer on 3 December.39 Hundreds of 
Royal Navy sailors 'cheered' and 'waved their caps' to the POWs as they alighted. 
Amongst the 'good humoured sallies', British sailors encouraged the Germans to 'Get a 
transfer' and 'Come and join the Navy'. Singled out by the sailors, one particular POW 
received 'a special cheer'. Fluent in English, he 'had made himself popular with his 
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captors'. A 'flaxen-haired youth', the German was greeted as 'Blondie'. Hurrying down 
the gangway, the British sailors sang 'Good old Blondie' in chorus. Last to go ashore, 
the commander of the U-boat, 'a strongly-built young man', made his way down the 
gangway, and given a 'warm welcome'. Shaking hands with the British officers, his 
departure was greeted with vigorous applause 'as if in a token of some heroic act'. The 
German POWs were 'given a remarkably friendly send-off by their captors'. Having 
distributed cigarettes amongst the German POWs, the British sailors cheered them as 
buses drove them to their camps. The POWs replied by waving their hands.40 Pictures in 
newspapers accompanying articles describing the disembarkation of the U-boat POWs 
showed them smiling for the camera and sharing cigarettes with British sailors. 
Newsreel commentators observed the camaraderie between German and British sailors. 
'They may be enemies', Lesile Mitchell of British Movietone commented, 'but the 
tradition of the sea is one of courtesy between victor and vanquished, and Britain knows 
how to treat her prisoners'.41 Pathe similarly observed 'no enmity between them and 
jack tar'.42 The cordial rapport between captor and captive emphasised in reportage of 
the disembarkation of the U-boat crew underscored the idea that there was no animosity 
between the British and the ordinary German, feeding into the official view that the war 
was against Hitler and the Nazi leadership, not the German nation. 
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Image 1 Western Morning News, 5 December 1939, p. 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2 Aberdeen Press, 5 December 1939, p. 1. 
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Pamphlets published by the Ministry of Information in 1939 professed that the Nazi 
leadership was the principal enemy being fought, and were remorseful that war had 
broken out between British and Germans. Providing an in-depth analysis of German 
history in Why we are fighting Germany, D. A. Routh explained that once again the 
German people had allowed their nation to be ruled by agressive and ruthless 
individuals.43 The German nation was not beyond salvation if National Socialism could 
be overthrown. In Assurance to Victory, the German people were viewed as victims of 
Nazi tyranny. Hitler had 'trampled on' their rights just as he had done in Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.44 Similarly, Hitler and the Working Man exonerated the 
German people from blame for the failings of National Socialism.45 Ian McLaine argues 
that this particular pamphlet was 'symptomatic of the extent to which the spirit of 
appeasement still pervaded the Chamberlain government'. 46  Yet, the camaraderie 
expressed during encounters between German captive and British captor concerned a 
section of the public which viewed the war differently.  
 'Our lack of appreciation of the true character and mentality of the Germans', 
bemoaned Major-General Ernest Swinton in his weekly review of the war in the Daily 
Mail, 'is sometimes shown by our treatment of prisoners'.  
 
But when one thinks of the sinking without warning of merchant vessels, the 
drowning of passengers and crews, the fate of widows and orphans, and when 
one recalls the horrors of Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, and German concentration 
camps, any question of camaraderie with the perpetrators of these crimes seems 
singularly out of place. A sense of proportion is required. Neither during the 
war, nor after, can we afford to indulge in this kind of camaraderie. This is not a 
sporting contest and there can be no rest for until the enemy's claws are drawn 
once for all. Well might we leave the greater part of the framing of the peace to 
our French ally, whose sterner logic will save him from the pitfall of a false 
sentimentality.47 
 
For Swinton, the camaraderie expressed between the captured Germans U-boat crew 
and their Royal Navy captors symbolised the failure of the British people to grasp the 
reality that it was the aggressive expansionism of the German nation, not just the 
ambitions of Hitler, which was being fought against. The 'nice distinctions' between the 
German people and Nazis, and idea that Britain had no dispute with the German nation 
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was a serious delusion. At the same time, Swinton stated: 'I am no advocate of brutality 
to prisoners of war. They should be properly housed and fed and kept in good health'.48 
Swinton was not alone and others shared his views. Penning a letter to the Yorkshire 
Post, M. W. Oakwood asked, 'How much longer is this nauseating rubbish to continue 
of U-boat crews being welcomed on landing?'.49 Their brother-in-law a merchantman 
captain, Oakwood reminded readers that the British sailors shook hands with the very 
men who had murdered innocent merchant seaman. Applauding Oakwood, Tyekbor, 
was equally 'sick' after reading of the reception of POWs at ports. 'The statement that 
we are not fighting the German people is at the bottom of much of this rot. We are 
fighting them all, till the canker is definitely cut out of the German nation'. 50 
Contributing to the discussion, a former POW similarly dismissed the sentiment 
expressed towards German POWs. In sharing his experience of captivity during the last 
war, the ex-POW emphasised 'the brutal methods used then by the Germans', noting the 
poor food, arduous labour, and daily beatings they received from their guards. By 
recounting the brutality he suffered, the ex-POW hoped to reveal to readers what he 
considered to be the innate callousness of the average German.51 
 Others too pointed towards the cruelty shown British POWs in German hands 
during the Great War. Writing to the Gloucestershire Echo a Lieutenant Colonel found 
it 'extraordinary how the myth of the good, kind German still exists'. He asked: 'Are the 
barbarities inflicted on British prisoners of war entirely forgotten?'52 Some evidently 
had not. In the Yorkshire Post, Ernest Phillips noted that 'the inhuman treatment of 
prisoners of war' was one 'German contribution to civilised warfare'.53 As these letters 
indicate, the memory of POW abuse was vented in the first months of the war.  
 Narratives of violence towards POWs were repressed during the inter-war 
period. Incapable of integrating it into the narrative of the war, Heather Jones suggests, 
after 1921 POW mistreatment was expediently forgotten in post-war societies. The 
'memory of the prisoner of war', Jones suggests,  
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was ultimately marginalised because it invariably invoked the question of 
violence against prisoners. This in turn raised the question of who were the 
perpetrators of that violence. In an interwar Europe that lionised ex-servicemen, 
few were comfortable facing that question.54  
 
Memories of POW mistreatment were suppressed during the inter-war period in the 
attempt to forge international co-operation and peace.55 Now in a state of war, memories 
of POW abuse were aired in order to demonise the enemy. While the warm welcome of 
German POWs upset ex-POWs, it would be the conditions afforded them in camps 
which would truly insult them.  
 In addition to publicising the arrival of German POWs, the press and newsreels 
depicted them in camps. The Guardian reported that a chief concern of the POWs had 
been a lack of cigarettes until a British officer had generously bought a supply for them. 
Their only desire was now was for their menu to include more potatoes and less meat.56 
In a caption to a picture of German POWs playing football, The Times noted that 'It is 
well recognized that the lot of the prisoner of war in this country is by no means 
unhappy'.57 The Daily Mail depicted a usual Sunday routine of the German POWs, 
which included a trip to the camp barbers. The captives were shown preparing and 
sitting down to enjoy their 'midday meal of roast beef, vegetables, and a sweet'. 58 
Similar pictures appeared in several newspapers. Depicting German POWs in a camp, a 
Pathe newsreel observed, during a shot of a POW carving meat for other POWs, that, 
'it's at meal times they find the biggest improvement on home. There's a fair share of 
everything, and he's just heard you don't have to spread guns on their bread'.59 Leslie 
Mitchell commenting on similar scenes in a Movietone newsreel noted that, 'Well 
housed and well fed, the German prisoners of war seem quite contented with their 
luck'.60 In parliament, Hore-Belisha, secretary of state for war, assured the house that 
'German prisoners of war are being well fed and well treated, and have shown 
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themselves much impressed by the marked difference between actual conditions in this 
country and the picture which they had been put before them in Germany'.61  
 One particular camp was singled out in reportage, and would receive similar 
criticism as Donnington Hall did during the First World War. While the press was 
forbidden from revealing the location of the camp, it is clearly Grizedale Hall. An 
article published in October 1939 described the comfortable conditions afforded the 
residents: 
 
German U-boat officers who have been taken prisoner by the British Navy are 
now in captivity in what was once a hikers' hostel on the rolling Westmorland 
fells. They are guarded by bemedalled veterans of National Defence Companies, 
and they enjoy the conditions of an expensive spa than that of a prisoner of war 
camp. The venue is hidden away several miles from a railway station, says the 
Ministry of Information, and the local cottagers have nicknamed the camp the 
"U-boat hotel." It was once a country house and was then converted into a 
hikers' hostel. The massive stone building, which dominates the few white 
cottages nearby, is closely protected by barbed wire entanglements which can be 
floodlit at night. The German naval officers have the benefit of a library in 
which is a full-sized ping-pong table. They feed in a large oak panelled hall, and 
though the fare is not exactly "ritzy," it is good and obviously appreciated. One 
English-speaking prisoner remarked after a heavy lunch, "this is better than 
being chased by the British Navy." […]. Officers are voluntarily employed in 
what their captors call "Kaiser Bill's hobby"—chopping wood. The prisoners 
have already had a visit from the local bishop who is arranging a supply of 
German books which will be censored, if necessary, by the Commandant. They 
also play football. At present they have to utilise a tennis pitch which somewhat 
handicaps their style, but they are hoping when they have made their own 
ground to do better things "mit ball." In the evenings they enjoy sing-songs 
around the grand piano. The average age of the U-boat officers is about 24. All 
are now fit and healthy, and the commandant declares that their discipline is 
excellent.62 
 
Publishing pictures of the camp (images, 3, 4, 5), the Daily Mail invited readers to 
'Come with a camera to the north of England', and view the excellent conditions 
afforded Gerrman sailors and airmen at the 'U-boat Hotel'.63 
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Image 3 Daily Mail, 15 November 1939, p. 12. 
 
Image 4 Daily Mail, 15 November 1939, p. 12. 
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Image 5 Daily Mail, 15 November 1939, p. 12. 
The Daily Mail pictured German officers strolling, under slack guard, warming 
themselves at the fire side in the lounge where they listened to BBC broadcasts, and 
gathering round the piano in the evening. Grizedale was considered much more a 
holiday resort, hostel, or spa than a POW camp, the only similarities being the barbed 
wire and guards.  
 In late November 1939, 21 German prisoners were held at the camp, which 
could accommodate 200, at a cost of £50 per day. Outraged, Colonel Josiah 
Wedgewood (Lab. Newcastle-under-Lyme) asked the secretary of state for war, Hore-
Belisha, 'Would it not be cheaper to keep them at the Ritz […]?'64 In the Yorkshire Post, 
the juxtaposition of two pictures implicitly suggested a leisurely experience of captivity 
in British hands compared to Germans. A picture depicting 'German U-boat prisoners, 
exercising in the grounds of a country house in England' was adjacent to one of 'Polish 
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prisoners of war, under supervision of a German officer, set to doing reconstruction 
work in the former province of Posen'.65 The conditions afforded German POWs were 
compared to the British civilian. That German POWs would attempt to escape from the 
comfortable surroundings of the British POW camp was thought 'ungrateful' by the 
London correspondent of the Nottingham Evening Post.  
 
We intern them under conditions which most hard-working Britons would 
regard as ideal for a summer holiday, and which contrast quite sensationally 
with their own concentration camps. Yet they persist in escaping, possible 
because the control is so slipshod as to make the temptation irrespirable. Yet if 
these incidents keep on recurring, even our tolerant British public may being to 
grow slightly restive. […]. Some U-boat prisoners, who are residing in an old 
baronial mansion, declared the other day that their only lack was cigars. If this 
oversight on the part of the authorities has now been made good, one trusts it is 
with German, not Havana, cigars. That might make the punishment fit the 
crime.66  
 
On 8 December 1939, J. B. Dunmore wrote to the Yorkshire Post comparing the 
treatment of German POWs and local Anti-aircraft units. They were 'heartily sick of 
articles and illustrations in various papers' which told of German POWs being well 
received, with 'a mattress, bolster, pillow and four blankets, and comfortable bunks, and 
good plain food, well cooked'. Local A. A. units posted at their lonely sites, Dunmore 
noted, 'would welcome' these conditions. 'Why not', Dunmore asked, 'look after the 
comfort of our own lads who are doing their bit to help to defeat a ruthless enemy?'67 'I 
think we must have gone mad', wrote another. 'What bitter reading it is for those who 
have lost their loved ones and those who have loved ones in danger'.68 'Don't let us treat 
these Germans as pals when in our hands. We can be humane, but the "tuck me into 
bed" treatment should be over, after what we read of the way the enemy conducts 
themselves in warfare to master the world and ourselves'.69 
 On 17 November 1939, Victor Burne wrote to the Gloucestershire Echo 
contrasting his experience as a POW in Germany during the last war to the treatment of 
German POWs depicted in recent newspapers. While British POWs 'were treated worse 
than pigs', many dying as a result of poor diet, German POWs were being lavishly 
treated in respect to their accommodation and food. Burne wondered what other ex-
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POWs made of this, and asked 'Why this wonderful treatment'.70 Two responded to 
Burne's letter a few days later, one echoing his sentiment.71 The second took issue with 
Burne's implicit accusation that he and other British POWs had been deliberately 
mistreated by their German captors. T.F.M. reminded Burne that the British blockade 
had 'made food scare very quickly, and that rationing was in force from the first'. In the 
situation it was not surprising that the Germans had provided for their own before 
enemy POWs. Supporting their statement, furthermore, T.F.M. noted they had attended 
a lecture given by a former Ruhleben internee who made 'no complaint whatever' of 
mistreatment.72 Burne found support from three fellow ex-POWs who wrote to the Echo 
recounting their own experiences of captivity. Arduous forced labour and near 
starvation rations were prominent themes in their letters. Furthermore the deliberate 
cruelty of the German captors was implicitly and explicitly referred to. 73  Having 
unleashed a wave of criticism, T.F.M. argued that the majority readers would differ 
from the views of Burne, maintaining the maltreatment of British POWs in Germany 
during the last war was not intentional and had been exaggerated: 'The fact was that 
these, like most of the "atrocities," were committed in Fleet-street'.74 The allegation that 
the press fabricated the atrocities committed by German proved explosive.  
 In response to the allegation that the violence against British POWs was 
invented in the press, overstated for propaganda purposes, several ex-POWs of the 
Great War wrote to the Echo describing their experiences at length.  Rowley Lewis 
challenged T.F.M. noting that his POW diary contained, 'many instances of the brutality 
which the Hun inflicted'. British POWs were subject to physical violence—'lashed, 
kicked to death, cuffed, and butted with rifles'—while carrying out their work under 
continual attack from British shell-fire and aircraft. In his view, the Germans were 
uncivilised, ignoring the laws of war both then and during the current conflict: 'The 
Hague Convention, meant nothing—no more than it does to-day in the wanton 
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destruction of defenceless women and children by submarine and mine warfare on the 
high seas'.75 In response to Lewis, T.F.M noted that a report had confirmed that most of 
the atrocities were inventions.76  M.G.W., writing soon after recounted the dysentery 
and starvation which marked his experience of German captivity. Although the 
treatment was brutal in the last war, they did not advocate revenge.  
 
And now, I say that the German prisoners should not be treated "soft." Feed 
them on an equal ration, keep them fit, and make them work. Treat them fairly, 
and finish at that. British prisoners of war get no sympathy from "T.F.M." 
because they are fighting men. Some of us still prefer to fight a bully to putting 
up with him. Mankind needs neither force nor humbug. A militant spirit for 
economic and social justice, irrespective of race, colour, or creed, he does need; 
and, above all, less self in leadership. Only a bullet can remove some of the 
rulers on earth. It is a nasty position for the people to be in.77 
 
T.F.M. was lambasted again by another, who argued that if T.F.M. had first-hand 
experience of captivity they would not hold their present ideas. Having been nursing in 
a V.A.D. hospital for most of the war, X had been informed of the 'hell' British POWs 
had gone through in German camps—being 'hit with sticks, belts, swords, and anything 
else handy, and floggings with "the rubber" were all too frequent'.78 In the same issue, 
L. A. Cole wrote that they could not understand why T.F.M. would question the 
authenticity of the men who had described their ill-treatment as POWs.79 T.F.M. argued 
that 'there is always a tendency to exaggerate such horrors when they pander to popular 
antipathies'. They repeated that they did not condone the brutalities that took place, but 
these were primarily caused by a lack of supplies.80 On 19 December, an anonymous 
writer who had worked with British intelligence during the First World War noted that 
captured documents taken from German POWs and dead were proof of the 'exceptional 
inhumanity' which was not 'manufactured for British propaganda'. The writer noted that 
the content of the documents which described 'murder, ill-usage of women, arson, 
robbery and gross bullying of armed civilians' were not considered regrettable actions, 
rather 'as evidence of irresistible German might'. Furthermore, these actions embodied 
Nazism in all but name.81 Although tired of the debate, COMMON SENSE suggested 
that the discussion of what happened in German camps during the First World War was 
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a waste of paper; examples of the German 'brutish mentality' were being witnessed 
everyday on the sea—referring to the submarine and mine warfare.82 
 Before the debate ended, two ex-POWs wrote to balance the record of the 
German treatment of POWs. V. D. Ventris-Field recounted how a German officer saved 
his life and wrote of German guards sharing food with British POWs. He concluded that 
he suffered no intentional brutality from his German captors. There were many atrocity 
stories but it was clear that there were 'good and bad, kind and brutal Germans, and in 
our treatment of German prisoners during the present war we should be considerate and 
just with them in accordance with British principles'.83 Another ex-POW agreed stating 
that although it was impossible to exaggerate the sufferings of British POWs in the 
latter months of the war they did not believe that it was intentional. In their experience 
of captivity, there had also been 'good and bad Germans'.84  
 The debate in the Gloucestershire Echo while idiosyncratic nevertheless 
provides insight into attitudes towards the treatment of German POWs and the legacy of 
Great War captivity. The debate centred on whether or not the sufferings of British 
POWs during the Great War were intentionally caused by their German captors. While 
the majority of ex-POWs recounted the suffering deliberately inflicted by their captors, 
a minority contested this view recounting benevolent acts. Although they might well 
have harboured vengeful attitudes, violence or retribution towards German POWs in 
British hands was not advocated by any correspondent. What irked former POWs was 
the idea that Britain treated enemy POWs above and beyond what was necessary.  
 Nearing the first Christmas of the war, rumours leaked of British civilians 
sending German POWs festive gifts. In the Nottingham Evening Post, a columnist 
despaired that German POWs, who in their view were all 'enthusiastic young Nazis, and 
hero-worshippers of Hitler', were 'inundated with Christmas gifts in the shape of cigars, 
cigarettes, and seasonable fare from sentimental admirers' across Britain. Such 'Good 
Samaritanism' did not, however, extend to the guards at POW camps. The columnist 
was perplexed by this view of the enemy, asking 'How can anyone explain this sort of 
mentality?'85 In the Portsmouth Evening News, another journalist similarly thought that 
this was 'an atrocious state of affairs'. This 'maudlin sentimentality' was considered 
misplaced, with refugees who had left to Britain from persecution in Germany a group 
                                            
82
 'German Mentality', Gloucestershire Echo, 23 December 1939, p. 3.  
83
 V. D. Ventris-Field, 'No Intentional Brutality By His Captors', Gloucestershire Echo, 28 
December 1939, p. 4. 
84
 'Returning Briton's Gifts to Germans', Gloucestershire Echo, 2 January 1940, p. 4. 
85
 'Echoes from Town', Nottingham Evening Post, 21 December 1939, p. 4. 
55 
 
from more deserving of Christmas gifts. Individuals who were sending comforts to the 
captives obviously did not realize that these POWs were responsible for the deaths of 
their compatriots:  
 
Obsessed by the feeling that the prisoners may well be lonely at Christmas, they 
do not seem to appreciate that many of the Germans are U-boat men whose 
activities have bereaved the wives and children of unarmed merchant seamen 
since September 3; and that others belong to that set of German airmen which is 
now busily gunning fishermen as they scramble into rowing boat after their 
trawlers have been bombed.86 
 
Despite such attacks, organising comforts for German POWs continued into the New 
Year. In March 1940, Vyvyan Adams, (Con. Leeds West), asked Oliver Stanley—Hore-
Belisha's replacement as secretary of state for war—to forbid a relief committee, chaired 
by Helmut Schroeder, from sending parcels to German POWs; the committee had sent 
several circulars to British people asking for donations to assist. However, despite 
Stanley's agreement that 'such a practice was both unnecessary and undesirable', given 
that they were 'already adequately provided for', he had no power to prevent Schroeder's 
Committee from doing so.87 While the government did nothing to prevent it, gifts and 
aid sent to German POWs were considered misplaced, the POWs were well provided 
for and there were more deserving groups, particularly British soldiers. Although 
criticised, those that did send presents to German POWs in Christmas 1939 were 
considered overly sentimental not disloyal. Reports of sympathy towards POWs and the 
perceived indulgence of the enemy irritated the public. A survey conducted by the Daily 
Mail revealed that sympathy for German POWs was one of the main complaints of its 
readers. Commenting on the result of the survey, to which thousands were said to have 
responded, Montague Smith noted that 'complaints against coddling German prisoners, 
and others that too few Germans have been interned is a very significant indication of 
the rising temper of the nation'.88 
 
3. The Altmark incident  
By the turn of the year, 'the war still seemed to remain at a standstill'. With few outlets 
for the 'violent terrors and excitements' there was 'mass frustration and anxiety'.89 In 
February 1940, the liberation of British POWs from the German tanker Altmark 
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stimulated both propagandists and public who had yearned for excitement during a 
stagnant war. M-O diarists recorded their excitement and cheerfulness. In London, an 
ARP attended wrote that 'The news of the release of the 300 prisoners on the "altmark" 
brightened me up a bit. The Whole crew (ARP Post) were thrilled by it. This was more 
like the adventurous colourful world of old!'90 'Wherever you go' a similarly excited 
female journalist in London wrote, 'people's eyes dance with glee about the […] 
Altmark. The tonic value of this is enormous […]'. 91  Magarey Davis, a cookery 
demonstrator in Kent, was 'thrilled by the thought of that shout "Any Englishmen 
below? We are the Royal Navy!"'.92 More than simply breaking the monotony of war 
news, the Altmark incident stimulated anti-German sentiment with the conditions and 
captors aboard the ship being portrayed as horrendous and cruel.  
 On 17 February, Churchill informed the cabinet that the ship, which had been 
resupplying the Graf Spee, had been identified the previous afternoon by RAF aircraft. 
The Altmark had been subsequently pursued into Jossing Fjord by a British destroyer 
flotilla, boarded and the British captives freed.93 Making a statement in parliament, 
Chamberlain congratulated the Royal Navy for the 'admirably conducted operation', the 
rescue of the 299 British POWs evoking the spirit of Nelson and Trafalgar, and a 
'notable addition to its annals'. More than a heroic tale, the intervention of the Royal 
Navy had saved the British POWs from, as Albert Alexander stated, 'a durance vile'.94 
The Sunday Pictorial wrote how the British sailors had gained: 
 
[…] freedom from a hell ship, freedom from a four-month confinement in 
stinking holds, freedom from Nazi brutality, from the filthy tyranny, the 
humiliations, practised by men whose lust for cruelty mounts with the 
helplessness of their victims.95 
 
Although it was known that the conditions the British seaman were subjected to were 
not as horrific as the press made out, little effort was made by British officials to rein in 
the scathing remarks regarding the 'hell ship' Altmark and her perverse Nazi skipper. As 
Wylie notes, the incident demonstrates that British authorities were not beyond 
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extorting advantageous diplomatic and propaganda value from POWs and their 
treatment if a favourable opportunity was presented.96 Conditions aboard the Altmark 
were reported as 'ghastly', with the POWs living in 'hell for many weeks'.97 Newsreels 
similarly described the 'filthy and inhuman conditions'. 98 Altmark survivors were 
interviewed and their statements corroborated reportage. Fredrick Thomas of Liverpool 
stated that 'It was a filthy place, with no fresh air. Conditions were terrible, the Germans 
made them as miserable as they possible could with their cruel, heartless treatment'.99 
Those interviewed reported that their surroundings had been purposefully made worse, 
by the Altmark captain, who Pathe described as 'one of the nastiest Nazis who ever 
sailed the seas'.100 William Curtis of South Shields stated that he 'was a tyrant' who 
'openly declared that he had no feelings for the British whatever'.101 J. Swaby described 
him as 'a big-bearded Prussian bully', telling a Daily Mail reporter, 'When we were 
taken aboard he would come and laugh at us, telling us that Germany was going to win 
the war'.102 In sum, a Manchester Guardian correspondent reported: 
 
The men I talked to make the captain something of a pathological case—"A bit 
queer, the captain." Sometimes he would smile pleasantly at his captive and 
wish them a good morning. More often he would abuse them in a towering rage 
and would address them on the brutalities of the British internment camps or, 
obscurely, on the sufferings of Germans in Silesia.103 
 
M-O took the opportunity to canvass opinion regarding the Altmark during an 
investigation into the Silvertown by-election. Of the 207 people asked, 156 thought that 
British conduct had been correct, with only three suggesting it had been wrong. 
Comments in favour included: 'It was a good job', 'They were right to rescue are men', 
'About them prisoners. I think we were right to rescue them', 'It was grand what they 
did', and 'I think they were in the right'.104 Questioned during the investigation a 54 
year-old pawnbroker stated that it was 'Shocking. But true to German type. You 
wouldn't catch an Englishman doing that to a German, even though they are a lot of 
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swine them Germans'. The wife of a labourer, 42 years old, stated: 'Awful. I'd like to do 
the same to them as they done to our boys, instead of giving the German prisoners food 
and presents'.105 Yet, M-O also noted that around one in five were suspicious, doubting 
the portrayal of the incident in the press, especially the fact the British seamen seemed 
to look better than made out to be. These voices were in the minority. While newspapers 
and newsreels were allowed to churn out mordent commentaries of the abuse of British 
POWs at the hands of their Nazi captors, all were not convinced by the picture they 
were presented with. M-O diarists questioned the deaths of the German seamen during 
the boarding of the Altmark as well as the infringement of Norwegian neutrality. 
Disagreements and arguments were recorded between co-workers and acquaintances.106 
M-O pointed out the inconsistencies and exaggerations in the reportage of the incident, 
noting that the embellishments seeking to stir anti-German sentiments had succeeded in 
doing so.107 'The "war cloud" is here again, and although atrocity stories have been 
widely discredited, people still are ready to swallow stirring stories at a time when news 
hunger is greater than it has ever been'.  
 
The story has produced far wider and stronger anti-German feeling than we have 
detected in any previous survey. Whether or not the story is strictly true it can 
therefore claim success as propaganda for the war. No longer Hitler, but the 
enemy as a whole, is the object of mass antagonism.108 
 
In sum, the exaggerated mistreatment of British seamen captive aboard the Altmark 
fuelled anti-German sentiment in Britain, the incident providing new evidence of 
German cruelty to POWs, symbolic of the inherent barbarity of the German enemy. 
Following the catastrophic defeats of April-May 1940 and the threat of invasion there 
would be a change in atmosphere at ports where German POWs disembarked.  
 
4. The deportation of German POWs, May to June 1940 
In response to the Altmark incident, Hitler brought operation WeserÜbung forward and 
Germany's assault on Demark and Norway was launched in the early morning of 9 
April. What followed was a succession of military debacles culminating in the retreat 
from Dunkirk, fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy regime. The British 
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public soon realised the threat of invasion. M-O recorded that, 'It was towards the end of 
one of the loveliest Mays in living memory that there came to the British people the 
realisation that they were in danger of defeat and annihilation'. 109  Policy towards 
German POWs was altered in response to the catastrophic military defeats in April and 
June 1940, intertwined with the radicalisation of policy towards enemy aliens, who 
along with POWs were considered too dangerous to be held in Britain at a time when 
invasion was feared. 110  The experiences of the First World War, particularly the 
memory of the Lusitania sinking, influenced ideas regarding enemy aliens, with the 
Home Office eager to avoid repeating the mass interment policies which resulted in the 
incarceration of 30,000 Germans.111 Seeking to avoid a general internment of enemy 
aliens, in September 1939, John Anderson, home secretary and minister of home 
security, outlined a liberal internment policy in parliament, whereby a sharp distinction 
would be drawn between friendly and hostile aliens.112 Tribunals were established in 
October 1939 to screen enemy aliens and decide if they were to be interned, subject to 
restrictions, or to remain at liberty, with only a minority of German and Austrian males 
interned by January 1940.113 However, their treatment transformed dramatically after 
the disastrous Allied campaigns and the successful German blitzkrieg which witnessed 
the fall of France and establishment of the Vichy regime. In the wake of the defeat in 
Norway, the Chamberlain administration was replaced by a coalition government 
headed by Winston Churchill, who immediately organised a new department to deal 
with the question of civilian internment. The newly created Home Security (Defence) 
Executive (HS(D)E) advocated the removal of enemy aliens and civilian internees, a 
proposal Churchill eagerly supported.114 By July, almost all German and Austrian males 
were in the process of being, if not already, interned. Several dominion governments—
Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, and New Zealand—agreed to accept a number of 
internees and POWs, and ships left Britain in late June and early July.115  With reports 
from Norway that Nazi spies had aided the German invasion, refugees and enemy aliens 
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in Britain were targeted as potential agents, this 'spy mania' helping legitimise the policy 
taken by the government. 
 Reflecting back a year on, Mass Observation noted that 'One of the outstanding 
features of May 1940 is anticipation of almost immediate invasion. There are long notes 
on reactions of terror, apprehension, and bewilderment. Dreams about invasion and 
personal encounters with Hitler are mentioned'.116 Fear of fifth columnists led to distrust 
of aliens and refugees. Mass Observation reports indicate that 55 per cent of those asked 
were in favour of general internment.117 However, government policy and wholesale 
deportation of civilian internees was criticised as a thoughtless reaction. Quickly 
researched and published in 1940, Francois Lafitte's study underlined the governmental 
panic behind the indiscriminate internment of enemy aliens, including refugees from 
fascism. His account of the appalling living conditions provoked widespread comment 
and embarrassment.118 The outcry in reaction to the sinking of the Arandora Star  in July 
1940 led the government to revise the policy toward enemy aliens. By the end of the 
year, after the threat of invasion waned, both government and press readopted a more 
liberal tone towards enemy aliens.119 In August, Mass Observation noted a clear decline 
in anti-alien attitudes.120  Although the deportation of civilian internees was halted, the 
presence of German POWs was still considered a security threat. In September 1940, 
proposals to send some 1,000 German POWs to Newfoundland were approved. At that 
time, there were some 850 in Britain, their number increasing by around 100 per 
week.121 Further numbers of POWs and merchant seamen were removed in 1941.122 The 
rationale behind the removal of German POWs was clearly outlined by Anthony 
Eden—secretary of state for war—in a cabinet memorandum: 
 
They are all of a dangerous type, and their security would be a matter for grave 
anxiety in the event of invasion. In such an event we shall have to use the vacant 
spaces in existing camps for newly-captured prisoners, and the combination of 
the character, knowledge and status of the existing prisoners with the fighting 
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value of the newcomers may give considerable trouble. Apart from the merchant 
seamen, the prisoners are Luftwaffe or U-boat men, and would be a valuable 
asset to the enemy if released by an invading force.123 
 
Newspapers and newsreels restated the belief of intelligence officials, that spies and 
saboteurs had aided German military victory, especially in Norway. The treacherous 
nature of the enemy was extended to German POWs in mid-1940.  Depicting the POWs 
as ardent Nazis and inherently aggressive, the press, emphasising their unruly behaviour 
during the journey to Canada, helped to legitimise their removal from Britain. 124  
Newsreels depicting German POWs adopted a harsher tone towards the captives from 
May 1940. Commenting on the arrival of German POWs at a British port a 
commentator for Pathe News described the 250 parachute troops: 
 
Many of them are found to carry dangerous looking knives with blades that 
shoot out. Most of them are obviously youngsters, the average age of all of them 
is eighteen. They were sent on a brutal job, but the British Government isn't 
going to make that a reason for given them anything but humanitarian treatment. 
Almost immediately on landing, they're given a square meal which must by 
rather a surprise to them after what they've been told at home about our food 
shortage. So that's another batch out of the way.125  
 
An atmosphere of distrust replaced the affability of earlier arrivals of POWs. As the 
commentator noted, these POWs carried concealed weapons—'dangerous looking 
knives with blades that shoot out'. Guards were no longer sharing cigarettes but were 
shown alert, ready to deal with any unruly behaviour, while the POWs were subject to 
thorough searches. Yet, as was stated, despite the Nazi enemy being heartless and 
untrustworthy, Britain would maintain the liberal-tradition of captivity, evidenced by 
the POWs, although probably undeserving, receiving a 'square meal'.  
 How this change of tone affected attitudes towards German POWs is difficult to 
gauge. M-O reports indicate that newsreel audiences showed little hostility to the 
German POWs pictured onscreen. In June 1940, M-O reported that despite the anti-
German commentary to shots of POWs in Paramount News newsreels, 'there was no 
sign of similar fury among the audience and it is still very infrequently that there is any 
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hissing at shots of German prisoners'.126 Similarly, commenting on audience responses 
to German personalities in newsreels in August 1940, an investigator reported:  
 
The German people have only been seen in a few sequences of prisoners of war. 
[…] only twice have there been hisses or boos for this. Once the hissing came 
from only one woman; her companion turned to her and said "it's not their fault, 
they can't help it". The woman replied "no, I suppose not" and stopped 
hissing.127 
 
In December 1940, during the Blitz, another report noted that 'Prisoners have been seen 
on three occasions; twice there was no response, once there was laughter at a 
particularly ugly German. On no occasion has there been any hissing, or signs of 
objection'. 128  By this time the German POW population numbered 300 and media 
interest in the captives declined, although sporadic stories continued to appear in 
newsreels and newspapers. Gaumont British News occasionally broadcast German 
POWs as part of their 'roving camera reports', their continued capture indicating 
battlefield successes.129 For instance in August 1941 the commentator declared that:  
 
If all the German prisoners who have been along this platform on their way to 
prison camps were placed end to end, they would make Nelson's Column look 
like a park railing. The point is that week after week we are draining the 
Luftwaffe of its pilots and crews. We needn't feel that the end is in sight yet – 
but we can feel that with each batch brought in the noose grows tighter around 
Hitler's neck.130  
 
In January 1941, an article on 'Reflections on Seeing Nazi Prisoners of War' appeared in 
the Sunderland Echo. The journalist, E. H. Elkins, recounted the reactions of British 
onlookers as a procession of wounded German POWs marched passed them as they 
waited for a train. 'A little, neat, grey-eyed woman, whose knitting needles had ceased 
to click, could not restrain an outburst of sympathy, "Poor fellows," she murmured. 
"They've suffered for anything they might have done."' In contrast, a 'stout man, who 
[…] had been in a bad raid, wasn't quite so sure. "I don't think anything is too bad for 
men who have been brought up to be murderers, and seem to find the job a damned 
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agreeable one," he said'. The women 'had the last word', supposing that the POWs were 
simply following orders, she declared '"It's Hitler who's to blame."'  Elkins, stirred to 
write the piece based on this comment, argued that freed from the ignorance of Nazi 
ideology the POWs could be saved.131  
 
5. The mooted exchange of POWs, October 1941  
On 30 September, the press celebrated the 'hopeful news' announced by Duncan Sandys, 
Financial Secretary to the War Office, in a BBC broadcast the previous evening. 
Addressing the relatives and friends of British POWs in German captivity, he stated that 
an agreement had been reached, in principle, whereby 1,500 British POWs would be 
repatriated. On 4 October, two British hospital ships were scheduled to transport 
German POWs from the south coast to Northern France returning with British 
repatriates. 132  In Parliament, Sandys declared that the arrangements were nearing 
completion, and the press eagerly anticipated the arrival of the first British POWs.133 
However, a warning Sandys had given in his broadcast—that such arrangements 'may 
easily be upset by unexpected changes in the military of political situation'—was 
farsighted. In light of a message received from Berlin, the War Office announced on 4 
October that the exchange was temporarily postponed. Having invaded Newhaven to 
report the joyful scenes of ships departure, correspondents instead described the 
atmosphere of disappointment. Daily Mail correspondent Olive Melville Brown 
recounted how the 'darkness of war returned to a dockside lit for a brief truce of mercy', 
when, at 21.05 the lights illuminating the hospital ships were extinguished. News of the 
delay brought hundreds of curious Newhaven residents into the streets. Brown 
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described the situation, as 'cruel' for the POWs across the Channel and the families 
across Britain anxiously awaiting the return of a 'loved one'.134  
 Although information regarding the attitudes expressed by the British public 
towards the event which developed at Newhaven is fragmentary, M-O summarised the 
findings of two surveys taken before and after the exchange was cancelled, questioning 
small London samples. 135  On 6 October, around half believed that the proposed 
exchange was a good idea. Some noted that the exchange was pragmatic given that 
wounded POWs could not be employed and were therefore useless. Others believed that 
exchanging POWs was humane and civilized, qualities perhaps equated by those 
questioned with notions of Britishness. However, a 'fairly substantial section' 
commented that it 'doesn't seem war', a view considered 'rather curious' by the 
investigator. It was argued that 'one should not "stop the war" even for such a short 
period'. Furthermore, the view 'you can't trust a jerry' was expressed several times. Any 
notion of an exchange, some argued, should have been rejected given that the German 
enemy was distrustful. There was 'a general feeling' that the exchange would have to be 
'more profitable' for the Germans. Speculating on the German intentions, it was believed 
that they were demanding political prisoners, and a minority assumed that their real aim 
was to retrieve Rudolf Hess. However, many of those questioned were 'puzzled' by the 
subject, and did not understand the scheme, who exactly was going to be exchanged, or 
why there were any difficulties involved with such an exchange. While people were 
watching the development of the negotiations, they 'felt they were badly informed, and 
wanted to know more about the whole scheme'. As a result, there was a feeling that the 
British government was not without blame, and that the publicity surrounding the 
exchange had been badly handled.  
 After the exchange had been cancelled, the same three groups of opinion—
approval, disapproval, and puzzlement—were found when a further sample of opinion 
was gauged on 9 October. M-O believed that as few people questioned expressed no 
opinion on the matter, public opinion had been 'thoroughly [...] aroused in the affair'. 
Those that approved of the action of the British government were very firm in their 
opinion and blamed the German government entirely. Although the British government 
did the right thing, some thought it was a pity that the exchange had been cancelled. 
Those that did not approve of the British government were disappointed that British 
POWs, who had been waiting on the other side of the Channel, were not repatriated. 
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Again, the use of German POWs to Britain was reasoned by some; as they were 
wounded they would be of no real benefit to the enemy and could have gone for nothing 
in return. To a lesser extent, some were disappointed that German prisoners were not 
sent home. A 45 year old female of C classification commented, 'Terribly disappointing 
to the folks over here and I suppose it must been the same for German families'. As with 
the proposal to exchange prisoners, 'an appreciable section' of those questioned were 
puzzled by the scheme being called off. They did not really understand why the 
exchange had been called off, or which government, German or British, was to blame. 
Some were of the opinion that the German government wanted 'special people', in 
particular, Hess. Others believed that the Germans did not really want prisoners at all; 
'To quote the vernacular', a 45 year old male of D classification stated, 'I think they were 
just fiddling'. While the intention might have been honourable, there was concern 
regarding who was to be exchanged. The report noted that there was a widespread 
feeling that the truth about the affair had not been told. Speculation about what was 
being concealed was endemic. While some thought the release of Hess was the 
contentious issue between the two governments, most of those questioned by M-O were 
uncertain of the specific details. Although no significant difference of opinion based on 
gender was noted, more women thought the proposed exchange was a good idea—
possibly as it was their relatives being perhaps exchanged—and that the decision to call 
the scheme off was a bad one. Throughout the affair, two fifths of those questioned 
supported the government's actions while one fifth thought that the wrong decisions had 
been made. 
 
6. The Shackling Crisis, October to December 1942  
The abject failure that was the joint British-Canadian commando raid on Dieppe 
conducted on 19 August 1942 resulted in some 2,000 taken POW. On 2 September 
1942, the German government informed Britain that those captured at Dieppe would be 
put in shackles after an order to bind the hands of captured enemies to prevent them 
destroying documentation was found on British troops taken during the raid. This threat 
was not carried out as the German authorities were satisfied by the British assurance 
that no order existed and would be rescinded if it did it.136 An incident was avoided for 
the time being. On 8 October the British cabinet discussed another German threat to 
shackle POWs taken at Dieppe. A small British commando force had orchestrated a raid 
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on Sark on the night of 3-4 October. The German authorities discovered that four 
German engineers, who had been shot while attempting to escape their captors, had had 
their hands bound by the commandos. The War Office asserted that the Geneva 
Convention did not explicitly forbid the binding of hands of captured enemies to 
prevent their escape. This was considered more humane than the alternative of shooting 
them. During the discussion it was noted that, as it forbid reprisals against POWs, if 
Germany proceeded to chain POWs the action would be an infringement of the 
Convention. It was decided to publicly announce that the government did not approve 
any order to bind the hands of POWs taken in the field, and that the German threat was 
contrary to the Geneva Convention. If Germany proceeded to manacle the POWs taken 
at Dieppe, Britain would place an equal number of German POWs in chains.137 The 
following day, German High Command informed the British government that they were 
not satisfied by the response and had proceeded to manacle 107 officers and 1,269 other 
ranks. Moreover, if the British intended to carry out the chaining of German POWs as 
stated, three times as many POWs would be shackled by Germany. Discussing the 
position, the cabinet was determined to proceed. 
 The shackling episode has been diligently examined by historians, Mackenzie 
providing an initial overview.138 It is considered to mark a departure in Anglo-German 
POW relations, the culmination of a steady decline which prompted new factors 
governing decision making. Locating the origins of this deterioration in the 
mistreatment of German POWs aboard the HMS Pasteur, Moore identifies the 
shackling of POWs as the end of the 'gentleman's war'—that being respect for the laws 
of war—between Britain and Germany. From this point on, British authorities were 
prepared to risk the welfare of British POWs if military or intelligence advantages were 
gained.139 Wylie argues that the POW regime was weakened as a result of the Shackling 
Crisis, whereby 'the scope of productive dialogue was demonstrably narrower'.140 The 
decision to meet German reprisals in kind has been questioned by historians. Rolf 
considers the cabinet to have 'blundered' into the crisis, endangering Allied coordination 
on the POW issue. He argues that, 'the British government proceeded to dig a deep hole 
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for itself, form which extrication was going to prove formidably difficult'.141 Certainty, 
as the majority of troops captured at Dieppe were Canadian and that Canada held more 
German POWs than Britain, the Shackling Crisis had ramifications for Anglo-Canadian 
relations, which Vance has explored.142 That Churchill was forced to yield in the cycle 
of reprisals due to public opinion in Britain and the Dominions is noted by historians of 
the crisis. Expanding on previous research, the nuances of the attitudes towards the 
Shackling Crisis will now be explored, and set within the wider context of reprisals 
against Germany.  
 The War Office statement, which denied that an order to bind the hands of 
POWs taken on the battlefield existed, was publicised on 9 October. 143  Churchill 
followed up the statement in a speech at Edinburgh which clearly outlined his intent, 
arguing that Hitler, 'feel[ing] the ring of doom remorselessly closing in', turned on the 
POWs in his hands in an attempt to break British morale. For Churchill, meeting the 
chaining of British POWs in kind was symbolic of British determination to 'keep right 
on to the end', the slogan ending his speech.144 This defiant stance was applauded, but 
ultimately there was disfavour for reprisals against POWs. 
 The decision to meet Germany head on was unusual as, until then, British 
authorities had avoided taking reprisals against POWs. There was an extensive 
disfavour for reprimanding vulnerable POWs and reservations over the prudence of 
competing in a campaign of brutality with Hitler. Churchill himself was well aware of 
this. Reading a report on reprisals during the First World War, he concluded that 
reprisals should be avoided, 'as we have today to deal with a German Government 
infinitely more ruthless and ferocious whose counter-reprisals are likely to exceed 
anything that the public conscience in this country would allow us to do in return'.145 
That reprisals against POWs were unpopular with the British public was recognised by 
the authorities, with the ineffective reprisals of the First World War in the back of their 
minds. In March 1915, retaliating to attacks on British shipping, the Admiralty decided 
that captured U-boat personnel would be tried as war criminals. Although segregated in 
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special detention centres, this was purely symbolic, and their treatment was not 
especially severe. In response the German government sent British POWs from notable 
families and the upper-classes to military and ordinary prisons. After mounting pressure 
in parliament, the Admiralty was forced to change policy. British reprisals were a farce, 
resulting in Churchill losing his position as first lord of the Admiralty to Sir Arthur 
Balfour.146 Public confidence in reprisals was completely shattered, and with politicians 
extremely hesitant to use such measures after the incident, Britain by and large shunned 
reprisals from 1915. The principal reason behind the failure of the policy was that 
British public opinion was not persuaded that the association of German POWs and war 
criminals was enough to justify reprisals which compromised the position of British 
POWs in German hands.147 Continuing reluctance was evident in 1939 when a subdued 
call for retaliation involving German POWs was made in parliament.  
 On 21 November 1939, Clement Attlee asked Prime Minister Chamberlain what 
action the government would take in response to the indiscriminate laying of sea mines 
by Germans, several ships having been sunk on British trade route in the past week. 
Chamberlin acknowledged the illegality of Germany's indiscriminate mine laying, 
assuring parliament that the government would retaliate. 148  Contemplating possible 
action, Sir Smedley Crook (Con. Birmingham Deritend) suggested positioning German 
POWs on British ships as a reprisal against the indiscriminate laying of sea mines. 
Chamberlain dismissed the idea and stated that the government would continue to 
observe the stipulations of the Geneva Convention.149 The few correspondents which 
commented on Crook's suggestion similarly rebuffed it.150 Writing to The Times on 24 
November, Hugo Keene was annoyed that Crook was allowed to ask such as question 
as, 'the world is fully aware that we do not, whether bound by Convention or not, make 
reprisals on helpless individuals'.151 In his view, reprisals were a superfluous subject to 
discuss. Whether bound by international law or not, the British would never resort to 
reprisals against POWs as it was antithetical to their national character.  
 The shackling crisis came at a time when the public was growing jaded of the 
war. The M-O morale report for September 1942 noted an increase in lack of interest 
over war news.152 This trend continued into early October. 'It's the Bore War all over 
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again', a local health minister was overheard exclaiming. People were 'fed up because 
there's a lull', the minister suggesting that 'some bad bombing', 'decisive action', or 'even 
[…] another Dunkirk' was needed to get the war going again. The battle of Stalingrad 
remained inconclusive, and while, at the end of October, the breakout from El Alamein 
would provide excitement, prior to it the Shackling Crisis offered some interest to a fed-
up public. 'The chaining of prisoners', M-O commented, 'aroused a certain amount of 
interest, and some indignation, although there were also comments, particularly from B-
Class people, that it was all rather silly, or even wicked'.153  Like historians of the 
incident, the British public questioned the wisdom of competing in a cycle of reprisals 
with Germany. The attitudes recorded by MO investigators were by and large negative, 
believing that responding to German reprisals in kind was ill-advised.  
 Three letters were published in the Gloucestershire Echo on 14 October 
commenting on the manacling of POWs. 'Reprisals is an ugly word, and is an ugly 
thing', wrote ONLOOKER, who asked if the British were 'prepared to run a "neck and 
neck" race with the Germans in cruelty to prisoners?' Chaining German POWs was 
unfair as they were not to blame: 'The brow-beaten conscripted soldiers of Nazidom are 
not responsible for the crime of their masters. Like war itself, reprisal punishes the 
wrong people, while the principals, for the time being, escape justice'.154 J. W. Seddon, 
a retired Royal Navy Commander, also thought Britain was 'doing wrong' by retaliating. 
He noted that as reprisals were proscribed by the Geneva Convention 'then no 
provocation whatsoever is any excuse for retaliatory measures against helpless prisoners 
of war'. It was the German people not German POWs that were 'guilty of a very foul 
deed'. Rather than chaining German POWs, who were not to blame for the manacling of 
British POWs, Seddon suggested 'the complete wiping out of a small city'. This would 
be easily accomplished, he argued, by bombers flying at 20,000 feet during daylight as 
civilian areas would not be as well defended as military objectives. 'There is still further 
advantage', Seddon explained, 'that if the Germans were not brought to their senses the 
dose could be repeated against other cities or towns one at a time'. 155  Seddon's 
suggestion demonstrated a zealous commitment to the rule of war. While the manacling 
of POWs was prohibited, the complete annihilation of German civilians in a small town 
was a legitimate act of warfare. E. W. Hallum also suggested bombing, but wanted to 
target Germany's ally, Italy. 'That the Germans', E. W. Hallum surprised by events, 
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'would retaliate against our threat to manacle prisoner for prisoner, was, of course, 
inevitable'. As the Germans were 'barbarians, devoid of honour, human feelings, and 
decency', chaining their POWs was a 'futile' proceeding. Germany, Hallum advised, 
should be given twelve hours to unfetter British POWs and if this demand was not met, 
'we reduce Rome to ruins without delay'. Italy would then press their ally to free the 
British POWs.156 It seems that few shared Seddon's views. 
 The Spectator  noted that 'few people in this country are happy at the action 
taken here, which is that of reprisal for reprisal, or are satisfied that it is the best means 
of striking back at Germany for her savage treatment of innocent prisoners'.  
 
We cannot compete successfully with them in brutality. We do not help British 
prisoners by chaining the German. In such a matter we can only play our true 
part by acting according to our own honour and dignity and disdaining to copy 
the enemy's misdeeds, dealing out retribution by the greater daring of our 
bombing and more determined attacks in legitimate war. Here is a situation 
where Britain should punish the enemy by every proper war-like means, but not 
by stooping to his level.157 
 
Writing to the Spectator , Gordon Evans echoed the opinion of the editorial, arguing that 
in chaining POWs, Britain 'merely play[ed] into the hands of the Nazis'. A 'more 
effective reply' in his view, was 'to refuse to play the Nazi game', and simply, 'add this 
new brutal breach of law to the list of crimes to be dealt with when victory is won'.158 
 In his Spectator  column, Harold Nicolson commented on Churchill's 
parliamentary statement on the shackling of German POWs. He noted that it was 
generally accepted that the Germans were at fault and not the British. Yet, Nicholson 
believed that it was the inappropriate response to meet German reprisals in kind. 'The 
treatment of prisoners of war', he argued, 'is in fact one of the most accurate barometers 
of civilisation'. Since the eighteenth century, the view had developed that POWs were 
not the captor's property and 'his treatment should be based, not upon motives of profit, 
punishment or revenge, but upon the sole consideration that he must be prevented from 
again taking up arms'. Britain 'had been pioneers in this enlightened movement'. 
Therefore, Nicholson hoped that negotiations with the Swiss would prove fruitful and 
POWs would soon be unchained. Their continued manacling simply corrupted British 
ideals.159 
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 Reprisals directed towards German POWs were unfair as they were not to blame 
for the actions of their leaders. The British public had a similar unease and distaste 
towards the bombing of Germany. Investigating attitudes towards reprisal raids in the 
immediately after German attacks, M-O 'regularly found that, after a blitz, people in 
bus, street and pub seldom talked of getting their own back on German civilians'.160 
Bombing was accepted as a necessary evil to shorten the war: 
 
Very few people like the idea of these raids; very few indeed want them stopped. 
They are widely regarded as an unpleasant necessity, seldom as a just retribution 
for the raids Britain has suffered. But this does not mean that there is little desire 
for retribution in any form. The desire is there, and has been since war began. 
The problem is how to canalise it in the most constructive (or least destructive) 
direction.161 
 
Retributive attitudes were directed towards the Nazi leadership, with a minority of 
people believing that 'the crimes of war should be visited on the ordinary citizen of 
Germany'. M-O noted that the statement on war criminals at the Moscow Conference 
was 'very widely approved'. It was agreed then that after the war, German officers and 
Nazi party members that were consenting accomplices in atrocities would undergo trial 
for the crimes in the liberated countries where they took place.162  
 By situating the Shackling Crisis within wider attitudes towards the treatment of 
Germany, the underlying reasons for public disapproval are clear. With retributive 
attitudes directed towards the Nazi leadership, meting out reprisals on German POWs 
offended British notions of fair play. Churchill was aware that the conscience of the 
British public would never allow Britain to compete in a cycle of ever increasing 
reprisals against POWs. Ultimately he had to yield. That the chaining of POWs by 
Germany was barbaric was unquestioned. There were, however, reservations over the 
wisdom behind meeting reprisals in kind. In chaining German POWs while Hitler, the 
perpetrator of the crime, escaped punishment justice was misplaced. By acting out the 
same barbarity as Hitler, Britain descended to the level of the enemy and the distinction 
between democracy and fascism was lost. Reprisals ran contrary to British values of fair 
play and the rule of law. Rather than unlawfully manacling POWs, retribution could be 
wrought through bombing, a legitimate act of warfare and/or waiting to bring the 
criminals to justice in a post-war tribunal.   
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7. Conclusions 
Although few German POWs were held in Britain between 1939 and 1942, their 
captivity was still a sporadically newsworthy and divisive subject. During the period of 
phoney war, newspaper and newsreel coverage of the capture and internment of German 
POWs emphasised their exemplary treatment in British hands. They depicted the 
German POWs as well fed, adequately—if not lavishly, in regards to Grizedale Hall—
accommodated, and highlighted that they were provided with literature, musical 
instruments as well as time to pursue sporting activities. The press demonstrated, there 
were far more unfortunate places to find oneself in than a POW camp in Britain. As this 
chapter has detailed, after the removal of German POWs from Britain in 1940, several 
incidents bought the POW issue back into focus. Again, news coverage by and large 
applauded British conduct towards German POWs while condemning the actions of the 
German government. Britain was represented as an upstanding captor, treating POWs 
correctly. Churchill's decision to retaliate in late 1942, manacling POWs in kind, was 
not celebrated but at best accepted as an only decent recourse to confront German 
barbarity.  
 Letters to the editor and M-O material indicate that the narrative presented by 
the media was challenged, however. Comparing their own position to that of German 
POWs, certain individuals were upset that the latter were afforded comforts denied 
them. Perceived leniency towards German POWs was criticised. Those who considered 
the average German a brute could not understand why they were afforded such good 
treatment.  
 Throughout the phoney war, the German POWs which found themselves in 
Britain were depicted as ordinary soldiers glad to be out of the war. Their relationship 
with their captors—the soldiers on the ships which rescued them from the sea and the 
camp commandants—were cordial.  Reportage of the German POWs held in Britain 
during the phoney war suggested that all Germans were not evil, Blondie—the German 
sailor sung to by his British counterparts—being case in point.  There was a noticeable 
change in the tone the press adopted towards German POWs during the period 
examined. The camaraderie between British soldiers and their German captives 
disappeared from reportage around the time of the Dunkirk evacuation. At this time of 
potential invasion, German POWs were depicted as dangerous individuals and British 
soldiers were cautious when guarding them, a stark contrast to the jovial exchanges 
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between captor and captive which had characterised earlier encounters. With the end of 
the phoney war then, it was no longer the Nazi leadership which was the enemy, but 
also the German people, including German POWs.   
 The Altmark, the mooted exchange, and Shackling Crisis served to highlight the 
cultural differences between Britain and the German enemy. The perversity of the 
German captain in his treatment of the British sailors, the pretence of the German 
authorities when negotiating the exchange of POWs, and the brutality of manacling 
POWs all fed into the wider demonization of the German enemy. Reportage of the 
German treatment of POWs followed the pattern of propaganda. Indeed, in terms of the 
Altmark and Shackling Crisis, reality was far different from what was reported. The 
British sailors on-board the Altmark did not suffer intentionally while the chaining of 
POWs was more symbolic than an actual attempt to harm them.  
 The reportage of the capture and handling of German POWs did more than 
simply describe their number and condition. In showcasing the upright treatment of 
German POWs, British values were demonstrated and celebrated. The way in which 
Britain dealt with POWs and their captivity highlighted the sportsmanship of the British 
people.  
 These values invested in the treatment of POWs were obviously deep-rooted, 
given the references to the First World War in discussions. It is clear that the legacy of 
the Great War played an important part in the shaping of attitudes towards captivity and 
the treatment of POWs. It can be seen in this chapter that the memory of Great War 
captivity was, however, contested. Whether or not the suffering of British POWs in 
German hands was intentional during the 1914-18 conflict was a point of debate. It can 
be suggested that the division of opinion here reflected  a broader dispute over the 
identity of the German enemy. One side argued that the German was inherently cruel, a 
barbaric enemy which needed not sympathy. The other viewed the Nazi leadership as 
the principal enemy. The German people had been misled by their masters and showing 
them compassion would serve to highlight that Britain was not their true enemy, that 
being the Nazi leadership.  
 If the idea that the Shackling Crisis marked the end of the gentlemanly conduct 
between British and German authorities regarding the welfare of the POWs in their care 
is correct, it remains to be seen if popular attitudes similarly changed.  Whether or not 
the values ascribed the treatment of POWs survived the intensification of the conflict, 
specifically the disclosure of the Stalag Luft III executions and liberation of Belsen, is 
the concern of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: 1944-45 
 
1. Introduction  
Following chronologically from the previous chapter, chapter three examines attitudes 
towards German POWs and their treatment between June 1944 and May 1945. This 
period witnessed the war against Germany turn in favour of the Allies, leading to the 
downfall of the Nazi regime. The capture and transportation of German POWs from the 
Normandy beachhead to Britain formed part of the reportage of the invasion, feeding 
into the narrative of success. Rather than arriving as invaders as they had prospectively 
been in 1940, German soldiers entered Britain as defeated captives. Again, the public 
came into close contact with the POWs as the dockside, on the railways, and in the 
streets where they lived. The public met their captives with the same mixture of 
curiosity and indifference as they had done earlier in the war. Not only had the war 
swung in favour of the Allies, another factor distinguished this period of the war from 
the earlier. In May 1944, the shooting of 50 RAF officers from Stalag Luft III was 
announced. This was the first instance where the brutality of the Nazi regime usually 
reserved for the racial enemies of Hitler had been directed towards British POWs. While 
British POWs had been subjected to substandard conditions aboard the Altmark and 
placed in manacles during the Shackling Crisis, they had not been executed. The 
culpability of the German people in the act was debated, yet there were no calls for 
reciprocity in the treatment of German POWs. Debates in the press remained similar to 
that of 1939-44. On the one hand, realist voices emphasising the brutality of the German 
people considered the treatment of German POWs soft, or unnecessarily superior to the 
level of treatment dictated by international law. On the other, liberal voices defended 
the treatment of German POWs and criticised any notion of straying from international 
law; this would only result in a compromise of British values, descending to the level of 
the enemy. Moreover, these defenders of the British tradition of treating POWs well 
made a definite distinction between the German people and the Nazi leadership which 
had misled them. Therefore, German POWs were exonerated from the atrocities 
committed by their masters; they were soldiers doing their duty like British servicemen. 
With the liberation of Belsen in April 1945, and the widespread disclosure of the 
horrors perpetrated in concentration camps, the liberal voices defending German POWs 
and their treatment grew quiet, with realist voices emphasising the unjustly soft 
treatment of German POWs. In the wake of Belsen there was little concern with the 
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stipulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Instead, calls to set German POWs to work 
dominated public discussion. 
 
2. The second wave of German POWs, June 1944 to February 1945 
Codenamed operation Neptune, D-Day witnessed the largest amphibious invasion in 
history. The multinational effort comprised of thousands of small landing craft escorted 
by hundreds of larger vessels carrying some 130,000 soldiers. It was preceded by an 
extensive aerial bombardment and airborne assault involving around 1,200 aircraft 
carrying British, Canadian, Free French and American forces. Neptune was one part of 
the attempt to establish a Second Front against Germany in North-West Europe, 
codenamed operation Overlord.1 While the focus was on pressing forward, the invasion 
also involved movement backward. Planning for Overlord had to consider the capture 
and transportation of enemy POWs from the theatre of battle. As there would be no 
space to hold them on the French coast during the opening stages of the invasion, POWs 
would have to be shipped back across the Channel to Britain. Forming part of the larger 
invasion armada, a fleet of Landing Ship Tank (LST) acted as a ferry service, 
transporting consignments of POWs from the beachhead to ports on the English south-
coast ports which operated as staging areas for the invasion, including Southampton, 
Portsmouth, Harwich, and Portland. After Cherbourg was captured, larger vessels were 
employed replacing the LST craft which were judged too inefficient for the task. By 
mid-July 49,000 had experienced the crossing—which could take between 24 hours and 
4 days weather depending—rising to 145,000 by the end of the year. 2  From the 
dockside where they were landed, POWs were moved inland by train and lorry for 
processing at transit camps before being moved on to more permanent accommodation. 
POWs in US custody were not destined to stay in Britain. After landing at Portland in 
Dorset, they were taken to Le Marchant Camp at Devizes in Wiltshire, before being 
transported across the Atlantic by ships departing Liverpool. The transport of POWs to 
Britain during the early stages of the Normandy invasion was accepted as a necessity by 
the cabinet. However, there remained a reluctance to see large numbers of German 
POWs held in Britain. Churchill was particularly anxious, understanding that their 
presence would only serve to exacerbate current accommodation difficulties and require 
soldiers to guard them who could not be spared. As the number of German POWs 
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increased with the Allied advance, the British authorities would look to their allies to 
take custody of their POWs on the Continent.  
 Breaking out of the Normandy beaches, the Allies pushed further into France, 
trapping a significant portion of the German armed forces in the Falaise pocket before 
liberating Paris in August. Allied successes led to the capture of large numbers of 
German servicemen, which, as always, posed problems. Reluctant to see them in 
Britain, the French were pressed to take custody of 50,000. They would accommodate 
and guard the POWs, which they were happy to receive to work in agriculture, while 
SHAEF continued to feed and clothe the POWs.3 However, the French treatment of 
their German POWs caused serious concern among British officials. In September 
1944, Sir Percy James Grigg, secretary of state for war, warned that British owned 
POWs in French run camps were being subjected to 'extremely unsatisfactory 
conditions', which was 'an embarrassment to our Forces'. Despite this, his suggestion 
that they be brought to the UK, forfeiting a consignment of Italian POWs from South 
Africa, was overruled.4 Their presence, it was argued, would only serve to aggravate 
current accommodation difficulties. Churchill himself emphasised the importance of not 
shipping large numbers of German POWs to Britain at a subsequent cabinet meeting.5 
Accommodation certainly posed an acute problem for the British authorities. Updating 
the cabinet in November, Grigg reported that the 130,000 POWs then held in Britain 
had only been accommodated through intentional overcrowding and the use of tented 
accommodation. The situation was desperate and the use of tents would have to be 
made during the coming winter, a direct violation of the Geneva Convention. 
Attempting to alleviate accommodation difficulties, Grigg had approached French and 
US authorities to accept 50,000 British owned POWs, warning that a 'very difficult 
situation' was on the horizon if these steps proved fruitless.6 Overcrowding and the 
prospective capture of even larger numbers of German POWs towards the end of the 
war with Germany forced the British to significantly modify their policy towards their 
POWs.  
 The foresight of Grigg was proved correct when in February 1945 two problems 
were faced by the cabinet concerning German POWs held in North-West Europe. In the 
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immediate term, there was the threat of an outbreak of disease in the overcrowded 
camps run by 21 Army Group. The total capacity of 39,000 had been exceeded, with 
56,700 POWs crowded in them; perfect conditions for a diphtheria epidemic, which was 
present in the Low Countries. Grigg compelled the cabinet to accept 7,500 POWs from 
Belgium immediately, and a further 20,000 later in the month if necessary. In the long 
term, recent operational development of the war in Europe necessitated the framing of 
plans to cope with the large number of German POWs expected to be captured. SHEAF 
forecast 860,000 German POWs being captured by the end of the war in Europe. Under 
the 50:50 agreement, Britain was liable for half the captures, 430,000. Added to those 
already in British charge, the total amounted to 709,000. Accommodation could be 
found for only 256,000. Therefore there was a deficiency of accommodation for 
453,000. The Secretary proposed a number of possible methods to alleviate the burden, 
but was not confident they would work. Therefore, Grigg proposed that the United 
States be approached to revise the 50:50 agreement. Instead, each nation would be 
responsible for their captures.7 The Cabinet approved the acceptance of the 7,500 POWs 
and, if necessary, the 20,000 in the future, and invited Grigg to examine, in consultation 
with other departments, how best to negotiate with the US about altering the 50:50 
agreement.8  
 
3. The invasion of Normandy, June 1944  
Mass Observation reports provide insight into the reactions of the British public to the 
invasion of Normandy. With the invasion of Italy, optimism was high at the end of May 
1944.9  This positivity fed into the anticipation surrounding the start of the Second 
Front.10 For some, the aircraft which crossed Britain in a continuous stream toward 
Normandy on the night of 5 June were an indicator that a momentous event was 
underway. At 8.00 German reports of Allied troops landing in France were quoted, 
followed by an official confirmation of the invasion by General Eisenhower over the 
wireless. The reaction of the British public to news of the invasion was unlike anything 
Mass Observation had previously recorded. Summarising the initial response to D-Day, 
a file report noted that:  
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The quietness, lack of immediate apparent emotion or excitement, was one of 
the vivid characteristics of D-Day. Perhaps, partly, because people had lived 
over the moment often in the past, expected things to be abnormal and in a 
undefined way different from any ordinary day. Largely because feelings simply 
did not get translated into words.11 
 
Investigators in London all agreed to the 'extraordinary silence'.12 Although individual 
reactions varied significantly, Mass Observation discerned a general narrative arc in the 
reaction to D-Day. At first, there was a short burst of overt excitement, an emotion, 
confined to the personal sphere, which was shared between family and friends at home, 
the offices, and the factory. This phase quickly passed as the implications of invasion 
became clear. Thoughts turned to friends and relatives taking part in the invasion. 
Outside the home, feelings were scarcely expressed. Little excitement was shown in 
public places. Here, there were no suggestions or over-optimism or elation. Observed by 
investigators, crowds at wireless retailers and newspaper stands were surrounded by 
discernible anxiety. Tension was evidenced by the speed at which newspapers sold out, 
as one investigator recorded:  
 
Fresh papers were now coming in; as soon as they arrived, small tense knots of 
people, mostly men, formed around each news vendor. But there were rarely 
more than 20 people trying to buy papers from any one man. In about 4 minutes 
all papers everywhere in Piccadilly Circus had been sold. Roughly counting, 
investigator found 21 people standing around reading front page of their papers. 
There was little talking, but others who had not been able to buy paper gave long 
glances at those standing and reading theirs.13 
 
In the clamour for news, jostling broke out in some places. There was irritation when 
people who had not been waiting received papers first—sellers having held back copies 
for their regular customers. Tension continued into the days following D-Day, however, 
there were more confessions of excitement. This was followed by cheerfulness, with 
some references to the war being shortened by the invasion and gossip of other potential 
landings.14 Throughout June and July expectations of how long the war would last 
decreased further, promoted by the visible collapse of the German defences.15  
 M-O reports indicate that there was a feeling that people were part of an 
important historic moment. The anxiety felt by individuals regarding the invasion 
stemmed from the possibility that relations and friends would be killed during the 
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invasion. More general anxiety came from the fact that such invasions had not been 
successful in the past, the failure of Dieppe perhaps the most notable. Although 
concerned with the possibility of failure, D-Day marked a point where previous defeats 
could be overturned. Considering the refraction of the legacy of the Great War, David 
Reynolds has argued that the end of the conflict in 1945 'finished the job apparently 
botched in 1918'.16 During the opening stages of the invasion, the capture of German 
POWs in Normandy and their arrival at British ports on the south-coast formed part of 
the reportage of the invasion; it was an important symbol of success and the changing 
dynamic of the war.  
 Having been fished out of the Channel—their craft having been sunk by 
invasion warships—a, presumably small, group of German POWs were landed at a 
south coast port late in the evening on 6 June.17 These were the first German servicemen 
to have been reportedly captured during the landings. The subsequent groups of POWs 
captured and brought to Britain formed an important element in the reportage of the 
invasion and subsequent breakout into the French bocage, symbolising the changing 
dynamic of the war which had already swung in favour of the Allies. Early in June, one 
particular POW anecdote, varying slightly in form in the different regional newspapers 
it appeared, was published alongside updates on the invasion.  
 
A train load of German POWs being transported to the north on 10 June stopped 
at a town in the south of England for a few moments. An onlooker asked a POW 
leaning out a window: "Well, Jerry, what do you think of England?". Another 
POW quickly responded: "Three years ago," he said, "Herr Hitler promised we 
would come to England." He shrugged and placed both of his fists together if 
they were handcuffed. "Vell," he added grimly, "we haf come.".18 
 
 Although impossible to verify the authenticity of it, this light-hearted exchange 
between captor and captive summarised the significant shift the war against Germany 
had undergone since the Battle of Britain. Having defeated France and forced Allied 
armies to retreat from Dunkirk, the German soldiers across the Channel had been poised 
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to invade Britain. Instead of victorious invaders, German servicemen marched into 
Britain in June 1944 as defeated POWs. Their arrival was commented upon by war 
correspondents who had flocked to the south coast to report on the invasion.  
 While journalists had certainly not specifically travelled to observe the 
disembarkation of the POWs, the inclusion of the captive enemy demonstrates that the 
German POWs formed an unavoidable part of the atmosphere and scenes of invasion 
staging areas on the south coast. Reports were by and large factual providing insight 
into the resistance offered Allied forces on the other side of the Channel. Furthermore, 
these descriptive accounts of the appearance and temperament of POWs were used as a 
measure of Germany's military condition and the morale of the enemy soldiers. One of 
the earliest reports was provided by H. P. Twyford, war correspondent for the Western 
Morning News, who commented on the POWs who he had seen being marshalled into a 
holding camp near the dockside in early June.  
 
They were mostly between the ages of 20 and 30, with quite a number rather 
tired and bedraggled looking, and seemingly quite happy about their position. 
They were of the type of solider perhaps best described as "holding troops," with 
just a sprinkling of those of a first line bearing. […] At this centre where they 
were received they had their examination, baths, and feeding before being 
passed along to another part of the country, where they will be kept out of action 
for the remainder of the war. About his aspect of their war career they seemed 
perfectly happy and contented.19 
 
Twyford provided another account a few days later:   
 
Today further batches of prisoners were being landed. This is a strange ferry 
service, unlike anything that any previous wars have known. The landing craft 
go the outward trip laden with fighting men and the implements of war. They 
bring back the wounded and the prisoners. The prisoners continue to be a very 
mixed bag, and odd assortment. They contain quite a sprinkling of Russians and 
Poles who have been forced into the German fighting machine and who are 
obviously in their element to be captured by the British. One pathetic sight 
among the prisoners which moved everyone almost to tears was a Russian boy 
of not more than 14 years. He was crying with fright, for he had been utterly 
scared by the Germans telling him that the Americans would "slit his throat." It 
was a tragic scene and it was a long time before any comfort from the British 
and Americans could assuage his fright.20 
 
Joe Illingworth, war correspondent for the Yorkshire Post, also provided his 
observations on the POWs he witnessed.  
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This afternoon I saw 500 prisoners brought ashore on the South Coast from a big 
landing craft. First came a lieutenant in his long coat and top boots. He bore 
himself well, looking neither to the left nor right as he was marched away alone 
under the case of the guard. He had the hard, fixed stare of the first-class 
German solider. After an interval the rest of the prisoners were marched out on 
to the quayside, and as they came you could hear onlookers murmur in surprise, 
for these were a motley collection. A Canadian solider who watched them go by 
commented: "These look a very delicate lot." There were few among them who 
stood six feet in their boots. Most of them, indeed, were undersized. Some were 
barely five feet in height. They were of all ages, and among them were a 
considerable number of old men—very old men—much too old to serve, one 
would have thought. Most of them, frankly, seemed glad to be out of it all, as the 
guards hurried them along to their cages they laughed both among themselves 
and at those of us who watched them. […] Then, as the last of them came off the 
ship, a ripple of amusement went through the crowd, for behind all this mass of 
grey-green German uniform scrambled six men in blue-grey uniforms—Italians. 
They looked better specimens than the Germans. They were certainly more 
handsome and a great deal better pleased with themselves. They had reason to 
be, for when I spoke to them afterwards I found they had eagerly taken 
advantage of our invasion and had made for our lines and surrendered.21 
 
Twyford and Illingworth's reports shared common themes which surprised the 
journalists. Initial batches of German POWs were not considered first-rate soldiers, with 
a great number being quite old or extremely young. Pictures of the POWs published in 
the press contrasted the maturity of Allied servicemen with their youthful captives. 
Furthermore, the majority of the POWs were not ethnic Germans. Batches contained 
numerous and unexpected nationalities, predominantly from Eastern Europe. These men 
had been forced to fight for Germany, and, uncommitted to their Nazi leaders, had 
surrendered to Allied forces at the first opportunity, in some cases killing their German 
officers. They were glad to have been captured and out of the war, and believed that the 
war would soon be over. While the reports were predominantly factual accounts of the 
observations of the journalists, they arguably presented a picture of a German military 
force lacking resources and men, a sharp contrast to the professional soldiers which had 
taken part in the Blitzkrieg of 1940 and the North African campaign. Certainly, the 36 
infantry divisions made up of some 850,000 soldiers defending the Atlantic Wall, as 
Beevor describes, 'were of very mixed quality'.22 Twyford correctly observed that the 
majority of the POWs shipped across during the early stages of the invasion had been 
specifically assigned to costal defence. The best soldiers were directed into SS 
formations, leaving only the older and younger servicemen for these infantry divisions. 
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Numbers had been increased through the conscription of Volksdeutsch—those deemed 
to be of German origin from central Europe and the Baltic. Poles had been forcibly 
recruited while Soviet POWs, wanting to escape the dire conditions of their camps, had 
volunteered to serve as Osttruppen. The various nationalities which made up the 
infantry divisions defending Normandy concerned German officers and NGOs, who 
feared that their troops would quickly turn on them when fighting commenced.23 These 
other nationalities were dubbed 'Hitler's slave troops' by Daily Mail war correspondent 
Alexander Clifford.24 These soldiers made up, as journalists reported, the first POWs to 
be taken during the invasion. Their age and nationality came as surprising, and 
portrayed a diminishing German military force. However as Illingworth noted, there 
was a higher proportion of first rate soldiers in later batches.  
 
There were German paratroopers among the prisoners, men of strict obedience 
who exercised a disciplinary influence on the remainder during the voyage. They 
came ashore in batches of about 100. Many were very young, mere boys, but in 
general they were a harder and tougher looking lot than those I saw in the early 
stages of our invasion.25  
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Image 6 Dundee Evening Telegraph, 13 June 1944, p. 1. 
 
Image 7 Yorkshire Post, 14 June 1944, p. 3. 
Newspaper content provides insight into the reaction of the public to the arrival of 
German POWs, which remained the same mixture of indifference and curiosity as it had 
been earlier in the war. There were several 'contact zones' where the public encountered 
the captive enemy first hand. In her seminal work on travel in the imperial environment, 
Mary Louise Pratt coined the term in reference to the space in which imperial 
encounters occurred. She defined a 'contact zone' as 'the space in which peoples 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and 
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establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, 
and intractable conflict'. In the case of POW encounters, Pratt's conceptualisation of the 
contact zone is useful, although it requires some alteration to the different context.26 The 
first point of contact between the public and POWs were the docks. On 8 June, the 
Daily Mail reported on the arrival of a group of POWs the previous night. The 
description of these early POWs matched others, but the report also notes the presence 
of a crowd which had gathered to view the POWs.  
 
A batch of German prisoners arrived here on British motor-gunboats late to-
night. They were N.C.O.s and men in field grey, and there were four ambulance 
carloads of seriously wounded. Soon after the boats tied up to the dock side 
armed marines came up the gangways leading a motley procession. Some of the 
prisoners wore their steel helmets and clutched bundles under their arms. They 
were loaded into eight open-sided lorries, with grinning Allied infantrymen in 
the rear. The news had quickly spread through the dockside streets, and 
hundreds of people, with soldiers and sailors—many of them just returned from 
the Cherbourg—Havre battle-fronts—stood on the kerbside to watch the 
prisoners pass. The four brilliantly-lit ambulances swung out of the dockyard 
and drove swiftly through the dark streets to a neighbouring military hospital. 
[…] Some of the unwounded prisoners smiled—one gave the "thumbs up" sign 
as he passed, and several shout "Kaput"—but there was no arm-slinging or "Heil 
Hitlering." The prisoners were not up to the standard of the average British 
solider either in equipment, uniform, or physique. A fair proportion were thin, 
sallow-faced boys of 18. They gave the impression that all the spirits had been 
knocked out of them. When a military policeman asked one man how he felt 
about the war, he replied slowly in English: "It does not matter now; it is soon 
all over. We are beaten, I know." That was the general attitude of the captives.27 
 
The arrival of this group of POWs was something of a spectacle which those in the area 
of the dock were curious to witness. Memoirs of German POWs support newspaper 
coverage, indicating that there was little demonstration towards them by those 
witnessing their arrival. Herbert Holewa noted the quietness of Southampton when he 
disembarked there: 'British people may have given the "V salute", but otherwise, very, 
very quiet, very nice'. The civilians standing on the pavement 'looked on in silence' as 
Siegfried Mohring and the other POWs were unloaded. 'Not one', he recalled, 'threw a 
stone or spat, swore, or insulted us, no one shouted'.28 At Harwich, Horst Woetzel 
recalls the 'cool matter-of-fact way' he was treated. Military personnel and dockworkers 
did not stare at the POWs. Another POW similarly recalled, 'at Southampton they 
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looked through us as if we were glass'. Writing of their experiences during their 
transportation, German POWs note a marked difference in British hands when 
compared to their treatment by soldiers and civilians of other nationalities. It was not 
uncommon for German POWs to be pelted by stones and bottles or bludgeoned by rifle 
butts in Belgium.29 George Gebauer had expected hostility from passers-by as he was 
marched through Southampton. Instead, 'they ignored us, minding their own business'. 
Gebauer speculated that the locals had seen many POWs and had become accustomed 
to the sight of the captured enemy.  John Marshall, Hull Daily Mail reporter noted that 
while many POWs were brought to port where he was waiting to embark to Normandy, 
'the dockyard workers stood silently watching them'.30  
 There was a degree of curiosity towards the POWs held in at the two large 
transit camps at Wanstead Flats, a portion of Epping Forest, and on the East Ham-
Barking by-pass. 31  These camps aroused local curiosity, with crowds of sightseers 
visiting Wanstead Flats during the weekend of 7-8 October. Press reports reveal that, at 
times, the crowds stood six-deep as they press close to the barbed wire. Military guards 
and specially detailed police kept move the people along. On Saturday passers-by saw 
the inmates playing football with a ball made of rolled-up rags, and on Sunday evening 
the Germans could be heard singing inside the camp. 32   For local residents, the 
proximity of the camps to their homes was resented. In October, the Daily Mail 
published a picture taken from a bedroom window of a house across the road of the 
POW camp at East Ham, noting that the women of the blitzed areas resented having to 
look out on the masses of POWs, even though they were behind barbed wire.33 The 
camp at Wanstead was closed on 28 October after protests were made by residents, who 
complained for the 'brilliance of the searchlights' illuminating the camp at night, and of 
the singing of the POWs.34  
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 From transit camps POWs were distributed throughout Britain, transported by 
train. Railway stations became another point of contact between civilians and POWs.35 
Newspapers reported some minor incidents. For instance, a train full of German POWs 
pulled in at a G.W.R. station with two black swastikas on the windows of one coach. 
The station inspector, looking in the carriages, found two more on the off-side windows. 
He asked the officer in charge why they were displayed. He said, 'they want to keep the 
old home atmosphere a bit longer'. The inspector said that the train would not move 
until they were removed. And they were.36  
 There was some controversy over the travelling arrangements for German 
POWs. While the cattle truck was the main mode of transportation on the Continent, 
POWs travelled across Britain in train coaches—upholstered, also being heated in 
winter. The 'luxurious travelling conditions' afforded German POWs were criticised in 
parliament, especially the inconvenience it posed to the British railway passenger.37 On 
11 July, Sir Edward Keeling (Con. MP, Twickenham) questioned the unreasonable 
practice of allowing one seat per POW on train carriages, and asked the secretary of 
state for war to change it to two POWs per seat, to allow other travellers a fair share of 
train accommodation. Keeling pointed out that the Germans used box-cars to transport 
British POWs 40 at a time on the Continent. As a matter of security, and to minimise 
the number of guards required, Grigg asserted that POWs had to remain seated.38 The 
explanation was not considered satisfactory. Reporting on the parliamentary debate, the 
Aberdeen Journal recorded the public irritation at the 'blind adherence to red tape'. The 
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journalist suggested that 'the sooner the authorities take a less gentlemanly view of our 
enemies the better'.  
 
A number of people feel that War Office procedure is still too closely modelled 
on 1066 and all that, when your enemy in the field was a brother-gentleman 
once his armour was off, and to be treated as one of yourselves accordingly.39 
 
Such gallant treatment of a defeated enemy was considered not only outdated, but unfair 
on the British civilian and solider. The Glasgow Sunday Post asked 'What softy insists 
on soft seats for Jerries?'. During railway journeys 'hundreds of folk have no hope for a 
seat', something guaranteed for the enemy. Moreover, in contrast to the 'Stalag stories of 
our prisoners being bundled into truck forty at a time', German officers travel to British 
camps first class.40  The inconvenience posed to the public by allowing German POWs 
seating was brought up in parliament several times.41 Protest continued in November 
1944 when, in the Lords, Earl Poulett noted that while POWs were seen sitting 
comfortably, the general public were 'crushed up like sardines in a box'. Poulett also 
criticised the practice of not reserving train accommodation for small groups of officer 
POWs. They had to be kept separate from the civilians so therefore the civilians were 
moved out of carriages, exacerbating the already crowded situation. Poulett had first-
hand experience of this, when he and his wife had been removed from their train 
compartment to make way for two POWs at an unspecified Midland station. German 
POWs interrupted the everyday lives of British railway-goers, although how often this 
type of thing occurred is unknown; it seems that it occurred rarely. While 'we do not 
want to imitate the Hun' he noted, the Germans used cattle trucks and the British 
traveller should be considered a little more. 42  The Daily Mail published Poulett's 
'astonishing story', along with other examples provided by readers which had long been 
the cause of 'deep resentment'. The public had had to stand in cramped corridors while 
they saw 'grinning Germans each with a seat to himself'. One Mail reader had recently 
reportedly witnessing five German officers in a heated compartment, smoking and 
eating chocolate, while 14 civilians were forced to stand in an 'icy corridor'. It 
welcomed the end to this 'scandal'.43  
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 The wounded amongst the prisoners were taken to military hospitals, often being 
in wards adjacent to British civilians and other nationalities. The proximity of German 
POWs to British servicemen and civilians caused some upset in parliament.44 Wing-
Commander Errington asked for German POWs to be segregated. Willink pointed out 
the strain on Emergency Hospitals necessitated German POWs being in wards with 
British soldiers.45 A nurse working at Blackburn Royal Infirmary described the arrival 
of some 30 German POWs to the hospital in late August 1944 in her M-O diary. When 
the patients of the ward where the German prisoners were to be located realised why 
they had been moved they were 'infuriated'. However, the animosity expressed toward 
the German prisoners came from the Polish and Russian patients and staff more so than 
the British. A Polish patient noticed the German uniforms placed at the end of their beds 
and 'nearly went mad'. Leaning out of the window into the ward where the German 
POWs were placed, he shouted and spat at them and had to be hauled back to bed by a 
group of patients. 46 A female Czech physician refused to attend to the Germans and 
made a great scene in the theatre […] when she went in a found the Jerries being 
anaesthetised to have their wounded attended to'.  Emotions were 'running high' in the 
hospital about the German patients, who the nurse described in her diary as unsavoury 
characters: nurses attending to the German convalescents were 'greeted by all kinds of 
catcalls and the Jerries jabble among amongst themselves and appear to be jeering'. The 
German were, however, treated in exactly the same way as British soldiers, being given 
a share of free issue cigarettes sent by charitable organisation, and allowed to roam the 
hospital grounds.47 Reflecting on the German patients a few months later, she stated that 
one or two nurses had been regarded as being too friendly with them. One the other 
hand, some nurses 'would have watched them die without raising a finger'. Personally, 
she was incapable of hating all Germans, and believed that 'there are good and bad of 
every race'. She made an insightful observation, revealing another factor which shaped 
British attitudes towards German prisoners. She thought that she would obviously feel 
differently towards the German POWs if she had been an 'unfortunate inhabitant' of an 
occupied country. She believed that if she had experienced German occupation then she 
'could know how to hate'. Interestingly the nurse noted that it was strange how a number 
of the other nurses were 'violently antagonistic to anything German' but had 'no close 
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connections involved in the fight', and had never 'suffered anything'.48  Her  partner had 
been captured at Dunkirk and was a prisoner in Germany. 
 A female nurse in Otley was collecting groceries when a batch of German 
POWs marched by. A 'miserable looking crowd', she felt 'terribly sorry for them'. The 
people watched them in silence, and there was no demonstration toward the POWs. She 
was glad that there was no demonstration despite Eden's statement in the commons 
about the shooting of the 50 RAF officers.49 This would have made any demonstration 
against the POWs understandable. 'Passion's sister hatred seem there but […] when all's 
said and done they are somebodies lads'. She understood that the POWs were average 
men. Then again Yorkshire had experienced a very different war to the rest of the 
country; 'apart from personal tragedies we've not felt the war much'. Leeds was 'semi-
blitzed' and Bradford had been attacked once, while Otley had never been raided. 
Therefore, the lack of demonstration was explained as a result of the different regional 
experience of the war, suggesting that other areas might react differently to German 
POWs.50  Indeed, there were some instances of demonstration towards transports of 
German POWs. Gebauer, who was on route to the United States with a group of POWs, 
was greeted with missiles and abuse by a hostile crowd in Liverpool.51  
 
4. Stalag Luft III, May 1944 to June 1944 
Observing the passage of a trainload of German POWs through the city, an associate of 
the London correspondent for the Aberdeen Journal had informed him that, despite their 
pitiful appearance—'They looked as though they had had everything the human frame 
could stand'—the crowd watching them showed no compassion. The shooting of R.A.F. 
officers at Stalag Luft III, it was suggested, was 'too recently carved on their minds'.52 
Their murder, Vasilis Vourkoutiotis has reflected, 'constituted perhaps the greatest 
crime against British and American POWs' during the Second World War.53 Wylie 
notes that the Stalag Luft III shootings 'steeled Britain's determination to fight on until 
Germany's unconditional surrender'. The incident also, 'underscored the ferocity of the 
Nazi regime, and forced policymakers to confront the possibility of their men being 
subjected to the kind of violence and brutality that had hitherto been reserved for 
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Hitler's racial enemies'.54 Calls for immediate justice against the perpetrators of this 
crime engendered debate over the accountability of the German people and the 
treatment of German POWs held in Britain. The unequivocal culpability of the SS, 
acting on a special command of Hitler, was confirmed at the Nuremberg Trials. 
However, in the summer of 1944 few in Germany knew the truth, and no one in Britain 
could positivity identify where responsibility lay—it would be 17 months after the 
killings before the RAF was ordered to find and detain those responsible.55 Therefore, 
when the murders were first publically divulged, whether this was a unique act of 
barbarity committed by the excesses of the Nazi regime, or an incident which confirmed 
the fundamental maliciousness of the German people was open to debate.  
 When Eden first announced the deaths of 47 Royal Air Force, Dominion and 
Allied Air Force officers after the mass escape from Stalag Luft III, on 19 May, he 
provided few details, ensuring that a full investigation would take place.56 With no 
concrete facts known, his statement and subsequent news coverage was vague. By and 
large, front page articles simply referred to the RAF officers having been killed by 
'Germans', a collective term which did not distinguish between the German people and 
the Nazi regime.57 Before any further information was reported, the shootings provided 
further evidence of the war turning against Germany and the intrinsically vicious 
character of the average German. In the Gloucestershire Echo, a columnist considered 
the act a sign of 'desperation' by a Germany now losing the war. Moreover, the killings 
exemplified 'the German's native venom and appetite for cruelty'. Suggesting that 47 
men were justifiably shot during an attempted escape was thought 'too much even for 
the most credulous to swallow'. Rather, the Germans had 'obviously seized on an excuse 
[…] to indulge in their characteristic relish for barbarous killings'. This was 'clear 
evidence of the despicable state of the German mind in these days of their decline'.58 
Having received a note from the German authorities and compiled reports from 
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repatriated British POWs and the Swiss protecting power, Eden made a full statement 
on 23 June 1944.59 Admonishing the explanation of the German authorities, he declared 
that the 50 officers—3 more victims having been added to the initial 47 reported in 
May—had not been killed while attempting to re-escape after arrest. 60 The German 
justification for the killings contrasted sharply with the statement made and evidence 
provided by Captain H. M. Massey, the former senior officer at Stalag Luft III.61 The 
facts pointed to only one conclusion:  the POWs were murdered at an unidentified place 
after their removal from a Gestapo prison. Eden promised that the government, 
condemning 'these cold-blooded acts of butchery', would not rest until the culprits were 
'brought to exemplary justice'.62 In the wake of Eden's statement, journalists recorded 
the anger of the British public and the desire for immediate retribution. Furthermore, a 
hardening of attitudes towards the German people was reflected. The London 
correspondent for the Aberdeen Journal observed that in the wake of Stalag Luft III, 
'The argument that the German people should be left alone as distinct from the Nazi-
Gestapo class does not cut ice any more with the majority of people here'.63 Similarly, 
the Dundee Courier  stated that 'There is no depth of infamy to which the Germans 
cannot sink. The black record of their atrocities covers the whole continent of Europe'.64 
In contrast, the editor of the Yorkshire Post advised their readers to 'not be misled by 
over vociferous demands to treat all Germans as bloody-minded sadists of the Hitler-
Himmler kind or by a kindly intentioned insistence that some Germans hated the 
cruelties done in their name or even knew nothing about them.65 The division of opinion 
on were responsibility lay for the murders, and the crimes committed in the name of 
National Socialist generally, was echoed in the House of Lords.  
 Even before Germany had offered an explanation for the deaths of the RAF 
officers, Vansittart refused to 'accept any explanation or extenuation put forward by the 
Huns'. Based on his experiences during the Great War as head of the Prisoner Of War 
Department, he had a 'vivid recollection of German cruelties', and spoke of the German 
incapability to speak the truth.66 On 13 July 1944, Vansittart called attention to the 
'massacre' of the 50 RAF officers, raising the question of how the culprits would be 
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punished. He reminded his fellow Lords of the failure to punish war criminals—
referring to Generals Stenger, von Billow, and von der Goltz—after the Great War. 
Although the punishment of war crimes was taken seriously by Allied jurists after the 
First World War, the result of the trials was poor.  With the Treaty of Versailles 
considered to have treated Germany unfairly, especially the 'shame paragraphs' (Articles 
227 and 231), Germans, including the German jurists, were more concerned with 
clearing the accused of charges than exacting justice.67 Vansittart was 'determined not to 
be cheated again'. He agreed that the Gestapo were the 'immediate' culprits, but behind 
them were the 'ultimate culprits', the German General Staff. Vansittart called for every 
member of the German General Staff who, at the time, had any connection with POW 
matters to be put on trial. He contended that they would have had to authorise to 
Gestapo's actions. The Bishop of Chichester was not convinced by Vansittart. He agreed 
the barbarity of the murders, but doubted the legal responsibility of the German army in 
the shootings, believing that the Gestapo superseded Army authority.68  
 
5. The burial of German POWs at Cheltenham, June 1944 to July 1944 
On 24 June 1944, the Gloucestershire Echo reported that four German POWs had been 
buried at Cheltenham cemetery the previous day, with full military honours.69 Each 
coffin was draped with a Nazi flag, and British soldiers of the Royal Corps of Signals 
acted as bearers. Having read of the funeral, 'two disgusted war-workers' registered their 
distaste at the ceremony afforded the enemy in a letter to the editor.70 In light of the 
'cold-blooded' treatment of the RAF officers from Stalag Luft III, they doubted if British 
POWs were afforded similar treatment; a cynical reference to the swift cremation of 
several of the officers. Four correspondents agreed that the mawkishness expressed 
towards the enemy in the ceremonious fashion of the funeral was distasteful and 
inappropriate. 'Away with such silly, sloppy sentiment!' W. T. Knightbridge wrote, 
while A Real Britisher similarly asked to 'cut out the sob stuff, please'. For those 
criticising the burial, the Germans, described as 'fiendish jack-booted scum', were not 
only responsible for the destruction and death caused in the current conflict and the 
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Great War, but had committed heinous crimes against innocent people—'nothing is too 
bad for them, dead or alive'. 71  Most correspondents, however, condemned the 
reciprocity advocated. The common trope in letters attacking the war workers view was 
avoiding descending to the level of the enemy, and the preservation of British values. D. 
P. Smith called to honour brave men. 
 
To insult the body of a fallen foe, or even to omit to pay him due honours, is the 
action of a barbarian. The Nazis may descend to that level. Most Englishmen 
will prefer not to flatter them by descending with them. By such action men 
dishonour not their enemies but themselves.72  
 
Although faced with an enemy capable of barbarous acts, such as the Stalag Luft III 
shootings, Britain could not sink to the level of the enemy by reciprocating their 
treatment of POWs. While the Germans might commit 'cold-blooded' acts, 'our war 
aim', a British sailor's wife wrote, 'was to be what they are not', 'to do justice'.73 Britain, 
as 'the accepted centre of freedom and justice', was tasked with setting 'and example to 
which the oppressed people of Hitler's Europe can look up'. Affording the enemy dead a 
funeral ceremony was symbolic of the democratic values for which Britain was fighting 
against Germany. Furthermore, burying the dead was a Christian act, one of the 
'corporal works of mercy'. The idea that all Germans were guilty of the crimes 
committed by the leaders was also challenged. These Germans were not to blame for the 
death of the RAF officers from Stalag Luft III. Although misguided by their Nazi 
leaders, they were still soldiers, the same as British servicemen, who had fallen on the 
field of battle. As the views expressed in the letters demonstrate, the burial of the four 
German POWs at Cheltenham was saturated with meaning.  
 
6. Comforts for POWs in Aberdeen,  September 1944 to November 1944 
Correspondents to the Aberdeen Journal and Dundee Courier registered their 'shock', 
'annoyance' and 'fury' at the distribution of sweets and cigarettes to German POWs at 
Aberdeen Joint Station. In light of the revelation that their money was spent on comforts 
for the enemy, correspondents noted they would cancel their subscription to the British 
Red Cross. Those condemning the action of the Red Cross were convinced that the 
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German POWs were fundamentally evil. While British POWs were mistreated by 
Germany in both wars, sentimental souls were treating German POWs like heroes on 
their arrival of Britain.  Reacting to the news of sweets and cigarettes being distributed 
to wounded German prisoners of war arriving at Aberdeen Joint Station, nine 
correspondents, from across Scotland, wrote to the Dundee Courier. J. A. M. criticised 
the charitable spoiling of POWs. Angered after learning of the reception given to the 
prisoners, J. A. M. wondered, if it had occurred to the 'soft hearts' that amongst these 
German POWs might be the very men who kicked over the water buckets provided by 
French and Belgium villagers to British prisoners as they suffered the torture of 
marching from France to Germany.74 J. A. M. viewed all German prisoners as Nazis, 
and it was 'a great pity' that so many had been captured—humanitarian idealism was 
redundant in the reality of war.75 It was another correspondent who instigated further 
letters being sent to the Courier on the subject. Having been shocked by the news, 
Vigilante—a pseudonym signalling that they did not think the law was just—asked the 
readers of the Courier  their thoughts on the distribution of sweets and cigarettes to 
wounded German prisoners on arrival in the country. A resident of Fordoun, in 
Aberdeenshire, they were outraged at the revelation that 'the Hun' received the same 
treatment as a British serviceman. 76  M. B. Sinclair certainly wondered how many 
British Red Cross supporters approved of the practice. Sinclair protested bitterly against 
it. This was not because they were enemies:  
 
I would be among the last to refuse comforts to a wounded enemy if that enemy 
were an honourable one and a fair and clear fighter, but the German, by the 
atrocities and barbarities which he has committed both in the last war and in this, 
has shown himself to be quite beyond the pale of all decency.  
 
The funds of the Red Cross were wasted on providing sweets and cigarettes to 'the 
arrogant brute'. Paraphrasing Matthew 7:6, Sinclair argued: 'There is such a thing as 
casting pearls before swine'.77 George M. Fleming wrote to confirm that he would cease 
his subscription to the P.O.W. fund until the distribution of comforts to German 
prisoners was stopped, and suggested—perhaps influence by the action of Reverend 
Green—sending tins of rat poison to the people who provided the items. If these people 
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had witnessed the horrors committed by the prisoners, Fleming argued, 'they would not 
be so mushy over the swine'.78   
 An ex-soldier's wife wondered 'what sane men died for' having read the reports 
of comforts being distributed to German prisoners. Ten of her brother and cousins, as 
well as her husband, had fought in France during the Great War. Only her husband 
survived—two had died of their wounded shortly after returning—and before he could 
take off his uniform, their sons were donning theirs to fight the Hun again. 'The 
Germans' she wrote 'had ceased to be a human race and are entirely the Hun, and should 
be treated as such'. As they were inhumane, they did not deserve compassion. The ex-
soldier's wife was glad at the likelihood that the Red Army would reach Germany first. 
As a result, those 'doing the kid glove business', that is the sympathisers, would not have 
a say in the treatment of the German people. Those that gave comforts to German 
prisoners undermined the death of British soldiers who had and were now again fighting 
the Germans, as they, through their affable treatment, were being too soft and therefore 
encouraging the German people to fight in the future.79 Glad to read the letter of Ex-
soldier's wife, E. D. Coats suggested she should petition the Prime Minister to stop such 
action, and similarly argued that, 
 
Though I recognise that a certain number of our people seem to suffer from 
mental derangement, it did not occur to me that anyone would be so lacking in 
knowledge of the dastardly conduct of the Germans, both in the last was and in 
this one, as to send them gifts of any kind.  
 
Coats noted that for the German people it was a win-win situation. The British not only 
sent parcels to Germany for British POWs, but also distributed comforts to German 
POWs, 'the most pampered people', in Britain. This, Coats maintained, was 'a direct 
insult to our own men'.80 Coats signature was St. Serfs, St. Fillans: the former was most 
likely a Church, so perhaps Coats was a clergyman, and the latter is a village in the 
central highlands of Scotland, near Comrie.  Finally, a demobilised solider noted his 
detestation at the news of pampered German prisoners. Having fought in both wars 
against Germany, he believed that Christian teachings could not be bought into the 
business of war. The ex-solider recounted his time in North Africa, as part of the Men 
England Forgot. This was the unofficial name for the Middle East Force, adopted as the 
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soldiers believed that compared to other services they were neglected in the press and 
radio. This was perhaps the source of his anger, that British servicemen in distant 
theatres of war were ignored while enemy prisoners in Britain were coddled.81 The 
majority of the correspondents writing to the Dundee Courier criticised the action of the 
British Red Cross, arguing that callous German prisoners—usually referred to as Nazis 
and Huns—were undeserving of comforts. One correspondent, however, felt implied to 
write to the Courier  answering these letters. Signed Buckhaven—a town on the east 
coast of Fife—the correspondent did not reveal their name, perhaps believing their 
opinion was not that of the majority, and fearing reprisal for expressing it. 'All decent-
minded people deplore Nazism', Buckhaven wrote, 'but don't let us descend to it. Poor 
wounded creatures, whether German or otherwise, command pity, and in the case of an 
enemy mercy'. From a Christian perspective, Buckhaven noted that no discrimination 
could be made between the wounded, even if they were the enemy. Furthermore, the 
Allies were supposedly fighting for a 'better world, a Christian world', being unmerciful 
to wounded enemies undermined this aim. Admitting that some prisoners might be, 
Buckhaven argued that not all were churlish or cruel. The Christian ethics for which the 
war was being fought had to be maintained, if not, the British would fall into the 
barbaric methods which they sought to defeat.82  
 
7. A Vicar's vulgar joke, October 1944 to November 1944 
Conflicting attitudes extended to the clergy. In October, reverend J. C. Chamberlain, the 
Vicar Of Christ Church, Shooters Hill, London, appealed to his diocese for comforts for 
sick German prisoners in Britain. Having heard of the appeal, a fellow clergyman, 
Reverend H. G. Green, the Vicar of St. Nicholas, Ipswich, responded with a note:   
 
Having seen your tender-hearted request for comforts for the blasphemers of 
God and butchers of men, I herewith send a small comfort which I am sure they 
will enjoy. I am sorry the tin is not full, but a small dose will do the trick. 
 
The 'small comfort' was a tin of rat poison. This action evidently caused concern in his 
diocese, with Green having to defend his actions. Preaching at his Church on 29 
October, Green noted his displeasure with Chamberlain's appeal. In an attempt, perhaps, 
to deflect criticism, he stated that it was 'a bit of a joke'. However, Green—who had two 
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sons serving in the forces—was still of the opinion that German prisoners 'were lucky to 
get the bare necessities of life'. The Germans had: 
 
[…] perpetrated vile acts of murder, terror, and plunder, and their villainies 
beggar description. I have no doubt that people who make such appeals think 
that they are acting in accordance with the Sermon on the Mount and the 
teachings of St Paul, but I defy anyone to find me a single sentence in the Bible 
where I can be called upon to serve the enemies of God and man.83 
 
While Green defended his actions at his Church, Chamberlain had already forwarded 
the note onto the Bishop of Ipswich, Dr Richard Brook—as a result, this story was 
picked up by national newspapers. Rebuking his action, Brook stated that Green 'must 
not be taken seriously', it was a 'poor joke—cheap and vulgar'. Distancing the Church 
from Green's views, Brook went on to say that while Green was entitled to his own 
opinions, 'such idle and ill-mannered jesting in so serious a matter is deplorable, 
especially in a clergyman'. Green had discredited the Church. However, Green found 
support from several other sections of society, with members of the Armed Forces, 
doctors and other clergymen, sending letters of congratulations.84 One report noted that 
a Canadian solider had been sent by 900 wounded comrades at a military hospital to 
shake Green's hand. The Canadian stated that his fare had been paid by his comrades, 
who wanted him to say that they were behind him. Freed by American forces, the 
Canadian had been a prisoner in Germany.85  Other reports noted that postmen had 
taken 600 letters to Green in support of his action. Having received such backing, Green 
stated to the press that he would respond to Brook's rebuke, disagreeing that he had 
brought discredit on the Church. Green was not they only one to criticise Chamberlain's 
appeal. Captain J. Davis M. C., president of the Grantham branch of the British Legion 
wrote to Chamberlain, 'expressing his disgust' over his appeal. He was father of three 
serving sons, one had died.86 At the same time, Chamberlain's appeal also received 
support, and by 6 November, £250 had been raised. While Chamberlain did not refer to 
Green's actions in his services, Green criticised his appeal again at an Evensong service. 
In response to Brooke's rebuke, Green stated that German prisoners, he said, would be 
well looked after. To hand out comforts and prizes was shameful and against all 
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principles of justice. 'Far too many people are basing their thoughts and actions on being 
kind to the enemies of God and men on the misapplied quotation 'Love your enemies,'' 
he declared. 'I believe in a full-blooded Christ,' he declared. 'He would not call on us to 
love Nazi brutes'.87 Chamberlain's appeal for comforts was borne out to the Christian 
idea to love thine enemies, and evidently received a measure of support, with a sum of 
£250 raised. Writing to editors, those that supported him were of a similar Christian 
conviction. However, Green and his supporters had no sympathy with an enemy they 
considered merciless.   
 The Allied advance toward Germany waned in January 1945, but by March 
American and British troops had crossed the Rhine into Germany. The Germans were 
now being fought on their own soil. From April, the pace of the war accelerated towards 
conclusion. Scepticism of the authenticity of atrocity stories largely vanished, so too did 
arguments that the German people were different from their Nazi leaders. Sympathy 
towards the average German with had been fostered by Allied bombing was lost. Calls 
for vengeance, M-O reported, did not increase, but sympathy for the Germans certainly 
declined.   
 
8. The liberation of Belsen, April 1945 to May 1945 
With the liberation of Belsen in April 1945, an extraordinary volume of information—
wireless broadcasts, newspaper articles, newsreels, and in some cases letters and 
conversation with relatives and other contacts in the military—presented the British 
public with evidence of the atrocities perpetrated inside German concentration camps. It 
was difficult to evade exposure to the stories. Yet, as Holocaust scholars argue, 
comprehension of the true nature of Nazi atrocities was severely lacking.  
 The existence of the camps entered the consciousness of the British public in the 
1930s, with reports on the abuse of political enemies of the Nazi regime in 
concentration camps written soon after they were established. In the early years of Nazi 
rule, inmates who had either escaped or been released published accounts of the cruelty 
they had witnessed. 88  Moreover, leftists in Britain attempted to highlight this Nazi 
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brutality through inquires. However, these attempts were subdued by the government 
pursuing a policy of appeasement. With the outbreak of war, the Foreign Office was 
free to publicise the mistreatment of prisoners in Buchenwald and Dachau. The White 
Paper published in October 1939 failed to encourage the wanton indignation in the 
public. Instead, the report was considered a cynical propaganda stunt of the same 
character as the atrocity stories published during the Great War. Although the existence 
of concentration camps was not challenged, it was argued that the government should 
have revealed more during the time of appeasement. With the public unimpressed, the 
Ministry of Information was resolved to limit the 'horror stuff', using it sparingly.   
 Throughout the war evidence was collected by the authorities and sometimes 
published in the media, but was met with scepticism in official and public circles. The 
codebreakers at Bletchley Park cracked SS Enigma Keys in late 1940, allowing the 
British secret service to eavesdrop on the unfolding Nazi terror within concentration 
camps. A vast number of messages were decoded by British intelligence, providing an 
'astonishing' insight into camp structures: inmate movement between and within camps; 
staffing; the shift to utilising inmates as slave labour; daily terror; and, the deadly nature 
of Auschwitz where a substantial number of Jews were being sent.89  The evidence 
gathered through broken radio communications was, however, rough. Other sources 
were required to corroborate this material. From the outset of the war, British 
intelligence agencies secretly recorded German POWs, the transcripts providing 
evidence of their participation and knowledge of war crimes.90 Even more significant 
was the material gathered from Jewish groups and the Polish government-in-exile, 
which collected reports from the Polish underground, sometimes circulating them 
directly to the British media. By the end of 1942 at the latest, Allied authorities were 
aware of the systematic extermination of European Jewry. In December, an Allied 
declaration publically denounced the slaughter of Jews in East Europe, but it made no 
reference to concentration camps, instead referring to 'labour camps'. This declaration 
was quickly forgotten as authorities feared excessive exposure to Nazi atrocities would 
detract from the war effort.91 The amounting evidence of the Final Solution was largely 
ignored. Walter Laqueur, suggests that, due to their ignorance of Nazism, officials in 
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London and Washington met the evils being committed with suspicion.92 By 1944 the 
truth was difficult to ignore.  
 While news of the war was generally positive—British forces 25 miles from 
Hamburg, Soviet forces 20 miles from Berlin—Mass Observation recorded the 'marked 
horror' at the revelation of the camps. The British public were asked three questions 
regarding the news of the concentration camps by Mass-Observation investigators. 
First, the sample was asked if they had any prior knowledge of the camps: 31 per cent 
claimed they had heard of them before, while 55 per cent stated they had 'a vague 
impression before'. Second, they were asked if they believed the stories. There was a 
dramatic rise in those who now considered them true, from 37 per cent in December 
1944 to 81 per cent in April 1945. Finally, they were asked about their feelings towards 
the German people apart from their leaders. There was a definite increase in the 
'unsympathetic' category, rising from 54 per cent in February 1945 to 67 per cent. The 
majority were now hostile to the German people, describing them as 'a plague spot', 
'vermin', and 'an abomination'. Several of the recorded responses called for reciprocity, 
adopting the fascistic tone of the enemy. A 55 year old male of D classification stated: 'I 
doubt if there's a decent German left. I think the whole lot deserve to be taken into 
slavery - oh, I don't know what they don’t deserve - hanging or shooting's too good for 
them'. A more extreme view was taken by a 30 year old female of C classification: 'I 
think this: the children should be taken out of the country, and we ought to turn their 
gas-bombs on them and exterminate them'. 93  Similar views were recorded by 
investigators posted outside cinemas and exhibitions, including the Daily Express 
exhibition at Trafalgar Square, which broadcast images of concentration camps. There 
were some sceptical remarks recorded. Some did not believe that this was a deliberate 
policy of the Germans but the result of the disorganisation of Germany, exacerbated by 
Allied bombing. However, these were untypical. Most were horrified and desired 
violent revenge. Germans, it was believed, were a brutal race which celebrated murder. 
The anger directed at the German people included German POWs in British hands: 
'After seeing the exhibition I feel we ought to shoot every German. There's not a good 
one amongst them. We're too soft. We oughtn't to take so many live prisoners'. An 
extreme solution to the German people lay in the treatment of POWs for a 50 year old 
male of C classification:  
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Pretty disgusted with it, that's how I feel. What's more I'm very glad such facts 
have been brought to light. The Germans have a sadistic trait in them, and 
delight in the sufferings of other races. If you'll pardon my saying so, and I'm 
loathe to say what I'm going to say to a lady, but my feeling on this are very 
strong indeed - The only way to punish them it to castrate every prisoner of war 
before he's released. Destroy the German race once and for all. Every healthy 
German citizen, man and woman, is a potential breeder of a future army in the 
making. 
 
An M-O diarist, angered by the images of concentration camps on newsreels, wanted 
reprisals.  
 
The German prison camp was shown; it was not very clear, but clear enough to 
make me want to put our Nazi prisoners in under the same conditions; nothing 
less with make those sub-human beasts realize that it is wrong to torture other 
folk in such cruel ways.94 
 
April 1945 also witnessed, alongside the publication of concentration camp atrocities, 
the liberation and return of British servicemen who had been captive in German hands. 
Regional press celebrated the return on local men, who were reunited with their friends 
and family.95 Interviews with the ex-POWs revealed the ordeal they had suffered. A 
strong and recurrent theme was the forced marches that they had endured as the 
Germans moved POWs from the East as the Soviet forces advanced. Anecdotes of 
brutality and callousness of their German guards littered the narrative of their trek 
across Poland and Germany. Although there were instances where the POWs noted their 
fair treatment, especially in contrast to the German treatment of Soviet POWs, these 
were lost in the emphasis on the suffering of British servicemen. In the Hull Daily Mail, 
two local men who had recently returned home after being taken prisoner during D-Day 
were 'eye-witnesses of the ruthless manner in which the Nazis punish even their own 
S.S. men', recounting the hanging of a deserter amongst the German forces. One of the 
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returned men recounted the merger rations. They had witnessed the 'starved men' on 
forced marches. In sum, the Germans, in their opinion, were 'mad' and 'not human'.96 
Another was the semi-starvation of the POWs. Red Cross parcels saved the lives of 
British POWs, who were underfed by the German authorities. Captain Wright, who had 
arrived back to Grantham after over four year's imprisonment in Germany, stated that 
without parcels, 'I should certainly not be here today'.97 Corporal Stevenson wrote to the 
Fife Press thanking the Red Cross for their parcels.  
 
I cannot too strongly emphasise the importance of these parcels, indeed I would 
state without hesitation that in their absence we would not have existed. The 
Italian and German rations were not sufficient to keep body and soul together 
most of the time. It was the event of the week when the parcel waggon arrived at 
camp.98 
 
On April 28 1945, the Fife Press commented at length on the return of several POWs 
from Germany.99 One interviewee stated that during the march, it was 'not uncommon' 
for German guards to assault those that fell behind with their rifle butts. Another 
recounted the many that fell ill and died on the road, even after arriving to their 
destination, 'three or four died every day from starvation and malnutrition'. The 
Yorkshire Post reported on three British soldiers recovering from their 500 mile trek 
from Upper Silesia to Weetzen near Hanover.100  
 
They told a "Yorkshire Post" reporter yesterday the story of that harrowing 500-
mile march in the middle of Europe's most bitter winter for many years, having 
to do up to 36 kilometers (24 miles) a day on a few scraps of bread and potatoes 
they either bought, if they could, or stole, if they could not, of men who dropped 
out, and were picked up by horse and cart—if they were lucky, of guards to who 
and kicked them if they did not keep up the pace: finally, they showed me their 
boots, the soles new and thick when they set off, but worn through when they 
reached their destination. 
 
They had been subject to 'semi-starvation' for two months at Weetzen before being 
liberated by American forces. When their liberators arrived, 'all three were too ill to get 
up from their beds'.  
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"The Yanks were wonderful," they declared. "They piled food on us, but 
unfortunately we were too far gone; it was too rich for us." Now they are being 
built up again on a steady diet which started with fish and other light food, and 
has now extended to a little meat. They are still thin-faced, with nearly all the 
flesh off their bones, but they said: "You should have seen us when we came in. 
I think we have all put on at least a stone and a half since last week." 
 
Miscomprehension of the true nature of the images and reports flooding the British 
press, distinctions between different categories of captive were not made. In the minds 
of the majority of the British public, the Nazi concentration camps and Stalags (POW 
camps) were conflated into a single barbaric system of abuse, and distinctions between 
different categories of captive were not made. In press articles and Mass Observation 
file reports, the term generic term 'prisoner' was employed when discussing 
concentration camps. Images and commentary concerning concentration camps and 
malnourished POWs were publicised concurrently. As a result of this universalisation of 
suffering, the abuse of British POWs in German hands formed part of the atrocity 
narrative, being incorporated into reportage and understanding of the brutalities 
committed within concentration camps. This had a sharp impact upon attitudes towards 
German POWs as the conditions they were afforded were compared to those who had 
suffered in German camps.  Recounting his experiences, Gunner Geoffery Dalton of the 
Essex Yeomanry asked why German POWs in Britain were receiving double rations. 
'"They're the very people," he says "who delight in hitting our own boys with a rifle 
butt. Men officially listed sick too! Just for, perhaps, picking up rotten sugar beet and 
swedes to stave off hunger."'101  In the wake of the liberation of Belsen, questions were 
raised regarding the treatment of German POWs with particular regards to rations.  
 
9. Rations for German POWs, April 1945 
The outrage and anger expressed in Britain after the disclosure of concentration camps 
encompassed German POWs in Britain. At the same time that the horrors of 
concentration camps were publicised to the British public, it was reported that German 
POWs received rations greater than civilians.102 In late March 1945, Grigg came under 
pressure in Parliament when pressed to acknowledge that German POWs received 
certain rationed commodities in excess of the British civilian.103 In the case of German 
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POWs who were engaged in employment, this was true. However, non-working 
German POWs received rations comparable to civilians. The Geneva Convention 
stipulated that POWs were to receive rations 'equivalent in quantity and quality' of the 
captor power's depot troops.104 While the government sought to adhere to international 
law, in light of the recent atrocities the press—overstating the situation—and public 
were incensed. Appearing on the same page as articles on concentration camps and 
recently repatriated British servicemen, editorials recorded the anger of the British 
public over this 'indulgent, generous treatment' of enemy POWs, who, along with the 
entire German nation, were complicit in the atrocities then being revealed. Letters to 
editors expressing indignation at the higher rations received by German POWs 
described them as 'murderers', 'inhuman beasts', and 'barbarians'.105 The German POWs 
were 'enemies of the human race', 'representatives of the most debased nation the world 
has ever known'.106 As they were uncivilised brutes, the application of international law 
was called into question. In light of Germany's breaches of international law and the 
maltreatment of British POWs, especially their 'deliberate hunger policy', the 
Convention was considered null and void. 107  The continued observance of it was 
considered a 'quixotic indulgence' by one correspondent.108 'The Geneva Convention is 
surely a standing joke as far as Germany is concerned, and it is high time we began to 
give it a miss', James Bateman, a disabled ex-serviceman of the Great War wrote to the 
Gloucester Citizen.109 Germany had not upheld the Convention. Instead of continuing to 
'overstuff the unlovely German paunch', there were groups far more deserving of the 
rations given to German POWs.110 First and foremost the inmates liberated from the 
concentration camps—the 'human sacrifices', 'wrecks', and 'skeletons'—pictured in 
newspapers and newsreels.111  The British civilian, who had been told of the necessity 
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of rationing and feeding liberated countries, had, throughout the war, gone with less 
than the German POWs.112 British housewives, in particular, could do with the extra 
sugar provided German POWs.113 Furthermore, the overfeeding of the enemy was an 
insult to the British servicemen repatriated from German camps.114 British POWs had 
returned 'mere shadows of the strong, brave young men who went to fight'.115 The 
continued observance of international law in the face of horrific atrocities committed by 
the enemy was deemed overly sentimental. People called for the rest of Britain to rise 
and protest against this situation, and the cutting of German POW rations was 
demanded.  
 
10. Conclusions  
The capture and transportation of German POWs from Normandy to Britain was 
reported to the public as it provided evidence that the invasion forces were overcoming 
Germany defences and defeating the enemy. Early captures in June 1944 were 
surprising, with extremely youthful servicemen and a variety of nationalities found 
amongst the POWs. The use of child soldiers and conscripts from occupied countries 
suggested that Germany military resources were waning. Furthermore, being 
interviewed by journalists, the attitude of the POWs was generally defeatist, resigned to 
the idea that Germany was going to lose the war. These common themes in early 
descriptions of German POWs arriving to Britain contributed to the narrative that the 
Allies were now winning the war and Germany would eventually be defeated. Their 
arrival symbolised this: German servicemen did not enter Britain in 1944 as invaders, 
which they had threatened in 1940, but as defeated POWs. Captivity therefore was an 
important symbol contributing to the narrative of a successful invasion.  
 Given that the early groups of captives did not match the stereotypical image of 
the Nazi solider, they were afforded sympathy and even pitied in some cases. Although, 
captured German officers and the more professional soldiers were derided as arrogant 
and tough. While they were humanised to a degree, they entered Britain at the beginning 
of a period when reports of atrocities committed by German forces were increasingly 
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difficult to deny as propaganda.  The period examined also began with Eden's 
announcement on the shooting of 50 RAF officers at Stalag Luft III. This seems to have 
had little effect on attitudes towards the German people and the treatment of German 
POWs, instead reinforcing pre-existing opinions of 'good' and 'bad' Germans. Without a 
concrete investigation, Eden could only promise that the culprits would be brought to 
justice in the future, and who exactly the culprits were was a matter of debate.  
 Discussions of the treatment of German POWs remained divisive remaining 
similar to those earlier in the war. On the one hand, the treatment of German POWs was 
scorned as spineless, a view argued by those which judged the entire German people as 
inherently cruel and more often than not pointed towards the mistreatment of Allied 
POWs during the last and current war. Sticking to the more tedious stipulations of 
international law for an enemy judged inhuman and uncivilised enraged individuals of 
this viewpoint. On the other hand, the liberal treatment of German POWs was defended 
as a Christian and civilised act. The observance of international law, despite the horrific 
actions of the enemy, was a central characteristic of the British and symbolic of the 
purposes for which the war against Germany was being fought. The treatment of 
German POWs continued to be a marker of British national identity in this period. With 
the liberation of Belsen, however, these liberal voices defending the treatment of 
German POWs and arguing for the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Germans were 
silenced by the images and commentary on concentration camps and the crisis it posed 
for humanity. Whether by self-censorship or that of newspaper editors, few defended 
German POWs on the grounds of international law when it was revealed that they 
received a higher ration than that of civilians, especially with images and stories of 
malnourished British POWs appearing alongside reports of concentration camps. By the 
end of the war, public opinion called for the employment of German POWs, making 
them work to rebuild the destruction they had wreaked on Britain. This marked the 
lowest ebb of attitudes towards German POWs and their treatment. In June 1944 the 
German POWs were afforded some humanity, in the wake of Belsen few could find it.  
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Chapter 4: Employment 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis now breaks from the chronological structure which informed an analysis of 
the period 1939 to 1945. Three central themes will now be discussed in relation to the 
post-war period, this chapter focusing on the employment of German POWs. In May 
1945, attitudes towards German POWs, and Germany more generally, were at their 
lowest ebb. As the last chapter argued, the reportage of the liberation of Belsen, 'death 
marches' of British POWs, and superior rations of German POWs, fed into demands that 
German POWs in Britain be set to work. Calls to employ German POWs were made 
throughout the war, based on the experiences and memories of German POWs 
employed in Britain during the First World War. This is the concern of the first section 
of this chapter, which examines the patterns of POW labour employment in Britain 
during the Great War and how these were recollected during the first months of the 
Second World War. The work-ethic and craftsmanship of German POWs were positive 
characteristics remembered by former supervisors and employers. Early suggestions of 
employing POWs were encouraged based on these ideas of usefulness rather than 
punishment. However, as section two will examine, concerns regarding security would 
force the government to dismiss ideas of employing German POWs. Italian POWs were 
considered far more reliable. However, complications regarding accommodation and the 
future of Italian POWs in 1943 forced the authorities to sanction and later expand 
German POW employment. Cabinet records and quantitative analysis demonstrate that 
they were productive workers who made an important contribution to the British 
economy, especially in the post-war period. However, as examined in section three, 
views of German POWs labour varied significantly between regions and among 
individuals. In certain cases, the introduction of POW labour was resisted outright. 
Section four examines the view of POWs from the perspective of the trade union 
movement, focusing on the German POWs in agriculture and the concerns of the 
National Union of Agricultural Workers. Rather than a useful asset, German POW 
labour was seen as disadvantageous for the British worker. Section five goes on to 
examine the concerns of local branches and other organisations which contacted the 
Trades Union Congress criticising the local employment of POWs and their effect on 
domestic labour. 
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2. Precedents of the Great War 
As evidenced in chapter 2 and 3, experiences and memories of captivity during the First 
World War influenced discussions regarding the treatment of German POWs in the 
Second. This chapter begins by assessing utilisation of German POWs between 1914 
and 1920 before discussing recollections of their employment in 1939. As will be seen, 
the German POW labourer was remembered fondly by former supervisors and 
employers. Notions of employing German POWs on a significant scale would be, 
however, shelved until the latter stages of the war.  
 POWs were one category of worker which operated within the broad system of 
forced labour utilised by belligerents during the 1914-18 conflict.1 The mass utilisation 
of POW labour, organised into what Jones has conceptualised as the 'dual prisoners 
work system', was the foremost precedent set by the First World War in regards to 
military captivity. 2  Davis similarly distinguishes the 'two basic categories of 
employment' in the age of total war: 'service work for the armed force detaining the 
prisoners' and 'contract employment in agriculture and industry'.3 Working POWs were 
split between labour battalions set to work near the theatre of operations, and working 
units based in camps located on the home front. The latter fared better than the former 
as not only where they removed from the hazardous battlefield environment but home 
front camps were subject to inspection by protecting powers and ICRC representatives. 
Such scrutiny of working battalions on the front line was lacking. At certain points in 
the conflict, POWs were forced to work in areas where they would be subject to their 
countrymen's artillery fire as reprisal for the unsatisfactory treatment of POWs in enemy 
hands.4 While forced labour was undoubtedly arduous and an indirect form of violence, 
the value of their labour, more so than the stipulations of international law, led both 
state and employer to ensure POWs were adequately fed in order to perform their 
work.5  The utilisation of POWs and other forms of forced labour was a learning curve 
for belligerents, with positive and negative experiences of the 1914-18 conflict 
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influencing, although not determining, the operational patterns of the Second World 
War.6   
 As the 1914-18 conflict dragged on, POW labour was increasingly integrated 
into war economies. German POWs began to arrive in Britain from late 1916, being set 
to work on a variety of tasks—road mending, quarrying, cement manufacturing. The 
largest concentration of POW labour found itself in agriculture. Over the course of 
1917-18, the system of agricultural employment developed gradually. POW labour was 
broadly split between working camps and migratory gangs. Yet, POWs were far less 
integral to Britain than other belligerents such as Germany and France. Indeed, the 
numbers working on the British home front were relatively small when compared to 
Germany and France. In September 1916 only 3,832 POWs were working in the UK, 
rising to 30,480 in May 1918. The largest proportion, 9,300 worked in agriculture; in 
building, 8,850; quarries, 3,360; timber work 3,250, and 2,350 on Royal Engineering 
tasks. The remainder was employed on manufacturing cement or road building.7 After 
the war, German POWs were used on restoration work. Between January 1919 and 
January 1920, some 200,000 worked under British authorities in France, clearing 
ordnance and debris from fields, trenches, and canals as a form of reparations. 8 
Assessing the significance of the German POWs employed in Britain during the First 
World War, Panikos Panayi concluded that their labour 'remained of limited 
importance'.9 Rather than making a significant contribution to the British war effort, the 
physical work they performed 'may have proved more important in maintaining routine 
and fending off the effect of barbed wire disease'.10 In contrast to the First World War, 
German POWs in Britain would have a far greater role in the economy during the 
1940s, particularly the post-war period.  
 Recollecting that they had worked the fields of Britain during the last war, ideas 
of employing German POWs were aired in late 1939 and early 1940. Writing in 
newspapers, former supervisors testified to the work ethic of the German POWs put in 
their charge. Francis Adeney, writing for the Lancashire Evening Post, found himself 
the commandant of a small camp after being invalided home in 1916. The country 
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mansion in the West of England held around 40 German POWs. News of their arrival 
'spread quickly', and early the next morning two farmers were knocking at the door 
offering work for 20 POWs each. Adeney praised the meticulous, disciplined, and 
enthusiastic character of the POWs, recalling that they worked 'magnificently […] 
proving exceptionally competent with the tractor'.11 Anticipating the call up of British 
workers, employers foresaw the use of German POWs to 'solve' gaps which appeared in 
the labour market. 12  Certain farmers thought highly of German POW labour, 
considering them better than other groups they were allocated:  
 
During the last war I had as varied a collection as it was possible to get. Some 
good, bad and indifferent, but the best workers I ever had were German 
prisoners of war. Prussian guards captured in France at the commencement of 
hostilities. They were so good that I concluded they were a special type of 
man.13 
 
In addition to their hard work and diligence, German POWs were also remembered for 
being remarkable craftsman. T. H. Ogden had also supervised a gang of German POWs 
in post-war France. Having provided one with a tin, Ogden received a 'beautifully 
engraved' matchbox holder, and recommended employing them in small workshops 
producing similar goods. 14  Another correspondent urged authorities to encourage 
German POWs to produce the 'toys and other novelties' they were characteristically 
adept in doing. Not only would this do something to mitigate the tedium of camp life, 
selling the toys during the upcoming Christmas period could help fund the running of 
the camps, lessening the burden on the state. 15  Responding to the suggestions put 
forward by readers, a columnist in the Derby Daily Telegraph agreed that occupying 
POWs would relieve their boredom, but thought that their labour could be 'of real 
benefit to the country'.    
 
The problem of the employment of prisoners is not yet one of any magnitude, 
but when it does arise, I have no doubt that the experience gained in the last war 
will be put to good service. Then, Germans in great numbers were given the task 
of helping on the land. And if work is wanted for them to-day, none better than 
the raising of food could be found.16  
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Experience during the First World War had shown that German POWs could be 
productive workers. These early suggestions and discussions of utilising German POWs 
were not borne from punitive ideas of employing POWs as a punishment. Rather, they 
were shaped by positive characterisations of German POWs as diligent and skilled 
workers. The avocation of setting German POWs to work appeared sporadically in 
newspapers throughout the war, especially when the effects of mobilisation were being 
particularly felt by the agricultural sector. 17  However, while these utilitarian 
recommendations regarding the employing of POWs would be considered by the 
wartime governments, it would not be until after D-Day when substantial numbers of 
German POWs were set to work.  
 
3. The employment of POWs in Britain 
On 20 February 1940, Brigadier-General Clifton Brown, (Unionist MP, Hexham) asked 
Oliver Stanley, secretary of state for war, whether the government planned to employ 
German POWs as in the last war. Stanley stated that this was not then being considered, 
although he did not rule it out in the future. 18  Ministries had already discussed 
employing POWs in October and November 1939. Keen to see them working British 
farmland, the Ministry of Agriculture advocated employing German POWs. The Army 
Council and MOL rejected MAF proposals, pointing out that a substantial amount of the 
unemployed had yet to be directed into work, and trade unions would undoubtedly 
oppose POWs being employed before British workers. At an inter-departmental meeting 
on 21 November, the idea was considered moot as only 150 German POWs were in 
Britain. Furthermore, POWs would be retained by the BEF in France, set to work 
behind the front line.19 Still, German POWs were not idle during the first months of the 
conflict. 1939 newsreels show German POWs performing manual labour around the 
camp grounds, and at the 'baronial mansion', Grizedale Hall, officer POWs held there 
were 'voluntarily employed in what their captors call "Kaiser Bill's hobby"—chopping 
wood'.20 While POWs completed chores in the vicinity of the camp, discussions of 
extending their employment remained hypothetical. The prospect of employing German 
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POWs in Britain disappeared with the decision to remove them to the Dominions.21 
While German POWs were considered to pose a security threat and therefore deported 
from Britain, contradictory plans were arranged for their Italian allies.   
 Drawing attention to the lack of labour for crucial drainage, ditching, and 
reclamation work in counties across the UK, the MAF proposed the immediate transfer 
of 2,000 to 3,000 Italian POWs captured in Libya to the UK, put to work under the 
supervision of Country Agricultural Executive Committees. The 'peasant' type found 
among Italian POWs from Northern Italy was considered ideal. The Secretary of State 
for War agreed so long as the POWs were 'carefully selected' and did not contain 'any 
violent or Fascist types'.22 Under the direction of Churchill himself, these initial plans 
were expanded to include 25,000 Italian POWs in light of the need to remove them 
from the North African theatre.23  By September 1943, 74,900 were employed with 
arrangements for a further 11,000 to be brought to the UK by the end of the year. A 
further 36,000 Italian POWs had been requested by the Inter-Departmental Committee 
established to allocated POW labour. In contrast to the plans of expanding the number 
and remit of Italian POWs employed, the ideas of utilising German POWs in a similar 
fashion still met a negative response in 1943.  
 In parliament, Commander Locker-Lampson (Con. Birmingham Handsworth) 
was an outspoken advocate of setting German POWs to work on a variety of tasks.24 In 
October 1944, after his suggestion that German POWs should be used as private 
gardeners was dismissed by Williams, Locker-Lampson exclaimed in the Commons, 
'What is the good of capturing Germans, unless we use them?'25 It is worth noting a 
subtle change in attitudes towards the idea of employing German POWs. 'German 
vandals who have tried to destroy this county ', Locker-Lampson cried in June 1943, 
'should be employed to help us to restore it'.26 In 1939 calls to employ POWs cited their 
usefulness during the First World War. Midway through the 1939-45 conflict, the those 
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advocating employing POWs did so out of vengence. In other words, they wanted 
German POWs to pay—through hard work—for the damage Germany had caused 
Britain.  Despite this, the government remained, as before, cited security concerns as to 
why the government preferred not to employ German POWs, and favoured Italians. 
However, the future of Italian POW labour would be complicated with the capitulation 
of Italy in 1943, leading to the greater use of German POWs.  
 General Eisenhower had stated in a broadcast to the Italian people that all British 
and US Italian POWs captured in Tunisia and Sicily would be allowed to return home. 
While Italian POWs captured during the earlier stages of the war would be kept, more 
recent captures were to be given up.27 Furthermore, in January 1944, the Lord President 
of the Council noted in a report that as a result of the change in status of Italian POWs, 
which would follow the signature of an agreement negotiated with the Badoglio 
government, the conditions which Italian POWs can be employed would be 
'considerably altered'. The supply of Italian POWs was now limited. While a total of 
73,000 which were surplus to requirements in other theatres could be transferred to the 
UK, this fell short of the 250,000 desired. In addition to the drying up of Italian POWs 
who could be employed, accommodation difficulties in the camp system after D-Day 
led to the cancellation of father shipments of Italian POWs to the UK.  
 Due to the need to release the maximum amount of accommodation for German 
POWs arriving from France, the Secretary of State for war proposed transfer of Italian 
POWs be stopped. From the perspective of labour requirements, the Inter-departmental 
Committee on the Allocation of Prisoners of War stated that the acceptability of this 
proposal rested on if the loss of Italian POW labour could be replaced by German 
POWs. The chief obstacle preventing the extension of German POW employed was the 
security restrictions, in particular the requirement of an armed escort. The Security 
Executive had agreed to the employment of up to 20,000 German POWs in small 
unescorted groups in agriculture and forestry work in rural areas outside Eastern and 
London regions, stipulating that: district military authorities and chief constables were 
consulted prior to their employment; that they continued to reside in camps, being 
escorted to and from work; none were members of submarine crews, Luftwaffe or 
known ardent Nazis; and, finally, that they were segregated from Italian co-operators 
and POWs. Furthermore, it was strongly recommended that the MOI persuade the press 
to take a more sympathetic angle on the relaxation of restrictions regarding German 
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POWs than they had done with the Italian POWs. Considering accommodation for 
German POWs, given they needed to be within travelling distance of work, the 
Committee estimated that 15,330 German POWs could be employed in the near 
future.28  
 At the end of the war with Germany, the Secretary of State for War, James 
Grigg reviewed the employment of German POWs. The Armistice and Post War 
Committee had decided on 14 December 1944 that any Germans compulsorily 
employed outside Germany after the war should be POWs. Grigg estimated a total 
demand of 730,000 German POW labourers in the UK and 150,000 overseas. With only 
160,000 in the UK, 570,000 were needed. Grigg thought this was 'quite out of the 
question'. The problems of transporting, feeding, accommodating, and guarding such 
numbers, made 'any proposals to meet the present demands quite unrealistic'. Instead he 
suggested that the maximum number of German POWs already in Britain should be put 
to work, replacing departing Italian POWs. Grigg recommended that the employment of 
German POWs should not be billeted or built new accommodation as materials were 
needed elsewhere. He also warned against delaying the demobilisation of soldiers by 
holding them back for guarding duties. If these principles were approved then it was a 
matter of deciding the number of German POWs required out of those available.  Grigg 
advised that skilled workers should be prioritised and that, subject to security, ardent 
Nazis should be employed. It was, in his view, unwise to send them to Germany but 
also 'equally indefensible' to retain them in Britain without making them work.29 
 The Minister of Economic Warfare believed that the Secretary of State for War 
was 'approaching this problem from the wrong angle'.  
 
We must be clear as to our objective. Is it to punish and reform Nazis, or is it to 
obtain labour necessary to the British war effort against Japan, and the 
maintenance of food production pending complete demobilisation? I suggest that 
it is the latter, and the reason why the various Ministries tabulated in Appendix 
A of W.P. (45) 292 have asked for 730,000 prisoners of war is that they are 
required for essential purposes. 
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The Minister strongly opposed the employment of ardent Nazis on farms as they 
required guarding. Any German POW labour had to be unguarded to be efficient.30 The 
Minister of Agriculture also disagreed with Griggs's proposals. He thought it unlikely 
that all of the 160,000 Germans in the UK could be employed. The 4,000 officers were 
exempt from work under the Geneva Convention. Moreover, the other ranks comprised 
of 'appreciable numbers of ardent Nazis who may be unemployable'. As a result the 
Secretary's proposals would lead to a 'serious shortage' of POW labour when attempting 
to meet the total demand of 730,000 POWs. 
 D-Day, therefore, marks the beginning not only of an increase in the number of 
German POWs held in Britain but also the beginnings of the utilisation of these captives 
as a source of labour. Initially thought too dangerous to be employed, the employment 
of German POWs would be sanctioned and the security restrictions limiting their 
employment progressively rescinded. As the cabinet records discussed above indicate, 
by the end of the war with Germany POW labour was regarded as an important, if not 
essential, source of labour. The following section will now considered how productive 
German POWs were and their contribution to the economy. As will be seen later, while 
the positive contribution of POWs is quantitatively undeniable, their employment was 
not considered advantageous by all, and in certain cases resisted.  
 
4. Debates over productivity  
Historians have sought to assess the productivity and contribution of POW to war 
economies both in general and with particular regard to Britain. Surveying the 
employment of POWs in twentieth century, Gerald Davis warned against over 
accentuating their contribution to captor economies. Weighing the benefits against the 
costs of employing POWs he suggested: 
 
On balance, the economic advantages of keeping war prisoners are reduced by the 
costs of their maintenance and the fact that POWs have generally been inefficient 
workers, poorly motivated, ill-suited to their tasks, often unable to communicate in 
their employer's language and subject to eccentricities induced by confinement.31 
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The cautious tone of Davis when estimating the role of POW labour is also found in 
official government histories of the war.32 However, Moore has stated that POW labour 
made a 'substantial contribution' to the British war economy, arguing that 'their 
usefulness as a (limited) labour force […] did much to shape the policies adopted 
towards them'. 33  Specifically considering their employment in agriculture, Richard 
Moore-Coyler has found POWs indispensable to production, especially in the 
immediate post-war.34 The work of Johann Custodis has confirmed Moore and Moore-
Coyler's claims over Davis' pessimistic hypothesis of POW labour in regards to the 
British case, demonstrating that German POW labour 'was more important than 
previously assumed'.35 Certainly, in quantitative terms, it is undoubted that the role of 
Italian and German POWs in the British economy was significant.  
 In government circles it was generally accepted that German POWs were 
productive workers, a useful asset to the British wartime, and later post-war economy. 
More often than not, there was a general complementary tone of articles which informed 
of the allocation of German POWs to various works in the local area. For instance, the 
Kent & Sussex Courier  reported that the first group of POWs had arrived to work on the 
foundations of the 76 temporary houses to be built in the Rusthall area; all were of 'good 
conduct'.36 Contractors in Lichfield were reportedly 'very satisfied' with the German 
POW labour they had been sent on housing sites.37  
 However, there was little consensus of their usefulness and work ethic in public 
discussions, and in certain cases resistance towards their employment. As the number of 
POWs employed increased, so too did the variety of opinions towards them. In August 
1945, the Aberdeen Journal pointed out that the quality of German POWs workers 
varied between regions.  
Widely varying reports are current as to the behaviour in the English harvest 
fields of German prisoners of war. One observer in the eastern counties goes as 
far as to say that they are winning the golden opinion of their employers by their 
diligence, that they yoke promptly at eight o'clock in the morning and working 
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steadily until lowsin-time at six, and that they are willing to forgo a part of the 
dinner-hour in return for a few pence of extra pay. From Yorkshire a very 
different tale is forthcoming. Here the Hun is said to be sulky and intractable, 
and farmers, in an endeavour to coax him to mend his ways and get on with the 
job, are supplying him with cigarettes and cigars. The agricultural executive 
officer for the East Riding has issued a stern rebuke and a warning against this 
pernicious practice. A united front against the Boche blackmailer seems to be 
desirable.38 
 
While they had heard of the productivity of German POWs, correspondents wrote to 
their local newspaper expressing dismay at the lax attitude of German POWs they had 
observed towards work. Writing to the Bucks Free Press in April 1947, Mr Baker was 
critical of the productivity of a gang of German POWs employed near his home.  
 
We must all do more work in order to live: that is one of the few common-sense 
things our present Government has told us. We must produce more goods and 
houses and grow more food. Why, then, is it that now the weather permits of 
building work being recommended in the fields at the back of this house, the 
German prisoners are not supervised to the extent that a reasonable amount of 
work is done by them? I have been interested enough to watch them 
periodically, because the ground where the building is being done formed 
(before and during the war) some allotments, one of which permitted me for a 
number of years to be self-supporting in potatoes and other foodstuffs. This I 
had to give up, although two seasons' produce were lost before the ground was 
touched–presumably the inevitable delays resulting from the bureaucracy under 
which we suffer. Not one German in ten appear to work at a time–the remainder 
stand about—and when he does work it is in "slow-motion" time. These are the 
men, moreover, who appeared to have nothing better to do than to wander about 
our snow-piled streets a few weeks ago. Did nobody think of putting them to 
work to remove it? Having been in command of a R.A.F. unit through which 
thousands of ex-Italian P.O.W.s passed during the latter part of the war, I know 
what work could be got out of them. Many units of the R.A.F. were extremely 
glad to have their services for all kinds of duty. Thus I am sure that with a little 
energy, a little co-ordination, some organisation and co-operation between the 
civil and military authorities good work could be got out of these Germans. Now 
that they are allowed to "fraternise" it is remarkable how smartly they turn 
themselves out, and the Germans react immediately to discipline. Are we too 
tired to try and discipline them ourselves? Apparently we are.39  
 
Similarly,  
Nearly three weeks ago a number of German prisoners of war were directed by 
the Ministry of Works to take down three Nissen huts earlier occupied by the 
military authorities, using part of my grounds. This labour, so-called, has no 
supervision of any kind. The skeleton structures of the Nissen huts are so rotten 
that they are almost falling down. During this three weeks two huts have been 
demolished, which has occupied the time of six able-bodied men. The actual 
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hours of labour have occupied rather less than two hours per man daily. The 
P.O.W.s arrive on the site at approximately 8.10 a.m. A fire is made, which is 
kept going like a furnace throughout the day by the use of good timber, a 
commodity most of us find impossible to obtain. By 8.30 a.m. tea is brewed and 
between this time and 3.30 p.m. this operations is repeated five or six times. 
Where the quantity of tea is obtained is a matter for speculation. At the least sign 
of rain these fellows take shelter like cats, while the average Englishman 
working outdoors carries on with his job. Since it occupies six men one whole 
week to pull own a decomposed Nissen hut, it would have occupied the same 
men much less time to destroy a church! I consider the position disgraceful, to 
find men of this type sitting round a stove of roaring fire playing cards and 
frittering time away. I wonder what the position would have been had Germany 
won the war!40 
 
Comparisons were often made between Italian and German POW labourers. Yet, 
comparisons were also sometimes made between German POWs and the British 
agricultural workers. At a meeting of the Barnstaple Rural District Council in January 
1946, it was alleged that in North Devon 10 Germans did as much work as 30 Britons. 
This inspired a flood of letters sent to the North Devon Journal outraged that such a 
comment was made. Correspondents reminded the Council that it was the endeavour 
and qualities of the British agricultural worker which had aided victory in the war 
against Germany. Furthermore, the Council and local farmers were accused of petting 
German POWs, overlooking the needs of the British worker. The secret of good 
working Germans was that farmers provided nice hot cups of cocoa and invited them in 
for dinner while letting their British workmen eat their meals under a hedge outside in 
the rain. Moreover, several correspondents attested that beyond the gaze of the farmer, 
the German POW shirked and dodged work. A former Sergeant of the North Devon 
Regiment was 'amazed and indignant that sentiments […] could be uttered such a short 
time after the ending of the war'. The qualities of the British men had only recently been 
lauded as central to victory in the war against Germany. He suggested that as the 
councillors had 'such a high opinion of the German and such a poor opinion of their 
own race, it would appear that Germany should be their habituation'.41  
During a meeting of Wiltshire agricultural workers where they discussed possible strike 
action over wages in February 1946: 
 
A resolution demanding control of the use of German prisoners of war led to 
cries of "Send them back to Germany, or put them against the wall and shoot 
them." Mr A. Coleman of Cherill declared: "I know a farmer who gives them a 
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hot dinner, cigarettes, and a hot cup of tea before they go home, yet he wouldn't 
give an Englishman a cigarette.  
 
Investigating the claim, a reporter interview the farmer Coleman referred to, who 
declared the accusations were false.  
 
He added: "About three week ago five German prisoners helped me to erect 
some elective light poles. They were here for 10 days, and two of them stayed 
for a few more days to help on the land. I have no German prisoners now. "The 
prisoners bought their own rations. The only thing I was supposed to do was 
given them boiling water to make their tea, and I did that. "I don't know whether 
the men working on the electricity lines gave them any cigarettes, but I certainly 
did not. "The only people employed on my farm are one boy, my son and 
myself.42 
 
While certain farmers denied providing extra rations and sundries to German POWs, it 
was well-known that this occurred. As The Times reported,  
 
[…] in practice many of them do so on the grounds that to do a full day's work a 
man needs sufficient food. A clear statement about prisoners' rations should be 
made by the War Office, because the favoured treatment the prisoners get on 
some farms causes discontent and is prejudicial to discipline.43 
 
In March 1945, the council of the NFU blamed farmers for the 'in many instances for a 
'deterioration of discipline' among Italian POWs 'by giving them preferential 
treatment'. 44 Accusations of preferential treatment POWs received extended into 
housing. Joiners working at Hough End Fields in Manchester went on strike after the 
withdrawal of permission to make tea during the afternoon. This bought work to a 
complete halt. D. V. Thomas of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers noted that 
German POWs were allowed to make tea on site.45  
 
5. Housing  
The preparation of housing sites was another important task which German POWs were 
employed on. Housing was a growing concern of the British public towards as the end 
of the war seemed ever more likely. In October 1944, a Home Intelligence report 
summarised popular opinion towards the housing situation, noting that 'Gloom and 
despair are widespread, and people now think it will be years before everyone is 
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adequately house; they fear the present 'hopeless' position will only be accentuated 
when demobilisation starts'.46  While this was a practical use of German POW labour, 
the use of the ex-enemy on housing projects was resisted by several local councils, 
especially when it was considered that these homes were for returning soldiers.  
 Councils discussed the possibility of employing German POWs on housing sites, 
but were careful to implement such schemes before local labour could be definitely 
confirmed as unavailable. Suggestions of utilising German POW were dismissed if 
there was any indication that British labour had not been exhausted.47 The introduction 
of German POWs on local housing projects caused heated debate at council meetings. 
Camborne-Redruth Urban Council discussed the possible employment of German 
POWs on the preparation of housing sites in late September 1945. The vote won 
fourteen to four, it was decided that if local labour was unavailable German POWs 
would be requested from the Ministry of Works. Councillors who voted against pointed 
out the availability of a large number of unemployed men in the district. While the 
council was not advocating the employment of German POWs instead of British 
workers, any notion of employment POWs alarmed those that voted against. Mr 
Nicholas wanted POWs ' sent back to their own country as quickly as possible'. Mr 
Tossell went further, stating that bringing German POWs into the area 'would be an 
insult to the men and women who had been on service during the war'. In his opinion, 
'there would be trouble' if they were.48 In Derby, Councillor Bateman opposed the use 
of German POWs on house-building, criticising a recent decision to apply for their 
labour. 'Acute as the housing problem is', he stated, 'I do not think our lads would mind 
waiting a little longer if they knew sites were being prepared by their own people'. 
Instead of German POWs, Bateman argued that men from the building trade should be 
released from the forces to undertake the job.49 Similar objections were raised at the 
Lanark County Council. Councillor Robert M'Cracken raised objections and moved that 
no POW of any nationality should be employed on housing schemes anywhere in the 
county.  
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He said the Council could not justify the employment of prisoners of war when 
they knew that to-day there were 15,000 Lanarkshire people unemployed. "So 
long as I am a member of this Council," he added, "there will never be a German 
employed in this county while Scotsmen are idle. "If you want to employ 
German prisoners of war give them the same treatment that our prisoners got in 
Germany. Send them into the coal mines and make them work 16 hours a day, 
and so save our Servicemen when they are demobilised from having to work in 
the mines." Councillor James Beecroft seconded. 
 
In response, Councillor Ure stated that unless housing sites were serviced soon, 'they 
would miss the boat'. Other authorities were using POWs. It was clearly a divisive issue 
and heated debate as Councillor M'Carckren was 'suspended for refusing to withdraw a 
remark he made about Councillor Ure, and he left the meeting'.50  Those that were 
opposed to the use of German POWs on the preparation of housing cites were 
concerned their employment would displace British workers and unemployed, it was 
also considered an insult to ex-servicemen who would live in a house built by the men 
they had fought against. Concerns regarding the insult that having a house built by 
German POWs for British soldiers' were perhaps overstated. Evidently, some soldiers' 
eagerly awaiting demobilisation cared little who built their homes, instead worrying if 
on return there would be a roof over their head.  
 
Recent reports that various local authorities are refusing to employ German 
prisoner-of-war labour to deal with the housing problem make disturbing 
reading for those of us who are stationed overseas, while our families in Britain 
have been homeless for years. The shortage of houses is so acute that all 
available man-power should be diverted to deal with it, and it is right that the 
Germans, who have contributed so largely to the deficiency, should play their 
part in the rebuilding. Experience in Germany has shown me that German 
prisoner-of-war labour can be made to work extremely well under supervision. I 
wonder if those of your readers who have homes of their own can appreciate the 
prospect which faces many of us on our return and demobilisation. For several 
years our wives and children have been existing in furnished rooms and living 
on sufferance with relatives, while we who have been supposedly defending our 
"hearths and homes" have non to which to come back. How can children by 
adequately reared in such circumstances? It is an absolute mockery for 
politicians to press for an increase in birthrate. A desperate situation invites 
desperate remedies and unless some action ensues we face a sombre future. We 
cannot reply solely on the Government. There must be co-operation from 
everyone. Surely peace is worth that price.51 
 
Blackpool Town Council turned down a £11,122 contract for new houses as the 
contractor proposed to use German POW labour. In response, A. Brett Ltd. Preston, the 
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contractors, explained that it was not a choice between British or German POW 
labourers, but that if no British labour was available German POWs would have to be 
used. A. Brett Ltd. 'hotly denied' they were using German POWs as cut-price labour, 
going on to state that they, like other contractors, would 'much prefer to use English 
labour'. As it was not available, they used the 'next best thing […] whether it is German, 
Italian, or any other nationality'.52 The use of German POWs on the preparation of 
house sites was considered an important use of their labour. However, it was resisted by 
some as it was feared that the allocation of German POWs would displace British 
workmen. Furthermore, some councillors considered the use of German POWs to be an 
insult to the ex-servicemen who would reside in a home which the ex-enemy built. 
These concerns and fears were, however, seemingly unfounded with several serving 
soldiers writing to their local papers to note their indifference to the labour used. All 
they hoped for was a home to return to.  
 
6. Agriculture 
The largest proportion of POW labour in Britain was employed in agriculture. Shipped 
from North Africa, 2,000 Italian POWs selected for their experience in the industry 
were set to work in July 1941, their number expanding to 50,000 by September 1944. 
The utilisation of Italian POWs allowed other labour sources such as WLA and 
schoolchildren to be directed elsewhere. An insufficient number of farm workers 
demobilised from the Armed Forces returned to agriculture. In addition Italian POWs 
were steadily repatriated from November 1945. In order to alleviate shortages, German 
POWs were increasingly used. Foreseeing the need to replace Italian POW labour after 
Italy surrendered in 1943, an experimental group of 969 German POWs were employed 
at two camps in Cumberland and Warwickshire in January 1944. By October 1944, 
16,000 German POWs were employed by the MAF across 22 camps. The number of 
German POWs employed in agriculture peaked in March 1947 at 170,000. By this time, 
German POWs constituted one fifth of the total agricultural labour force. Most POWs 
were collected from their camps in the morning by farmers and returned in the evening.  
Those with records of good behaviour were housed in hostels a short walking distance 
of the farm. POWs of the upmost compliance and trustworthiness could be billeted, up 
to a maximum of three, directly on farms, working and living with the famer. As it 
reduced the costs of transporting, accommodating, guarding and feeding POWs, the 
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authorities preferred to locate POWs at hostels and billets. Moreover, theoretically at 
least, it increased the time POWs spent working.53 The contribution of POW labour to 
British wartime and post-war agriculture is clear and the authorities sought to maximise 
their productivity. Yet, in the view of the trade union movement POW posed a serious 
threat to the British agricultural worker.  
 In November 1945, the NUAW raised concerns over the difference in rates of 
pay for British workers and POW labour at a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) 
meeting with the Minister of Labour, George Issacs.54 The NUAW delegation noted that 
it was cheaper for farmers to hire POW labour. The rate of 1 shilling an hour had been 
accepted by the union when Italian POWs were first employed given the 'inferior 
character' of their work. German POWs had, however, proven to be capable workers 
and the availability of their labour at this rate was considered 'detrimental to Trade 
Union standards'.55 On 22 January 1946, a union delegation met with the Ministers of 
Agriculture and Labour to discuss the matter further.  
 At the meeting, the NUAW read a statement outlining their concerns based on 
complaints received from local branches. They argued that German POWs were 
displacing British workers as the rates paid for their labour did not match estimations of 
their productivity. In the view of the NUAW, most German POWs had experience of 
agricultural work, and had proved to be 'well-disciplined' and 'tractable'. As a result, 'it 
was a paying proposition to farmers to get a body of disciplined men to work for them, 
first at a rate of a shilling an hour and then at 1/3d'. Their availability at this rate was 
'disastrous' for British agricultural labourers. The NUAW pointed out that if a farmer 
employed a member of the Women's Land Army through the WAEC, the cost to him 
would be no less than 1/3d. an hour and to obtain male workers he would not only have 
to pay the minimum rate of wages applicable to the County, but enough cover overhead 
charges as well.56 In the opinion of the unions, famers would always seek the most cost-
effective labour. 
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 Farmers, the unions argued, were using underhand measures to acquire German 
POW workers, and offered examples of complains from local branches. In 
Cambridgeshire NUAW members employed by Mr. Robbins in Isleham were offered 
18 shillings an acre for harvest work. They refused this wage as it was usually a higher 
rate. Mr. Robbins immediately asked his local W.A.E.C. for POW labour, which was 
supplied. The NUAW representatives argued that this was 'a typical case of a farmer 
attempting to depress rates of wages by means of German labour'. 57  Reports also 
indicated that in parts of the country where it had been usual for many jobs to be done 
piece-work rates, famers were introducing German POWs on time-rates. Piece work 
earnings offered workers additional pay as their wages reflected productivity. The 
introduction of German POW on time rates, deprived NUAW members the added 
remuneration they had ‘a right to expect’ from piece-work earnings. Amongst other 
examples, in Bedfordshire, members of the Cople Branch complained that Mr. Mark 
Young of Sandy was employing thirty German POWs to stook corn. This was usually 
done on a piece work basis, until the arrival of the prisoners. When POWs were not 
available British workers performed a variety of jobs on piece work rates which they 
then had to do on day rates. In addition, the NUAW highlighted that farmers were 
retaining POW labour while dismissing or turning away British workers. For instance, 
in Lincolnshire, Mr. B. Runciman of Weston Spalding discharged two union members 
stating that 'there was nothing for them to do'. At the same time he employed four 
German POWs. In sum, the NUAW argued that the cases mentioned showed how POW 
labour was ‘undermining the economic position of British workers in agriculture’, 
presenting farmers with ‘an economic power against the workers’ which prevented them 
from 'obtaining the rates of wages and conditions of employment […] necessary to their 
well-being’.58 In their statement the NUAW also made clear their opposition to the 
billeting of German POWs on farms:   
 
In every village throughout the land there have been young men who have had to 
fight against the Germans. The German have been notably brutal in their 
prosecution of the war and have not hesitated to violate the international code in 
respect of civilised war-fare. Now the Ministry of Agriculture proposes to billet 
these enemy aliens upon the rural population of England and Wales, our people 
view this proposal with great dis-favour and they do not think that Prisoners of War 
should be billeted on farms or in the villages but that they should be kept in camps 
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isolated from the population and should return to their native country as soon as 
circumstance will permit.59 
 
During the ensuing discussion, TUC officials supported the claims of the NUAW. They 
too wanted to see German POW labour be paid for at the rate of the job. Furthermore, 
they believed the continued use of German POW labour was preventing farmworkers 
from being demobilized. In regards to billeting, the TUC understood that 'there was a 
differentiation between the billeting of Italian prisoners and of German prisoners. There 
was not only a domestic difference but a psychological difference as well'.60 The public 
hostility towards Germans had not evidenced itself particularly against Italians. 
Therefore, while the billeting of Italians might be accepted, there was not likely to be an 
acceptance of Germans. Furthermore, the TUC suggested that although a farm worker 
might be against the billeting of a German POW, they were 'susceptible to the subtle 
pressure' of their employer.  
 Having considered the views expressed by the union side, the Minister of 
Agriculture put them into a realistic perspective. He made clear the need for German 
POWs in agriculture. Since the outbreak of war auxiliary labour had been needed to 
supplement the labour force. The problem had not disappeared and the food situation 
was in fact worse now than in 1939. Williams stated that 'his problem was not so much 
supplying labour to farmers as supplying food for Britain'.61 As the MAF was directing 
orders to farmers it was their responsibility to find them labourers. Yet, WLA members 
were being released and the estimates of voluntary labour for the year had dropped. 
Furthermore, although 60,000 Italian POWs were employed in December they were 
being gradually repatriated. Therefore, German POWs were needed to alleviate 
shortages in agricultural workforce.  In regards to the rates for German POW labour, the 
Minister noted that the 1/3d. an hour fee took into account their inexperience in 
agricultural work, and the added costs of supervision and transport which resulted in a 
loss of working time. He assured the delegation that this would now take place before 
March. Although the Minister could not promise the outcome of the review, 'he gave the 
assurance that he was desirous, so far as practicable, of meeting the wishes of the 
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agricultural workers'. The minister ‘was not unsympathetic to the agricultural workers’ 
claim and he promised an early review of the payment of prisoners of war’.62 
 The minster then considered the issue of billeting the main difficulty being in 
respect of milking. Milking was a 'top priority' and it presented the ‘gravest difficulty’ 
at the present time.63 It was doubtful whether the supply of milk could be continued at 
its present level in the near future unless something drastic was done. Milking required 
a worker to be available seven days a week, Italian POWs 'had shown themselves 
capable of training for milking' and were employed to perform it. Because of the early 
morning milking it had been necessary for them to be billeted near to the place of 
employment if not actually on the farm.64 Accommodation was sometimes found for 
Italian POWs employed on milking in the form of barns and stables, or even in the 
household of the farmer, but milking had been the principle reason for the billeting. At 
the time around 18,000 Italians had been billeted on the farms. Italian POWs were 'the 
best type of workers' and as a rule, the most productive workers were to be repatriated 
first. 65  This had left a 'nasty breach' of labour which was contributing the present 
difficulties and would have to be filled. German POWs offered the solution. The 
ministry were aware of 'the different psychological attitude towards Germans' and, 
'indeed, so were the Cabinet to whom this experimental scheme had been submitted’.66  
At the time some 200 German POWs were billeted and no German POWs had been 
billeted on a farm without the written assent of the farmer being given. 
 It was clear that the MAF needed the labour of POWs in certain industries—as 
the case of milking had demonstrated. In order to make sure that the employment of 
POWs did not displace British workers, Prisoner of war Panels were set up in order to 
investigate claims of this happening. These Panels comprised of a farmer, farm worker, 
and an independent member; the Minister issued instructions that any complaints made 
should be examined immediately. If it could be proved that a farmer had dismissed 
British labour in order to employ German POWs, every POW in that employment was 
to be withdrawn at once. Since the inception of the employment, there had been some 
twenty complaints. However, in only two or three cases was it shown that the farmer 
could be really indicted. Moreover, the minster had appointed a special investigating 
officer who was a former organizer of the NUAW and 'a well respected member of that 
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organization' who had the full authority to go into any part of the country to enquire at 
once into any labour dispute which arose. 67  They had attempted to meet every 
possibility of a complaint which might arise – concerning billeting there had been, so 
far as the MOA was aware, none.  
 The Minister of Labour, Mr. Isaacs, stated that the Minister had covered 
everything in the case. The situation regarding food production was ‘really serious’ at 
the present time; if encroachments on existing rations which ‘would be disappointing to 
many people’ the agricultural labour force would need to be considerably expanded. 
Although 18,000 agricultural workers had been released under Class B, 13,000 had been 
recruited into the Armed Forces from the industry; this represented an expansion of only 
5,000. In regard to billeting and the local committees for dealing with complaints ‘he 
wondered whether it was possible for the Minister to let the committees have some 
more explicit statement, for he felt that if the machinery was properly used it would be 
of considerable help’. Williams stated that he would immediately consider elucidating 
instructions to the panels. ‘The only complaint he had had concerning these panels was 
from Essex and that was the case which had been handed in at that meeting by the 
National Union of Agricultural Workers. He promised that that case would be 
investigated personally by his investigating officer, Mr. Monks, within twenty-four 
hours’.   
 At the end of the meeting, Williams stated that he would inform the unions as 
soon as possible concerning the proposed review of rate for POW labour. Isaacs invited 
the General Council and union representatives to stay behind and discuss the 
employment of POWs generally. He outlined the problems regarding labour. The 
Ministry of War Transport was 'anxious' to get more labour into railway workshops in 
order to deal with 148,000 railway wagons which needed repairing. Informal 
discussions has taken place between with railway union representatives. It was clear that 
the union opposed the introduction of German POWs into the industry. Yet, only 5,000 
railway workers had been demobilised. This number was too small to alleviate the 
labour shortage. Accidents had occurred as a result of the lack of workers and 
inadequate supervision. For similar reasons, the MOL wanted to send German POWs 
into mines. While the United States had decided to repatriate all their POWs, the 
government was 'anxious' to keep them. Sending German POWs home would only 
exacerbate the already 'alarming' food situation there. Furthermore, it was impossible to 
cut down the number of occupation forces while returning German POWs. Isaacs 
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informed the union representatives that 565,000 POWs were 'needed' in Britain in 1946. 
They were useful as they could be directed into unattractive employs such as founding. 
Here, 'it was not so much wages that were unattractive so much as the dirt, the damp, 
the heat and the general bad conditions in some of these jobs'. Isaacs was unsure how 
the relevant unions would react to the introduction of German POWs into these 
industries. Again, sympathetic to the concerns of the trade union movement, Isaacs 
explicitly stated he wanted clear communication between both sides of industry and 
'was very definitely of the opinion that the rate of the job should be applied and he 
would adopt no other attitude'.  
 The NUAW deputation, with the help of the TUC, was successful in negotiating 
a higher rate for POW wages in agriculture. After careful consideration, the Minister of 
Agriculture decided that from 1 April 1946, the principle of the rate for the job would 
apply to POW labour in the industry—the rate to be charged for prisoner labour was to 
be equivalent to the minimum wage fixed by the Agricultural Wages Board for regular 
adult male workers.68 Despite the successful renegotiation of wages, the position of 
agriculture workers was still threatened in the view of the NUAW. In early 1946, the 
JCC had discussed the need for POW labour in that year. The NUAW had wanted the 
wages for POWs raised to act as a deterrent to farmers who wished to employ them. 
However, with the need for agricultural manpower still serious, more POWs were to be 
employed in the industry. Dann wrote to the TUC in March expressing the NUAW’s 
disillusionment over this recent news. He noted that with the ‘helpful support of the 
General Council’ the MAF had decided to give the rate for the job for POW labour in 
the industry. However Dann noted that the proposed introduction of more POWs 
alarmed the NUAW, which undermined the negotiation of wages: 
 
My Executive did appreciate, during the war, the necessity of food production, 
and they acted with that factor in mind. It is now intended to bring even larger 
number of them on to the land, and my Executive and our membership feel that 
the presence of such vast numbers will undermine the conditions of employment 
of our membership. The idea of fixing the rate for the job was that this should 
act as a deterrent upon employers, but the fact that the Minister will take this 
into account when fixing prices removes a great deal of the value for the "rate of 
the job" from our point of view. On the other hand, my Executive and 
membership do feel that the opposition to the claim of this Union for £4.10 per 
week is impeded by the presence of such large numbers of prisoners. 
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Dann reminded the TUC that some 160,000 POWs were working on the land and 
ultimately it was intended to bring a further 248,000—roughly half the number of 
regular British farmworkers. The NUAW were resolved to resist this expansion in POW 
labour; their executive passed the following resolution:  
 
This Committee is much concerned with the presence of such a large number of 
prisoners of war and it is further greatly concerned by the intention to bring 
more, which it is felt will undermine the position of the British farm worker. 
Therefore this Executive does not support the continuance of employment of 
prisoners of war on the land.69  
 
Correspondence between the TUC, local union branches, and government, reveal little 
about the attitudes of the trade union movement towards German POWs beyond the 
concern expressed that British workers were being displaced. Although analysis can 
only be speculative as the empirical material hides these attitudes, contextualising the 
evidence within the broader post-war situation regarding the trade union movement and 
agriculture can help unpack the material collected.  
 Turning his attention to post-war agriculture and farming in his study of the 
British countryside since 1900, Alun Howkins notes the prevalent belief in society that 
the agricultural industry, revolutionised in terms of technological advances during the 
conflict, had saved Britain from starvation during the Second World War, 'farming and 
farmers' Howkins states, 'were among the heroes of the 'people's war''. While the 
contribution of agriculture was highly regarded, a deep distrust of government was held 
in the farming community.70 Memories of the 1918 betrayal were difficult to overcome. 
The general view held was that governments were only very interested in agriculture 
when the threat of war was apparent.  
 The continued employment of German POWs and the expansion of their 
activities in post-war Britain alarmed the unions, perhaps as it was seen to evidence that 
the government cared less about the welfare of British farmworkers in post-war Britain. 
The farming community had been called upon during the war, after being neglected 
during the inter-war period, to produce food in the fight against Germany. Now, in 
victory, the agricultural landscape was increasingly populated with the ex-enemy, an 
economic rival to the British farmworker. The number of cases which the union 
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collected from local branches, presented to the MAF in January 1946, were few. 
Furthermore, the union found it difficult to prove that British labour had actually been 
displaced by German POWs and not legitimately dismissed by farmers. All evidence 
points towards exaggerated fears of German POW labour, flooding the labour market 
and undercutting wages, undermining the position of British workers. Yet, this inflated 
concern demonstrates that the unions were fearful not only of the German POWs, but 
the government's use of them. For the union, this was perhaps a symbol of what they 
feared most, that agriculture would again be neglected after the war concluded. Looking 
back on the post-war years, Jack Boddy a Norfolk farmworker in 1945, later becoming 
General Secretary of the NUAW, stated:  
 
All the activities of Tom Williams appeared to be directed towards assisting 
farmers, leaving the farm workers to pick up what they could from the 
increasing prosperity of their employers, which left them at the mercy of the 
Agricultural Wages Board….Sad to say, I believe Labour felt it could ignore the 
farm workers because their ability to influence the results of the General 
Election was numerically low as they had become a relatively small proportion 
of the rural workers.71 
 
Farmers criticised the decision to raise POW rates. The subject came up at the 
Executive Committee meeting in Leamington. It was agreed that German POWs 'were 
not worth the rate they were being paid before the last increase', and a strong protest 
was sent to NFU headquarters. The Staffordshire branch had registered a similar protest. 
At the Tamworth meeting, W. L. Hemus thought the NFU had not 'taken a strong 
enough line'. He had employed four POWs. 'If they were Englishmen and willing to 
work, which most prisoners were not, it would be rather an insult to our own men to pay 
them the same rate. They were not skilled at all, and the N.F.U. should refuse to pay 
them a rate equivalent to their own workers'.72  
 
7. Local disputes  
The displacement of British workers by German POWs was a central fear of local union 
branches. Any instance of German POWs being employed in an area where there was 
unemployment was met with a stern response, usually demanding the removal of 
German POWs from the particular workplace concerned or even withdrawing German 
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POWs from the entire industry. In May 1946 the Secretary of the Leamington & 
Warwick Trades Council wrote to the TUC protesting at the employing of German 
POWs in the engineering sector and requesting that they were withdrawn. The union 
had 60 members signing at the Local Employment Exchange, and considered their 
continued unemployment the result of the availability of German POWs. 73   The 
following September, Poole Trades Council requested the TUC to review government 
policy regarding POW labour as their employment had resulted in 'British labour being 
displaced'.74 The Tintern and district branch of the British Legion had similar concerns.  
 
At the monthly meeting of the Executive Committee held […] on May 3, I was 
instructed to draw to your attention the amount of German P.O.W. labour being 
used in this district, to the exclusion of British labour, paramount to exploitation. 
Instances were quoted, particularly in the motor engineering industry where 
P.O.W. are being employed at a very reduced rate of pay, to the exclusion of 
British labour. Again, in the farming industry where recognised rates are paid, 
P.O.W.s are being used for work other than farm labouring. My Committee feel 
that action should be taken to ensure that the recognised rate of pay (T.U.) 
should be charged for their P.O.W. labour & not in isolated industries only. In 
the opinion of my Committee action would stop a lot of the possibility of 
exploitation & may help to ease a lot of the unemployment in S. Wales.75  
 
The British Legion wrote to the TUC enclosing an extract from Empire News. 'We are 
receiving strong complaints from our people in the North West regarding the 
employment of German prisoners of war in driving other prisoners to work, on the 
ground that if forces ex-Servicemen out of employment'.76 The TUC ensured the British 
Legion that, 'If this story is true, then it would be completely contrary to the 
arrangement arrived at between the General Council and the Ministry of Labour'. 
Empire News proclaimed: 'DRIVER ON DOLE NAZI IN HIS JOB'. Men from the 
Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire regions had been reportedly sacked by the Ministry of 
Transport, their jobs given to POWs.  
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 Other unions were concerned that the POWs were being used for jobs beyond 
their initial use. Writing to the TUC in February 1946, the Frome & District Trades & 
Industrial Council noted their concern at the 'usage' of German POWs in the area. The 
secretary of the trades' councils department agreed that this was 'a disturbing matter', 
advising that the local Employment exchange be consulted. It transpired that the 
German POWs had been employed on the structural alteration of property previous 
requisitioned by the government during the war. Such employment came under the 
remit of the local Employment Exchange. However, the German POWs had in fact been 
employed by the County War Agricultural Executive Committee and originally 
assigned to agricultural work. This was 'irregular', unless some special circumstances 
had been arranged.  
 A particularly controversial and worrying letter received by the TUC was sent 
by the Westbury (Wilts) Divisional Labour Party in June 1946, which had received a 
resolution from the Warminster Local Labour Party protesting against the dismissal of 
70 employees from the local Government R.E.M.E (Corps of Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers) factory. 'It is alleged that German P.O.W. labour is retained, it is 
further suggested that our political opponents are arranging to make political capital in 
this matter'.  The dismissal of the British workers and the retention of German POWs 
was considered to breach protocol which dictated that POWs would not be employed 
when British labour was available. The TUC took the matter to the Ministry of Labour, 
seeking advice as to whether 'these discharges violate the agreement arrived at with the 
TUC that prisoner-of-war labour shall not be employed whilst suitable British labour is 
available'. Having inquired into the matter, the MOL informed the TUC and the 
Westbury Labour Party of the outcome: 
 
I find that the prisoners engaged in this establishment are employed under War 
Office control on work of a kind formerly done by soldiers. The civilian workers 
threatened with discharge were engaged on unskilled work in another branch of 
the factory manned by civilian personnel. The War Office have assured us that 
the proposal to discharge the civilian was in no way connected with the 
employment of prisoners, but it is clear that the circumstance have been such as 
to give rise to considerable local criticism and the War Office have suspended 
all discharges pending further consideration of the position.77  
 
While displacement was not widespread, and in many cases the accusations of 
displacement were based on misunderstanding, the employment of German POWs in 
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districts which had unemployed or potentially dismissed workers was a delicate issue 
for unions and the TUC. While safeguards had been introduced and in many cases, it 
can be assumed, acted accordingly in protecting British workers from displacement, 
incidents did occur which provoked criticism of the employment of German POWs. It 
suggests that local unions which raised concerns over the employment of POWs did so 
as they were upset that little or no consultation had taken place as it had been promised 
when the introduction of POW labour had been discussed. 
 
8. Conclusions 
While ideas were aired in press and parliament from the moment the first were captured, 
the widespread employment of German POWs only became viable from the summer of 
1944. By this time, attitudes towards their employment had changed. In late 1939 and 
early 1940, those which advocated the employment of German POWs did so based on 
fond memories of their work ethic and usefulness during the Great War. Moreover, it 
was thought that setting POWs to work would alleviate the tedium of captivity. Such 
ideas remained hypothetical given the decision to deport German POWs from 1940 and 
the government's view that they were far too dangerous to employ. So then, the issue of 
employing German POWs was predominately a late war/early post-war subject of 
discussion.   
 German POWs were undoubtedly productive, a vital asset to the British wartime 
and post-war economy. This was the conclusion of the ministers when discussing labour 
needs. The British public and other organisations clearly had different views.  User 
Departments attempted to work with the trade union movement to allay their fears 
concerning the employment of German POWs. However, User Department had to 
continually point out that there was a great need for POW labour. It seems that the 
employment of German POWs was by and large accepted at a local level, but concerns 
and problems arose periodically, with German POW labour outright resisted in certain 
areas. Interestingly, while on the one hand, the employment of German POWs was 
considered a just form of reparations after the destruction Germany had wrought, on the 
other, their employment was considered insulting at times, British workers had, 
throughout the war, received a message that they must work hard for victory, now they 
were told that the Germans were needed to fill gaps which British labour could not.  
 For the trade unions, the wartime enemy was now a post-war rival in the labour 
market. Yet, it was not necessarily a hatred of the German which was at the root of 
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concern, but rather a criticism of the way in which they were utilised, and anger at the 
ability of employers to hide their illegal employment of German POWs to the detriment 
of British workers. This chapter has therefore provided a more nuanced examination of 
attitudes towards the employment of German POWs, beyond that of official circles. The 
stereotypical image of the hardworking, meticulous, and polite, German POWs is 
challenged. While productivity reports may have portrayed this image, individuals 
perceived the workmanship of German POWs in a variety of ways. Based on the 
evidence collected, it can be suggested that there were pockets of local resistance 
towards the employment of POWs. Writing to their local papers, individuals registered 
their annoyance having witnessed unsupervised German POWs relaxing. As 
employment policies regarding German POWs were relaxed in order to increase 
productivity, they became more visible in post-war Britain. This led to complications 
regarding fraternisation regulations as the space in which the public encountered POWs 
amplified. Debates regarding regulations governing contact between the public and 
German POWs, their freedoms and participation in civil society, is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Fraternisation 
 
1. Introduction 
The employment of German POWs increased their visibility in post-war Britain, and 
brought the public into closer contact with them. Unused newsreel footage shows 
civilians strolling by German POWs working at Kensington Gardens in preparation for 
the Victory Parade in London in April 1946. Outwardly, the civilians captured on the 
camera were indifferent to the POWs. 1  Reflecting on opinion towards the German 
people, M-O noted 'some qualitative change' between April and October 1946. While 
the majority of a London sample was still antagonistic towards Germans, 'People 
appeared to be feeling their way towards a new attitude'.2 Concern over the welfare of 
German POWs led to calls for a relaxation of the restrictions governing their freedoms. 
What becomes apparent in reading the arguments for relaxing restrictions on contact 
between public and POWs is a desire for 'cultural demobilisation'. This concept, defined 
by John Horne, refers to the process whereby the wartime mentalities summoned to 
fight a war are dismantled in an endeavour to return to a peacetime society.3 In regards 
to British attitudes towards German POWs, Henry Faulk alluded to this, stating 'The 
war psychosis began to ebb at the beginning of 1946'.4 In the attempt to rebuild civil 
society at a national and transnational level, individuals and organisations in British 
society sought to interact with German POWs still held in Britain. It was believed that 
in the attempt to secure future peace, the British people had to reach out to their German 
captives, demonstrating the British way of life. There was, however, a sharp division of 
opinion with a section of the British people still harbouring hatred for the German 
people and POWs. 
 This chapter begins by outlining the fraternisation regulations enacted during the 
war and the continuation of the fraternisation ban in the post-war years.  While contact 
between POWs and the public was policed, the increased proximity of POWs to the 
public led to them becoming features of the local landscape. As a result, the 
fraternisation regulations were brought into question. This is the concern of the third 
section. Following pressure in both parliament and the press, the government lifted the 
fraternisation regulations in December 1946. From this point, POWs were given 
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increased freedoms. The debates regarding their increased freedoms are considered. 
Fraternisation, as Bob Moore has noted, was a gendered policy, the main concern of the 
British government being to minimise contact between British women and German 
POWs. In turn, this chapter considers the subject of marriages. After some high profile 
cases of British women and German POWs, marriages were permitted from July 1947. 
As this chapter demonstrates, German POWs were brought into ever closer contact with 
the British public, eventually being allowed to marry British women.  
 
2. Non-fraternisation policy 
Prior to the arrival of significant numbers of German POWs and their widespread 
employment across Britain from mid-1944, a legislative framework was already in place 
to regulate contact between them and the public. The Defence Regulations, enforced 
from September 1939, included a stipulation to deter members of the public from aiding 
POWs in their escape. Under Regulation 18C, 14 years penal servitude was the 
maximum punishment for any civilian caught assisting the escape of a POW. Such an 
extreme penalty demonstrated that the authorities regarded such action as a serious 
offence. In the wake of the Dunkirk evacuation, a time when invasion was feared, 
regulations were amended. The Prisoners of War and Internees (Access and 
Communication) Order No. 1389, passed on 27 July 1940, prohibited the public from 
access to any place where POWs or internees were detained. Furthermore, civilians 
acting in a way which was likely to prejudice the discipline of a POW or civilian 
internee would be penalised. Under this somewhat vague language, the transmission of 
communications for or with enemy POWs and the gifting of items such as cigarettes 
and food, were criminalised. While these stipulations formed a seemingly standard set 
of regulations to govern contact between enemy prisoners and the public, the authorities 
ran into difficulties from mid-1941. Italian POWs were transported to Britain from 
camps in North Africa to alleviate labour shortages in agriculture. In order to maximise 
their productivity, a number of Italian POWs were later billeted directly onto or nearby 
farms, thus eliminating the need to transport them to and from their employment. 
Billeting, however, brought the enforcement of fraternisation regulations under scrutiny. 
As billeted POWs were not 'detained', a term used in the regulations to describe them, 
civilians conversing with or being friendly toward them were not breaking any 
particular rule. Reluctant to change the wording of the Defence Regulations, but eager 
to minimise contact, the authorities judged incidents of fraternisation on a case by case 
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basis. Therefore, by the time the German POW population in Britain was substantially 
increasing a legislative framework had been constructed to limit contact between them 
and the public. In this way, the British authorities attempted to regulate contact and 
ensure the discipline of enemy POWs. Towards the end of the war, however, non-
fraternisation was a measure which aimed to do more.  
 Before stepping onto German soil in September 1944, the British soldier 
received a War Office guide for entering Germany. 'You are', the guide read, 'about to 
meet a strange people in a strange, enemy country'.5 Worried that the suffering of the 
German people would be met with sympathy from the good-hearted Tommy, the guide 
emphasised that they were responsible for their own suffering, having elected Hitler into 
power and not resisted his regime. The German was not to be trusted, and the best 
solution was to avoid contact. The Germans, the guide concluded, were to be regarded 
as 'dangerous enemies'. The warm relations between liberator and liberated in countries 
such as Italy and Belgium were not to be repeated. Authorities were particularly eager 
to keep Allied servicemen away from German women. As William Hitchcock has 
summarised, 'the occupation aimed to educate the German about their moral and 
political failings, and this required a distance, cold, and firm demeanour'.6 Towards the 
end of the war, Montgomery's warning to his troops was reported to the British public. 
He made it clear that soldiers were not to fraternise with Germans in any way, apart 
from official business.7 This was to teach the German people a lesson. The ban on 
fraternisation was enforced to make clear to the German people that they could hope for 
no more than a satisfactory level of treatment. This aim, however, was immediately 
undermined, and, considered absurd by some, and quickly became an embarrassing 
policy to adopt. Almost immediately after they had entered Germany, Allied soldiers 
broke regulations.8 By the summer of 1945, there was ample evidence of fraternisation 
reported back to Americans in newspapers.9 The general feeling of Germans, British 
observers noted, was that non-fraternisation was similar to the more ludicrous policies 
of the Nazi regime.10 Gradually, restrictions on fraternisation were lifted. Unrealistic 
and criticised, the failed non-fraternisation order was reversed by October 1945. This 
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was an acknowledgement that inevitable ties had been forged between soldiers and 
Germans. Yet, in Britain, fraternisation between the public and German POWs 
remained illegal. This geographic inequality was not lost on the public. In early 1946, 
the government was questioned on the continuation of the fraternisation ban in Britain.  
 
3. Civil Society 
The interwar period has been commonly viewed as a time where associational activity 
declined, especially in Europe and North America. When the 1920s are compared to the 
1940s, there is certainly a basis for this conclusion. However, scholars have noted that 
such a comparison between these two decades neglects the important changes which 
civil society underwent and the marked expansion of associational life in the 1920s and 
1930s. The Great War witnessed a substantial reduction in associational activity. Rather 
than the beginning of a decline, however, this led to civic leaders reorganising and 
refocusing associational life. For instance, the weak pre-existing organisations of the 
peace movement were replaced by new, vigorous organisations such as the Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom (established 1915), and the movement for 
the creation of a League of Nations. Along with the creation of stronger organisations, 
civil society witnessed a great expansion after the Great War, with many new 
associations created. In Britain, the most notable was Save the Children (established 
1919). This expansion occurred also at a transnational level with human rights and 
environmental NGOs which operated at an international level. The Great War, 
therefore, witnessed a reorientation, not a decline, in civil society and associational life. 
Civil society did contract, during the interwar period, and the expansion of associational 
life was reversed. This was not due to the Great War, but the impact of the Great 
Depression and the rise of authoritarian regimes in the 1930s and 40s.11  
 
4. Lifting the fraternisation ban, March 1946 to December 1946 
The period between 1944 and 1948 witnessed a dramatic expansion and diversification 
of the POW camp network in Britain. During this time, German POWs came to 
dominate as the numbers of Italian POWs first peaked and then decreased. The precise 
number of camps which were built and used to house POWs across the United Kingdom 
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is difficult to know, due to the complicated numerical sequence allocated to them. 
Difficult to recover archeologically, the surviving list of camps can only illustrate a 
potentially vast network of sites housing POWs. Attempting to recover the legacy of 
Britain's POW camps, Anthony Hellen recorded some 390 major sites. If all types of 
camps are considered—main camps, satellites and hostels—the figure rises to some 
1,500. In 1945, there were 50 base camps, 27 labour camps (9 under construction), in 
addition to transit camps, officers' camps, hospital camps, and special status camps such 
as Wilton Park, a training centre, and Norton, a YMCA camp. The geography of camp 
settlements was linked to the employment of German POWs, and generally correlated 
with major areas of arable farming in lowland areas of Britain. In Yorkshire, over 30 
camps were located, accounting for 7.5 per cent of the national total. Lincolnshire, 
Hampshire, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Essex, and Shropshire each account for 3-4 per 
cent. In Scotland, Dumfriesshire had 5 camps, the most of any Scottish region. In 
Wales, Monmouthshire had 6, the most for any Welsh region. Overall, the majority of 
camps were located in England, 83 per cent, Scotland and Wales both had 10 per cent of 
the camps, and the rest were located in Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands.  
Rutland was the only county in England that did not have a main camp situated in the 
region. 12 counties in Scotland had no camps, in Wales there were none in three, and in 
Northern Ireland camps were only located in the regions of Belfast, County Down, and 
Armagh.12 As the number of German POWs increased, and their employment expanded, 
so too did their contact with the British public.  
 While fraternisation regulations sought to minimise contact between the public 
and German POWs, the decision to employ German POWs from 1944 brought them 
into closer contact.13 As part of the larger POW camp network, smaller satellite sites, 
working camps, and hostels were constructed as well as billeting German POWs 
directly onto farms. While this was done to increase productivity, it also increased the 
proximity of camps, and their inhabitants, to localities. Commenting on the relationship 
of the sites to their surrounding area, Hellen writes: 
 
these camp settlements were eventually a locally well-known and widespread 
feature of normal civilian life across much of Britain, and they formed an 
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important part of the cultural landscape, although their overall extensiveness was 
deliberately kept from public awareness.14  
 
German POWs gradually became a feature of the local landscape. The first contacts 
made by POWs were generally through their employment and religion. Regional 
newspapers took interest in their readers' new neighbours. A reporter from the 
Cheltenham Chronicle was given permission by the War Office and Lieutenant-Colonel 
F. S. S. Lamprey, the commandant, to report on the conditions of Camp 263, 
Leckhampton Court. Located near Cheltenham, this medieval manor house was initially 
requisitioned in 1939 by the War Office to provide accommodation for the Durham 
Light Infantry, followed by the US Army Signal Corp during preparations for D-Day. 
From 1945 it functioned as a working camp, providing accommodation for German 
POWs who were employed on farms in the local area. The reporter noted that the 
inmates were content in their captivity, and had no complaints regarding their treatment; 
the POWs 'knew that the position here was made as tolerable for them as possible'. 
Provided with camp tokens they were able to buy sundry items at the camp canteen 
which provided a 'liberal quantity of articles'.  Welfare arrangements were described as 
'uniformly excellent', and the beauty of the camp environment was emphasised in the 
several pictures included in the article.15 In addition to praising the treatment of the 
POWs, the article also served to familiarise readers to the everyday lives of the captives, 
and humanise the German POWs. The POWs were pictured relaxing around a 
'delightful little pool of running water with a fountain, ringing by a bed of flowering 
pansies, built by the German prisoners of war' (image 10). While one POW was 
pictured with Betty, a tame jackdaw, settled on their head (image 11). According to 
George Orwell, the British people were, characteristically, 'flower-lovers' and 'pigeon-
fanciers', with German POWs demonstrating these characteristics, they were portrayed 
not as brutal Huns or Nazis but as human beings enjoying similar pursuits as the 
caricatured Englishman.16  
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Image 8 Cheltenham Chronicle, 24 August 1946, p. 4. 
 
Image 9 Cheltenham Chronicle, 24 August 1946, p. 4. 
Over the course of 1946, the government was lobbied, predominantly by their own party 
members, to lift the fraternisation ban. The punishments meted out to members of the 
public for fraternisation were considered petty. In Parliament, government ministers 
routinely dismissed any suggestion of revising the regulations. In March 1946, Reginald 
Sorensen (Lab. Leyton West) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
James Ede, if his attention had been brought to a recent case where a woman had been 
fined £5 for fraternising with a German POW. Given that regulations had been relaxed 
in Germany, Sorensen wanted to know if similar relaxations would be considered in 
Britain. Ede stated that inquiries were being made into the case, but made no statement 
on the lifting of the ban.17 A few days later Jack Lawson, Secretary of State for War, 
declared, in response to Flight-Lieutenant John Haire (Lab. Wycombe), that there was 
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no intention of relaxing current regulations.18 In April, Mr Messer asked if the ban 
could be lifted so that German POWs and British people could converse and thereby 
build a better understanding between the people of both countries. Lawson referred 
Messer to his previous reply to Haire. 19  Similarly, 'No, Sir' was the blunt answer 
Richard Stokes (Lab. Ipswich) received from Lawson when he demanded that the non-
fraternisation rule be suspended in June 1946.20 He later described a £1 fine ruling a 
woman was given for gifting a piece of cake to a German POW as 'ridiculous'.21 As 
German POWs were to remain in the country, Tom Driberg (Lab. Maldon) asked 
Lawson if fraternisation would be permitted between civilians and POWs, at least 
including 'white' POWs. Again, Lawson dismissed the suggestion.22 Further pleas to 
relax the regulations made by Dirberg and Skeffington-Lodge were met with the same 
response by the newly appointed Secretary of State for War, Bellenger, in October.23 
The government persistently maintained that no relaxation of current rules was being 
contemplated.  
 The division of opinion amongst the general public can be gauged by the letters 
sent to the press on the subject. Having witnessed two German POWs be ejected from a 
football match between Derby County and Preston North End, an ex-serviceman wrote 
to the Derby Evening Telegraph criticising the pettiness of the authorities.24 While this 
was a minor incident, it provoked a series of letters which attached social and cultural 
significance to the treatment of POWs. Other correspondents, applauding the ex-
servicemen's criticism considered the ejection of the two POWs un-civilised and un-
Christian.25 It was time, they argued, to treat German POWs as human beings, not 
enemies. The current regulations were outdated. Some correspondents testified to the 
humanity of the POWs, living nearby camps in Derbyshire and meeting the Germans 
had shown that they were not fanatical Nazis, instead they were, as a mother of an ex-
POW wrote, 'good behaved boys', who had bonded with local children. The British 
people were called upon to practise their Christian principals, showing compassion and 
forgiveness. One suggestion was that POWs could be invited to British homes during 
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the forthcoming Christmas period.26 Allowing the German POWs to participate and 
understand the British way of life, was considered imperative to future peace. Those 
that advocated lifting the fraternisation ban were well aware of the hostility still present 
in others towards the former enemy. Acknowledging, and in some cases agreeing, that a 
victorious Germany would show little mercy towards a defeated Britain, they still 
believed this line of thought unhelpful. Continuing to cast German POWs as social 
pariahs, it was argued, would only lead to building resentment amongst them; 
resentment, it was pointed out, was a cause of the last war. However, the humanitarian 
and Christian calls to reach out to German POWs were rebuked by those who saw them, 
and the German people in general, as inhuman brutes. A lengthy, and rather sarcastic, 
letter was sent to the Derby Evening Telegraph, criticising those who had suggested 
inviting the POWs into British homes. Having fought in both wars, the correspondent 
reminded his more sympathetic citizens of the atrocities committed by the Germans 
during the recent war, which he himself had witnessed: 
 
I have had the very pleasant experience of taking my comrades off the cross, 
who had been murdered by these nice men. I have also seen the women and 
children brutally killed, children with their hands cut off, their insides torn out 
all by these same nice young men. Yes, let me remind these same people of 
Belsen, and of London, Coventry, Sheffield, Hull, Grimsby, Birmingham, 
Bristol, Manchester, and a lot more that had death rained down on them through 
this same kind race. Look at the suffering in the world to-day, all because these 
nice boys thought they were the master race. The old saying "turn the other 
cheek" went out of date long ago. These beasts have made people suffer; they 
must and should take their punishment for it, or next time we may not be so 
lucky in stopping the German jack-boot from strutting about the streets of 
England.27 
 
The German POWs were beyond salvation and sympathy; their status as social pariahs 
was a justified punishment. Compassion would allow Germany to rise again, ultimately 
leading to future war. This letter provoked a great response, with the Telegraph 
dedicating an entire page to the numerous letters concerning German POWs, noting the 
'sharp division of opinion'. There were those that argued the Germans POWs were 
beyond forgiveness; never, could their cruelty during the war, and the Great War, be 
forgotten. Again, the cruelty of Germans was emphasised: revealing in killing helpless 
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women and children and making lampshades from human skins was referred to. It 
would be a mistake to allow the POWs to escape punishment, and an even greater 
mistake to forget they were capable of this barbarism. There were far more people, such 
as British servicemen, deserving of a place at the Christmas tables of the British 
people.28 This attitude towards German POWs was considered narrow-minded. War 
was a horrific business, with terrible acts committed by both sides. 'I have also seen 
nights that have nauseated me, carried out not by the "Nice Germans" but by the so-
called "English Gentlemen.", a former Royal Engineer wrote, in reference to the 
bombing of Hamburg.29 Britain had fought and men had died to create a better world, 
'the only way to secure it was through uniting nations and encouraging fraternisation'.30 
Adhering to wartime attitudes of hatred would make a 'mockery' of the peace'. 31 
Moreover, the idea that all Germans were inhuman brutes was considered ridiculous by 
those that had met the POWs nearby their homes. Furthermore, taking the idea that all 
Germans were brutes to task, a correspondent defended the 'Decent Germans'. As this 
debate shows, the idea of lifting the fraternisation ban was a contentious issue, those in 
favour saw it as a necessary step to sure future peace, those against could never forget 
what Germany had done. The captivity of German POWs was an issue which was 
intertwined with many others: religious principals, national identity, civility, and the 
legacy of both the 1914-18 and 1939-45 conflicts.      
 While the government remained dismissive of any suggestion to relax 
regulations, MPs pleading for the ban to be lifted emphasised that the festive period 
would be an opportune moment to begin restoring Anglo-German understanding. 
Skeffington-Lodge suggested that, if rules were not to be relaxed, special arrangements 
could be made to allow German POWs to spend Christmas Day in British homes, if 
invited to do so. He argued that it was 'important to return prisoners of war to Germany 
as an example of our British way and purpose'. Stokes agreed that it was a 'golden 
opportunity to instil a bit of British life' into the POWs, one that 'ought not to be 
wasted'.  Although sympathetic to the suggestion, Bellenger refused to comment.32 Soon 
after, however, Bellenger unexpectedly declared that regulations would be relaxed. 
Well-conducted POWs were permitted to take unescorted walks up to a five mile limit 
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of their camp or billet, to converse with the public, and, subject to the permission of the 
camp commandant, accept invitations to private houses within the five mile radius of 
the camp. These relaxations were not a special arrangement for Christmas but would 
continue beyond the festive period. Skeffington-Lodge welcomed the concessions.33 A 
few days later, Bellenger announced that POWs may receive parcels from relatives and 
friends in the UK, and write and receive letters from members of the British public.34 
Although welcomed in parliament, the lifting of the fraternisation ban and the prospect 
of German POWs spending Christmas in British homes divided opinion. In the Western 
Morning News, it was reported that: 
 
Gradually, new conceptions of the etiquette towards ex-enemies are replacing 
the natural wartime mentality. Some residents in the vicinity of prisoner of war 
camps in the South-West have developed sympathy towards these vanquished 
men. Many will regard as apt the statement in Parliament by the Secretary for 
War (Mr. Bellenger) concerning relaxations in the rules relating to fraternization 
with prisoners of war in this country. […] German prisoners stationed at a 
Plympton camp have had a number of invitations from local householders to 
spend an evening in their homes, and one woman in the area has offered to 
entertain 20 at Christmas. Recently, following an entertainment at Robourogh 
prisoner of war camp, two prisoners presented two souvenirs to be sold in aid of 
the Salvation Army's Christmas Cheer Fund for Orphans. Even in the heat, hate, 
and turmoil of war there was fraternization on certain sectors of the Western 
Front between British and German troops in the 1914-18 War. How often after a 
raid or patrol captors rewarded captives with "Cigaretten, Fritz?" before sending 
them down the line to captivity.35 
 
Reacting to the news of the relaxation in regulations Rhona Churchill, Daily Mail 
columnist, pondered over the type of man British families would be inviting into their 
homes. She had spent several days 'chatting' with German POWs to gain insight into 
that thought. Herman Schmidt, Churchill explained, possessed a 'strange, jumbled, yet 
partly lucid mind'.  
 
It contains not the slightest sense of war guilt, no consciousness that Hitler was 
evil, a scepticism of all camp literature and lectures, and is completely blank so 
far as any understanding of the British point of view is concerned.36 
 
Fritz Schultze, a POW 'Somewhere in England', agreed with Churchill's diagnosis, but 
thought it unfair to the minority of POWs who were not like Hermann Schmidt.37 
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Christmas 1946 was a watershed moment in the history of German POWs still captive 
in Britain. Fraternisation regulations were relaxed. The government conceded to 
individuals and organisations which advocated interacting with POWs as means to not 
only alleviate the monotony of captivity, hopefully improving the morale of men 
separated from their homes and families, but also to teach the POWs about the British 
people and their lives. There was a positive response to Bellenger's announcement that 
POWs would be permitted to accept invitations to private homes to celebrate the 
Christmas period. The Daily Mail reported that camp commandants 'throughout the 
country' had been 'overwhelmed by the flood of invitations for German prisoners to 
spend Christmas in British homes'.38 In regional newspapers the number of invitations 
was recorded. In Cheltenham, a number of local residents offered to entertain German 
prisoners held at Leckhampton Court. Recently, residents had donated some 250 books 
in addition to numerous magazines and newspapers to the camp. 39  It was initially 
reported that the people of Bedfordshire had by and large ignored the county's 4000 
POWs.40 However, on 27 December the Bedfordshire Times reported that a number of 
families had invited German POWs. 41  Families across Nottingham district sent 
invitations to the military authorities at Camp 166 at Wollaton Park—a map was 
included in the article illustrating the five mile radius around the camp.42 The Glasgow 
Sunday Post announced that 'Dozens' of German POWs 'will share Christmas fare in 
Scots homes' on Christmas Day. 25 had been asked for by name from camps in Lanark 
and Peebles. Others had been invited from camps at Johnstone, Errol, Ricokchiem, and 
Craigellachie. 180 prisoners would be guests of the Perthshire Agricultural 
Committee.43 The Western Morning News reported that around 1000 invitations had 
been received by the camp commandant at Chaddlewood House, Plympton. Some 
commandants were certainly in favour of POWs spending Christmas at British homes, 
the Commanding Officer at Taunton Golf Club had appealed to local residents to extend 
their hospitality to 30 POWs under his command on Christmas Day and Boxing Day.44 
German POWs at a camp in Horsforth were welcomed into the homes of West Riding 
people on Christmas and Boxing Days. In one case they were guests of a former 
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prisoner of war in Germany. The German prisoners were allowed out in 2s and 3s in 
response to over 250 invitations.45 70 German POWs from Leckhampton camp were 
able to take up the invitations of local people to spend Christmas Day.46 80 German 
POWs in the Vale of Evesham would sit down to Christmas dinner with 'their former 
foes'. The commandant of the POW camp near Evesham told an Echo reporter that 
invitations were still being received.47 120 German POWs were entertained to dinner on 
26 December at Stranraer by the wives of farmers they had been working for. The 
farmers also attended, the company numbering about 200. The wives served from tables 
on which sat decorations made by German prisoners. About 150 German POWs were 
entertained by Derby families of Christmas Day and around 100 visited private homes 
on Boxing Day.48  
 
I've been thinking how the German prisoners who were invited into British 
homes enjoyed their Christmas. I should very much have liked to meet some of 
them; and I think it was a most excellent idea, though a pity that many of them 
through red tape were unable to accept invitations. I hope they were not 
despising us in their hearts, and thinking rather bitterly of us as magnanimous 
conquerors. It's difficult for us to think of them as human beings, these men 
whom we have seen behind barbed wire for so long, wearing strange uniforms 
which mark them unmistakeably from their fellow beings; it is harder for them 
to think of us as humans, for they cannot afford to be generous towards us. But 
it's by these home contacts and gestures of friendship that we shall gradually 
break down the walls of hostility and bitterness which, if not broken down, can 
bring us another war.49 
 
As well as invitations by individual families, groups of German POWs were invited by 
organisations and local churches and cathedrals to join in with the Christmas 
celebrations. Bristol Cathedral organised a special carol service for German prisoners of 
war amongst the arrangements made for Christmas. Some 400 were expected to attend. 
Around fifty people had written to the commandant of Ashton Gate camp inviting 
seventy German prisoners to their homes for Christmas.50 There were similar services 
organised.51 In Preston, Reverend Wilson (minister of Carey Baptist Church), made 
arrangements for some thirty German prisoners to visit the homes of members of the 
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congregation for Christmas dinner. The prisoners attended the Church every Sunday 
morning.52 50 German POWs from Tealing camp were to be entertained to a Christmas 
party in Linathen Centre on Christmas Eve. This was organised by the minister and four 
elders of Mid Craige Church. 53  1000 cigarettes were to be distributed to some 80 
German prisoners when they were to attend Harpenden Roman Catholic Church on 
Christmas Day. Collections to purchase the cigarettes had been made at Masses.54 
 Invitations to spend Christmas at British homes had a profound emotional effect 
on the select German POWs who could take up the invitations. Thirty-seven-year-old 
Erich Scarl, a lawyer whose home was in blitzed Hamburg, spent his happiest Christmas 
since 1938 in Preston. He was one of 22 German prisoners from the camp at Fishwick 
Bottoms, Preston, who were entertained on Christmas Day in the homes of members of 
Carey Baptist Church. Erich had his Christmas dinner with the church secretary, Mr. 
George Cook, and his family, at their home in Linnet-street. Erich and Mr. Cook sat by 
the fire in the afternoon and talked of their respective lives during the war years. Erich, 
who has been a prisoner for three years, said he 'was very, very happy to find himself 
spending Christmas in an English home'. Those Germans among the 22 who could not 
speak English could still play dominos and draughts with their hosts, some of them men 
who spent part of the war in Germany.55 German POWs, sometimes through their camp 
commandant, expressed thanks for the hospitality shown by British people during the 
Christmas period.56 A columnist in the Western Daily Press stated that the several 
hundred invitations extended to German POWs in the area to spend Christmas day at 
the homes of Bristolians and worship at the Cathedral was an 'Outstanding example of 
the spirit of goodwill'. 57  However, while the lifting of the fraternisation ban for 
Christmas 1946 was welcomed as a means to promote Anglo-German understanding 
and foster future peace, while also breaking up the monotony of camp routine for the 
POWs, there was some criticism. Some that wrote to their local paper suggested that 
British children, orphaned by the war, were more deserving of parties at Christmas than 
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German prisoners.58 One who suggested this had been a prisoner of war in Germany for 
five years. Set to work in a coal mine, he noted that 'If the Germans are away from 
home, they are at least well fed and not ill-treated. People who find they are open to 
offer hospitality could make many orphaned children happy by inviting them to their 
homes'.59 However, by and large, appeals to entertain German prisoners were endorsed 
by some who argued that it was the way to lasting peace.60 
 
5. Further relaxation of restrictions, January 1947 to July 1947 
The relaxation of restrictions in December 1946 led to further calls in press and 
parliament to liberalise the POW regime in Britain. It was hoped that permitting 
German POWs greater freedoms would lessen the hardship of captivity as well as 
normalise relations between them and the British public helping to foster understanding 
between former enemies. Several German POWs attended a lecture on recent visits to 
Germany and France given by Mr. Jas. L. Palmer, Editor in Chief of the Western 
Morning News, at the Plymouth Public Library on 25 January 1947. Since his visit to 
Germany, Palmer had spoken on many occasions and had at every opportunity 
advocated the proposals that POWs of good conduct should be allowed more liberty: 
 
They should have the opportunity of participating in cultural and religious life, 
because we have every reason to be proud of our record in the war and since, 
and it is all the good that they should have first-hand opportunities of observing 
our traditional way of provincial life.61 
 
Advocating the future relaxation of restrictions in a letter to the Hull Daily Mail, a 
Reverend Erving noted that the screening process had shown that most POWs were not 
ardent Nazis, and in two local camps not a single Nazi was found:  
 
Most of them are very nice fellows, and anxious to meet and know English 
people and see a little of England. They have received very good impressions of 
English people and England. Their propaganda during the war had told them all 
sorts of stories about us, that we would shoot them and do all sorts of horrible 
things to them. The good impressions which they have gained could be 
deepened permanently, and to good effect, if they were allowed a little more 
freedom, for example, permission to use public transport, to visit the cinema, if 
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necessary only in the company of an English civilian. I know that this would be 
much appreciated.62 
 
Granting more freedoms to POWs so that they might experience more of British life and 
British people would help, Erving argued, to mitigate the lies which wartime 
propaganda had fed the German POWs about the British people, aiding a better 
understanding between former enemies. WM. ABBOTT asked if Erving had 'forgotten 
that all these German prisoners-of-war were Nazis or they would not have followed 
Hitler into war'. He was deeply suspicious of the suggestion that the POWs were 'nice 
chaps', knowing that:  
 
[…] the German always is when he is licked. But let him be the top-dog and 
then he is the biggest bully and braggart and cruellest man the world has seen or 
is ever likely to see. As a little reminder to Mr Erving, just let him look around 
and he will see what I mean. He surely must come into contact with people who 
have lost loved ones by the actions of those "nice chaps." I wonder if Hitler 
would have let us go to the pictures if he had won this war?63 
 
Abbott was dismissive of relaxing regulations based on the argument that in victory the 
Germans would have been punitive. This generalisation of the German POWs as Nazis 
was criticised by Frieda Denby, who noted that there were good and bad in every 
nation:   
[…] all Germans were not Nazis, as all Britons are not Socialists. Germans male 
and female were conscripted for war just as we were. […] That there were Nazis 
and sadists is not disputed—but there are these types in Britain too. Hate is an 
unchristian thing, and continuation of that policy between nations will surely 
bring about another war in the not far distant future. The Germans, too, have lost 
loved ones by our action: family love is the same thing in every nation, it is not 
just peculiar to us. It is up to us now to make friends with the prisoners of war, 
to write to their families, to do everything in our power to cement international 
friendship and love: it is the only way to safeguard our children—and, theirs—
from the horrors of war.64 
 
Overcoming wartime notions of the enemy and remembering the common humanity of 
Britons and Germans and their shared suffering in the war was crucial to future peace in 
Denby's view. Erving wrote in agreement:  
 
It is surely complete nonsense to assert that because some German soldiers were 
cruel during the war, when passions were inflamed and conditions quite 
abnormal, therefore all Germans are the same. If a stranger were to say that 
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because there is at present a spate of crime in this country, therefore all 
Englishmen are criminals, murderers and so on, would we not be the first hotly 
to deny it and point out examples of people who are the opposite? I know 
personally one German pow who gave two pints of his blood to a Norwegian 
mother after childbirth. Secondly, the people of this land have for centuries been 
noted for chivalrous treatment of those against whom they fought in battle. That 
chivalry was based on the Christian religion. It is not surprising, therefore, 
through it is equally wrong, when people say that because we would have 
suffered at the hands of the Nazis, had they been victorious, we must make 
things unpleasant for all Germans. Not all Germans were Nazis, just as not all 
Englishmen are Conservatives or Socialists. Those of us who have tried to use 
the way of friendship with Germans (and there are many) to try to help in some 
small way towards building up international peace, know that it is the more 
constructive way, and are quite convinced that to keep so many men here as 
prisoners two years after the end of the war is a blot on the good name which we 
have had hitherto for chivalry and fair-dealing.65 
 
In February, when pressed to equate the freedoms of German POWs with that of Italian 
co-operators, Bellenger stated that he was looking into the matter.66 In March, German 
POWs were given further freedoms. The patches on prisoners' clothing and distinctive 
lettering were to be gradually removed as chocolate dyed battledress became available 
to them. General Officers Commanding Home Commands were given the authority to 
extend the five mile radius, if it enabled POWs to reach a special amenity such as a 
town, otherwise restricted. Authority was also given to allow individual prisoners, 'of 
exemplary character', to proceed to an area outside the normal limit. POWs were 
allowed to enter private houses without having to obtain their Commandant's approval 
and attend football matches and other games in organised groups at the invitation of the 
management or local authority. POW bands were permitted to entertain friends in return 
for hospitality where it was possible to a hut or hall outside the Camp to be used; 
payment for admission to such events was prohibited, and incidental costs had to be 
paid by the POWs. They could also take part in educational activities outside camps 
after the approval by the Control Office for Germany and Austria under arrangements 
made by that Department.67 Furthermore, in June, it was announced that from July 
POWs whose work was satisfactory and were not ardent Nazis, would be able to draw 
part of their pay in sterling, to use shops, cinemas, restaurants and public transport 
within the five mile radius of their camp, but not to use licensed premises.68 
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Learning of Bellenger's announcement in parliament, the Aberdeen Journal reported 
that, 'The emergence of the German P.O.W.'s into our ordinary lives is certainly going 
to give rise to sharp controversy. This is clear from reports from many parts of the 
country'. Cinema proprietors and individual football clubs were to exercise their own 
discretion on whether to admit POWs to their establishments.69 The liberalisation of the 
POW regime was a divisive issue. Commenting on 'the increased liberties and privileges 
recently granted to German prisoners of war', the editor of the Yorkshire Evening Post 
noted that 'In Leeds this has produced sharp debate on the prospect of rubbing shoulders 
with them "at the pictures"'. In a poll the paper conducted earlier in the week, 85 per 
cent of respondents stated that they would not mind, reflecting 'the tolerance usually 
shown by the people of this country'. However, strong feelings had been aroused by the 
issue, demonstrated by the number of letters sent to the paper in recent weeks.  
 
In point of fact this is one of the problems which the average citizen would 
rather be rid of than face. Few people remain unaffected by some degree of 
embarrassment when they meet the prisoner of war, walking aimlessly about 
with nothing to do until the time comes from him to return to his billet or camp. 
It seems all wrong. Yet such are the fortunes of war, and these are the men who 
fought against us and would gladly have taken the fruits of victory. Moreover, 
there were things done during the war one does not need to go into all those 
matters which trouble the mind of the average citizen when he is faced with the 
question of how he should treat the captive enemy. It is obviously the question 
of rubbing shoulders with the German prisoner, of finding oneself sitting 
alongside him, which is going to cause difficulty. He might be the very one who 
dropped the bomb which blasted one's home, or caused the death of some loved 
one. Any yet, to go on treating him as an Ishmael is hardly the answer for a 
civilised nation. […] It is, of course, on the possibilities of provocation—of 
feeling being sharply aroused—that the whole subject turns. Some little 
additional liberty for these men is not untimely. Yet they themselves will have to 
show direction about the way it is exercised.70 
 
While the need to grant further freedoms to the German POWs was accepted, the 
wounds of war and memoirs of atrocities still fresh would make encounters between 
them and the public awkward. Indeed, in some areas German POWs were barred from 
cinemas after local patrons protested against their admittance. The Manchester 
Guardian reported that POWs had been barred from two cinemas in Essex and four in 
Bridgend, the director of the company explaining, 'that the ban had been imposed to 
avoid causing offence to patrons who had lost relatives or property at the hands of the 
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Germans'.71 The Ross Urban Council rejected a request from the Foreign Office asking 
if they would permit German POWs to attend meetings to observe the workings of 
democracy. Light-heartedly, council Shawcross argued that the POWs would be 
'completely fogged' by council discussions, with another member agreeing that 'some of 
us go away not known what has happened!'. Councillor Davis, 'would not tolerate such 
a thing' having lost his only son in the war.72 
 
The changing nature of the POW regime, bringing them into ever closer contact and 
visibility in British society was observed in the Essex Newsman. In their 'Sign of the 
Times' section, it was reported: 'SEEN in Chelmsford High Street on Thursday: –Two 
tall German prisoners pushing prams, with babies, and the young mothers walking 
alongside. The number of local families who regularly entertain Germans in their homes 
has more than doubled since Easter'.73 In some instances, those that entertained German 
POWs received abuse:  
 
On two occasions recently my wife and I have invited German prisoners of war 
to our home. This morning we were disgusted to be the recipients of a letter 
containing a highly flavoured account of a battle incident involving alleged 
German atrocities culled form an American magazine, with a comment written 
by the anonymous sender. "Pity you were not there." As our correspondent is so 
chary of divulging his or her identity, it is, unfortunately, impossible for me to 
reply personally. May I, therefore, through the courtesy of your columns, 
explain that though we were not present at that particular incident (if it ever 
occurred) we were both rather busily employed elsewhere; my wife for four 
years in an aircraft accessory factory in London, where she was incidentally the 
first, and for some time the only, woman bakelite moulder in England, and 
myself for five years on R.A.F. aircrew duties. As we, directly and indirectly, 
did our best to destroy as many Germans as possible during the war, quite 
irrespective of age and sex, so we now ask the right to do all in our power to 
prevent our children being involved in a similar unhappy duty in a few years' 
time. We are still sufficiently idealists to be believe that this can be done better 
by establishing bonds of genuine friendship than by threats and atom bombs. We 
are aware that this last statement is the subject of many different opinions, all 
worthy of consideration except one—that of a person who is sufficiently 
contemptible and malicious to send unsigned abuse through the post.74 
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Evidently, there was still a division of opinion towards German POWs and their 
treatment in mid-1947. Considering the local opinion of the 'Germans in Our Midst', the 
Nottingham Evening Post published a number of letters on the subject in June 1947.75 
Two correspondents praised the local German POWs. MERE WOMAN thought they 
were 'a credit to the community'.76 While Mr Sykes, hon. secretary of the Nottingham 
Prisoner of War Welfare Committee emphasised the need to reach out to them: 'We 
have an opportunity to making them ambassadors of peace and friendship when they 
return to their own country'.77 In contrast, two correspondents condemned the 'forgive-
and-forget policy'.78 A serving solider thought the public had been too quick to forget 
what the ex-enemy had done:  
 
There are quite of lot of German P.O.W.s in Nottingham now, and they are 
getting looked after better than the British soldier. During the war, while we 
were fighting, nine out of every ten people hated the Germans, and they thought 
that nothing was too good for the British forces. But now the war is over, people 
think more of P.O.W.s than they do of us. How does correspondent "G.P.G." 
expect the peacetime soldier to show his manners to anybody who thinks more 
of those who were, a little more than a year ago, killing English sons and 
husbands.79 
 
Beginning in Christmas 1946, regulations governing the contact between German 
POWs and the British public were relaxed and numerous privileges were granted 
whereby the captives were permitted to enjoy leisure activities outside the camps and 
accept invitations into British homes. For the authorities, the relaxation of regulations 
was a means to mitigate the adverse effects of continued captivity on the morale of the 
German POWs helping to increase their productivity in their employment. It also 
placated calls in press and parliament which argued that interaction between civilians 
and POWs would help foster Anglo-German understanding and lessen the burden of 
captivity. Yet, while the necessity of relaxing regulations was by and large agreed, the 
legacy of the war, particularly the revelation of atrocities, would undoubtedly make 
everyday encounters between POWs and the public awkward affairs. Moreover, 
hostility towards German POWs was still very much present in British society. Those 
that opposed the relaxation of restrictions argued that in victory Germany would never 
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have permitted the British such luxuries and that while the POWs might seem repentant 
they were the same old enemy.   
 
6. British women and German POWs 
 One of the first films which German POWs could go and see, if their local 
cinema had not barred them, was Frieda, directed by Basil Dearden. Released on 19 
June 1947, the titular character, a German nurse played by Mai Zetterling, aids British 
pilot Robert escape a German POW camp towards the end of the Second World War. 
Robert, who is grateful but does not reciprocally love Frieda, marries her so that she 
may obtain a British passport. On their return to Oxfordshire, Robert introduces his wife 
to the family. Robert is forced to leave his job as a local schoolteacher on account of the 
hostility he and Frieda faces from the townspeople.80 The publicity poster asked 'Would 
you take Frieda into your home?' posing the question whether the audience would 
accept a German woman in Britain.  
 As historians such as Rose have shown, women who enjoyed themselves—
'good-time gals' and 'flappers'—were often cast as anti-citizens, especially when they 
involved themselves with the different ethnicities which populated wartime Britain.81 
Such negative attitudes were exacerbated when British women were discovered to be 
associating with German POWs. As Bob Moore notes, fraternising with the enemy was 
a 'far more morally charged debate'.82 However, attitudes towards fraternisation between 
British women and German POWs gradually relaxed as the POWs increasing proximity 
to the public allowed them to be seen as normal, average men. The wartime measures, 
continued to be enforced during the post-war, which sought to minimise contact 
between women and POWs were increasingly viewed as petty. Given the freedoms 
allowed German POWs and their proximity to women in the WLA and ATS, how could 
the government, it was argued, continue to make the unavoidable natural relationships 
between women and POWs illegal? From being cast as an inhuman perpetrator of the 
horrors disclosed in concentration camps, the German POW, by July 1947, would be 
considered marriageable material for a British woman.  
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 On March 2 1945, the Daily Mail published a picture of two women outside 
Bury Magistrates Court. 83  With three others who were employed at the Florence 
Nightingale Hospital, they had been summoned to the court for breaching the non-
fraternisation order. This was the first high profile case of fraternisation between British 
women and German POWs. The two Sisters and three nurses were accused of 
exchanging letters and gifting sundry items to German POWs who had received 
treatment at the hospital in January and February that year. The letter racket was 
described in court as 'a persistent, clever, and crafty system of communication'. On 
inspection, a Sergeant of the Pioneer Corps had uncovered a stitched-up bag which was 
concealed underneath the uniform of a German POW leaving the hospital. Nicknamed 
'Mosquito' by the POWs, Sister Helena Mulvenna admitted to sending letters to Erich 
Neumeister, and visiting Warth Mills camp, where the POWs were held, on several 
occasions. Read out in court, the content of the letters was described by the prosecution 
as 'rather warm'. However, they were considered 'romantic' and 'harmless', with 
Mulvenna stating that her 'high regard' for Erich had affected her judgement. Sister 
Winnie Cunnane admitted that she had given cigarettes, soap, and razor blades, to 
Rudolph Frommert, arguing that it was fair given that the British patients were given 
these items as well. Cunnane admitted having a 'slight attachment' to Frommert, and 
that 'there had been a little kissing in the kitchen', but claimed that she had refused a 
proposal of marriage from Frommert and the question of escape was never discussed. 
Nurse Ivy Knott had sent a cigarette case engraved with her name and address to 
another POW. The Detective-Sergeant investigating the case had a first though they 
were assisting the POWs to escape, but inquires had confirmed that this was 'only a 
serious case of fraternisation and the nurses had no ulterior motives'. Found guilty, the 
women were not branded traitors, anti-citizens, or collaborators. They were considered 
foolish by the Bench, silly for having let their excitements overcome their judgement. 
While it was noted that the magistrates had considered sending them to prison as a 
deterrent to others from acting similarly irresponsibly, they were instead fined: the two 
Sisters £15, Knott and Hodges £1, with Owen dismissed on payment of costs. This case 
of fraternisation was one of many uncovered by the authorities. It was one, however, 
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that had additional scandalous qualities. First, the relationships between the women and 
POWs had been formed while Britain was at war with Germany. Second, the women 
were employed in a professional capacity and had breached regulations at their 
workplace. Indeed, recognising this breach in discipline, the board of the Florence 
Nightingale Hospital dismissed Mulvenna, Cunnane, and Knott.84 As a result of the 
incident, any German POW who required treatment in the future in the area under 
control of Western Command was not sent to civilian establishments.85  
 A few weeks after the incident at Bury, in the Commons, Rhys Davies asked if 
the Secretary of State for War would consider amending the appropriate regulations so 
as to preclude the sex inequality which has arisen whereby a British POW may marry a 
German woman abroad and bring her to the UK while British female nurses were 
recently prosecuted for being too friendly with, and suggesting marriage to male 
German POWs here. Henderson noted that Davis had misunderstood the regulations; 
British POWs were not allowed to do that. The nurses were prosecuted for contravening 
regulations prohibiting fraternisation with German POWs.86 This case of fraternisation 
was probably not the first and certainly not the last. 
 While regulations were lifting from late 1946, sexual relations between British 
women and German POWs remained illegal. Yet, as Bob Moore has noted, despite the 
fraternisation ban, 'all manner of clandestine relationships' were discovered during and 
after the war.87 Policing these relationships was ultimately impossible. In September 
1946, the Derby borough police called upon the parents of young girls in the county to 
warn their daughters against associating with the men or frequenting the vicinity of 
camps.88 Young girls in the area had been seen conversing with German POWs through 
the barbed wire at several camps. As it was difficult to police it can be speculated that 
many couples successfully avoided discovery of their forbidden relationships; the 
precise numbers of incidents will remain unknown. Yet, POWs and women were 
caught, and their cases were published in regional and, when particularly scandalous, 
national newspapers. These reports provide insight how these relationships developed, 
how the participants were dealt with, and attitudes towards fraternisation.  
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 At Romford Magistrates Court, in March 1946, Lily Anne Sampford pleaded 
guilty to a fraternisation charge. She had become friendly with a group of POWs 
working nearby her home the previous August, inviting them into her home for tea, and 
offering them cigarettes and, occasionally, a meal. Sampford admitted to allowing one 
POW to kiss her, but argued that it was out of friendship not passion. When the POW 
had been transferred to Potters Bar, Sampford continued to visit him. It was here that 
their relationship had been uncovered, when they were spotted together behind a hedge. 
Sampford claimed that she was returning a collection of photographs which the POW 
had left behind at her house, and stated that she did not realise her actions were wrong. 
While the chairman informed her she was liable to three months imprisonment and a 
£100 fine, Samford was considered of good character and fined only £2 in each of the 
two cases.89  When convicted of fraternisation, the full force of the law—a £100 fine, or 
even imprisonment—was rarely, applied. The women, prosecuted at Magistrates Courts, 
were often described by the Bench and prosecution as 'foolish', having allowed their 
emotions to overcome their better judgement.  
 In August 1946, 27 year old Hans Kupzong, a POW held at Ripon camp, was 
brought before a court martial. Evidence was provided including letters which had 
passed between Kupzog and a local girl named Thirkill. It was stated that on one 
occasion they had met in a wood near Wath where they kissed and marriage was 
mentioned. Thirkill stated in court that cycling to work with a friend, Kupzog had 
waved to them and they had waved back. In May 1945 six letters were exchanged 
between them; Thirkill passing them to Kupzog on her way to and from work. Kupzog 
had also made her a wallet, and she in return gave him chocolate and cigarettes. Her 
friend, Aileen White, also 17 years old, admitted to passing letters and the wallet 
between Thirkill and Kupzog. Thirkill denied that she had encouraged him; rather she 
was sympathetic to his plight as a POW. Kupzog, pleading not guilty, maintained that 
he misunderstood the meaning of the term fraternisation. However, the German camp 
leader stated that the regulations had been made well known in the camp. Kupzog 
argued that he had only heard of the regulations when he had been charged; he believed 
that talking and writing to British women was permitted. The solicitor defending 
Kupzog agreed that as a victorious nation, Britain had to ensure the discipline of 
German POWs was maintained. However, he argued that the regulations had not been 
given or had been given in a manner which Kupzog had misunderstood. 'We have to 
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protect our womenfolk', the solicitor stated, 'but there is a certain type of woman who 
will go after and encourage people who a short time ago were our enemies. I think that 
from a humane point of view this is grossly unfair to the prisoner concerned'.90 Kupzog 
was charged with conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline in that between 30 
April and 26 May he had improperly associated with Thirkill. Such incidents continued 
into 1947.  
 In May 1947, Otto Port, a 20 year old German POW, was tired by military court 
at #96 POW camp in Rugeley, Staffordshire. He had been charged for illegally 
consorting with Eunice Eveleyn Jackman, a domestic servant and resident of Burton-on-
Trent. It was alleged that they were found asleep in a store hut on the edge of an RAF 
aerodrome. Constable Tomkinson had found Port standing behind the door of the hut on 
the aerodrome at 5 am on 30 March. Jackman was hiding behind some stacks of radar 
material. Although the couple contended that they had been 'walking around all night', 
'dodging' the police, Tomkinson stated that not only was Jackman in possession of an 
alarm clock—presumably to wake them up—a stack of radar paper strips had an imprint 
of two persons who had been lying there. While the court-martial took place, hundreds 
of Port's comrades crowded the room at the POW camp. He pleaded not guilty. The 
German camp leader, Otto Schoenfield, stated that that the regulations regarding 
fraternisation were displayed in the camp mess and had been read out to the POWs. 
Jackman, who had provided several false names when asked by Tomkinson, eventually 
admitted that she had met Port at 10 pm on 19 March at an inn in Needwood, and had 
spent the night with him in the shed; she had known Port for about a month. Port 
maintained that he had tried to leave but stayed when Jackman said she was afraid of the 
dark. He denied that anything improper had taken place.91 In certain sections of British 
society where there was hostility towards German POWs, women were chastised for 
any interaction with German POWs. However, there was a growing call, especially after 
marriages were permitted in Germany, to permit relationships between British women 
and German POWs.  
 Women who fraternised with German POWs, especially those women already 
married, were considered irresponsible. In January 1946, Canon Elliot Mitchell, Vicar 
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of Dartford, denounced British women for 'petting and pampering' German POWs. A 
group of women had been recently reported for fraternising with 20 German POWs 
from Swanscombe camp, while the POWs were working on a housing site near Dartford 
town centre. The women had taken cigarettes and cakes to the POWs. The Canon stated:  
 
We are told they are giggling girls and irresponsible married women. I am 
wondering what sort of homes they come from. These married women should 
spend their time preparing a nice place for their men—a splendid place—when 
they come back from serving this country in Germany and other places.92  
 
Opposing attitudes towards fraternisation were captured in the Lancashire Evening 
Post. In September 1946, two 'disgusted girls'—asking to remain anonymous as their 
parents did not agree with their views—wrote to the paper protesting against the 
inequality of allowing British soldiers in Germany to fraternise with German women 
while British women were not allowed to with German POWs in Britain.93 In response, 
P. Turner asked if the two girls realised what would have happened to them if Britain 
had been invaded by Germany, suggesting that there would have been 'but "mass rape" 
of British women. 'It isn't the two girls who should be disgusted. It is the public who 
should be disgusted with them'.94 Similarly, an ex-serviceman of the 8th Army, was 
sickened by the letter, and on the same lines noted that in the event of a victorious 
Germany the girls, 'would have no alternative to fraternise' with the Germans'. They 
were reminded of Belsen, and criticised for forgetting the sacrifices of the British 
soldiers. 95  Others came to the girls defence, noting the gender inequality. Belsen, 
'another disgusted girl' argued, had not stopped British soldiers in Germany from 
fraternising with 'frauleins'. If they were allowed to marry Germans, surely British 
women were as well.96 Whereas British women were abused for considering marriage 
with a German POW, the British solider in Germany 'aroused sympathetic interest, and 
even cheerful little articles in the Press' one wrote to the Yorkshire Post, 'What is the 
difference in the situations?' they asked.97 Two correspondents to the Hull Daily Mail 
made it clear that women seeking a German husband would not be welcome in Briton.98 
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7. Monica Cann and Herman Ganter, May 1947 
In May 1947, the secret marriage between 22 year old Monica Cann, and 28 year old 
Hermann Ganter was revealed.99 The pair had met at the Central Ordanance Depot in 
Donnington, where Cann, a 22 year old A.T.S. (Auxiliary Territorial Service) Sergeant, 
taught English. Cann was summoned to Wellington Police Court, charged with signing 
a false declaration of marriage on 9 January and causing the insertion of a false 
statement into the marriage resister on 11 January. She was remanded on bail for one 
week.100 Reporting the case, journalists were right to speculate that revelation of their 
wedding five months after it happened was likely to open up the important issue of the 
prohibition of marriage ban between POWs and British women. In the House of 
Commons, Bellenger was asked to clarify the position of the government towards the 
marriage ban. Pointing to the 'recent case' of marriage, Tom Driberg (Lab. MP, Maldon) 
asked what action the Secretary of State for War would take. Given the case was sub 
judice, Bellenger refused to comment on it, suggesting only that the matter of marriages 
between British women and German POWs was under consideration. Echoing Driberg, 
Hector Hughes (Lab. MP, Aberdeen North) asked 'is it not unreasonable to allow this 
social intercourse and rule out the probable consequences of it? Would it not be 
reasonable to allow both?' Richard Stokes went further, asking Bellenger, 'Does he not 
realise that he cannot resist the inevitable course of nature'. The desire of marriage 
between British women and Germany POWs was thought an entirely expected one 
given that regulations allowed them to enjoy each other's company. Bellenger remained 
reticent about War Office thinking and his personal view.101  
 The idea that relationships between British women and German POWs were a 
natural and predictable occurrence was a sentiment echoed in court. On 4 June, Cann 
pleaded guilty to both charges, receiving a £2 fine on each charge along with court 
costs).  After announcing the magistrates' decision Alderman Thomas Jones stated: 'The 
vagaries of human love lead very often to extraordinary conditions'. Certainly, the 
ceremony itself was secretive and impulsive; the witnesses were a lady from a nearby 
house and a man found in a library. Cann paid all the expenses, and borrowed a 
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complete uniform from a soldier which Ganter was married in. Defending her actions, 
Cann stated: 'I married him because I loved him, and I do not regret it one bit. I knew it 
would be hopeless to try to get married through the proper channels. I did not put 
Ganter's true name because if I had they might have guessed he was a German'. This 
sentiment was echoed by Cann's solicitor, who stated that a 'sense of proportion' had 
been 'utterly lost' during the case. 'Here is a girl' he continued, 'not yet 22, who desires 
to marry the man she loves, and she commits some technical offences'. The solicitor 
pointed out that there were similar cases all over the country every month'.102 Evidently 
there was public interest in the case, Hermann Ganter's repatriation being published in 
local newspapers unconnected with Shropshire. When Ganter was repatriated in July 
1947, Cann intended to follow him to Germany.103 Hermann Ganter was repatriated 
with 1,399 other POWs on 22 July 1947.104  In the wake of Cann's charge, further 
questions were raised regarding the marriage ban. On 10 June Skeffington-Lodge asked 
the Secretary of State for War how many official and unofficial applications he had 
received from British women wishing to marry POWs and what disciplinary action had 
been taken against the men involved. Freeman said that 54 written applications had 
been received and that no disciplinary action had been taken against any of these POWs 
based on the information contained in the letters of inquiry.105 Further questions about 
the issue were met with the response that an announcement would be made shortly.106 
By the time Cann's secret marriage to Ganter was disclosed, public opinion was 
shifting; the idea of marrying a German POW became more acceptable. Following Cann 
and Ganter, it was one particular case which would provide the catalyst for reversing the 
marriage ban.  
 
8. Olive Reynolds and Werner Vetter, July 1947 to August 1947 
At his court-martial in early July 1947, the 22 year old Werner Vetter described 
himself as 'a man who had not the right to love'. Sitting next to her and their ten 
week old baby girl, he pleaded guilty to improperly associating with 21 year old 
Olive Ethel Reynolds. His defence was that he intended to marry her as soon as 
possible. Found guilty, Vetter was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.107 
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The sentence given to Vetter sparked a lengthy debate in the House of Commons. 
Considered severe, Bellenger was asked to revise the sentence. He was reminded that 
Vetter was young and of good character. Skeffington-Lodge, Paget, and Hughes, all 
pressed the Secretary of State for War to permit Vetter to marry the mother of his child. 
Bellenger ensured that the case would be examined as soon as the War Office received 
the court martial proceedings. Leah Manning pointed towards the 'sex discrimination' 
practiced by the War Office against British women. British servicemen were allowed to 
marry German women. Sorensen pressed Bellenger to ensure that German POWs who 
had fathered children by British women would be allowed to meet their financial 
obligations rising from paternity by receiving adequate pay. Bellenger asked the House 
to await the response of the Home Secretary on the subject of marriages between 
German POWs and British women. He did, however, rule out any differentiation in pay 
between POWs who became fathers and other POWs. In response to Renton, Oliver 
stated that he was anxious that the implications of such a marriage were fully 
appreciated by the women and the POW. First, the women would lose her British 
nationality. Second, there could be no provisions made for her to live with her husband, 
who were remain a POW and therefore was confined to the camp or hostel under 
military control; there could be no relaxation of regulations in the husband's favour over 
other POWs. Third, there was no guarantee that the husband would be permitted to stay 
in the country when due for repatriation. These stipulations would be made known to 
both the women and the POW wishing to marry; 'if, nevertheless, they determine to 
marry, no obstacle will be placed in their way'. Although the allowance of marriages 
was welcomed, several MPs raised concerns regarding Oliver's statement. Skeffington-
Lodge was not satisfied by Oliver's reply when he asked in Vetter's case would be 
quashed. He promised to raise the subject in the near future.108 Oliver's statement was 
considered a 'warning' to POWs and British women wishing to marry.109 
 A Daily Mail reporter interviewed Olive and her sister Pat after Oliver's 
declaration that the marriage ban would be lifted. The sisters celebrated in their three 
roomed basement flat in Farnsley Road, Chingford, Essex. The announcement that 
Werner might be freed and they could marry overjoyed Olive.  It was revealed that Pat 
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had a 'secret love' for another POW, Herbert Wolf, a 22 year-old POW who had served 
with the Waffen SS, which could now be disclosed. Olive and Pat's mother supported 
their decision to marry their German POWs. Olive had received 150 letters from 
sympathisers, 60 from other girls wishing to marry German POWs. Another POW had 
written to her proposing marriage. Both sisters were expecting to go to Germany and 
were prepared to lose their British nationality.110 
 Skeffington-Lodge, who was a minor champion of German POWs, especially in 
his Bedfordshire constituency, asked Bellenger to make a statement about Vetter's 
imprisonment. Bellenger stated that all cases would be reviewed.111 Charles Studden, 
writing to the Cornishman, was 'shocked at the severity of the sentence' given to Vetter.  
 
This case seems to have disposed of the proudly held belief that British justice is 
"tempered with mercy." Are the Germans still to be regarded as enemies in the 
full sense of the word even now the war is over? Is this country also going to 
"nationalise" the emotions of the human heart? Warm, human faults such as 
these two are guilty of are surely not so sinful as many cold-blooded, calculated 
and wilfully committed crimes, and there was no evidence given against the 
girl's moral character, who has apparently been a respectable citizen. This surely 
is a case where British folk should demand justice with mercy, in view of the 
special circumstances which should have been taken into account.  
 
Studden quoted from an article which appeared in the Cornishman on 10 May 1945. 
Herbert Thomas had advocated taking a merciful attitude towards Germany, putting the 
needs of humanity above any thoughts of vindictiveness. Studden called for readers of 
the Cornishman to write to him immediately if interested in the case of Vetter. If he had 
a sufficient number reply to him, Studden would then petition Bellenger so that 
'something may be done for this unfortunate couple'.112 Subsequently, due to public and 
parliamentary pressure, Vetter had his sentence remitted in August.113 Olive and Werner 
married at the village church of Hampton Lovett near Droitwich on 28 September 1947. 
Bride and groom entertained some sixty guests at a Droitwich Girl Guides' hut. 
However, the honeymoon ended at 10 pm when Vetter had to be back at his POW 
camp.114 The Daily Mail reported that 'Wedding bells will ring tomorrow' for Reynolds 
and Vetter at Hampton Lovett parish church in Worcestershire. As a result, a discussion 
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would take place in parliament regarding POWs marrying British women. Reynolds 
stated that Vetter had managed to rent a flat near his work for the couple, when she was 
interviewed at her home by a Daily Mail reporter. It was noted that Reynolds would 
take a pram brought for the baby as a christening present by the POWs at Chingford 
camp, where Vetter had been in a military prison.115 Olive could not afford the fare to 
accompany Vetter back to Germany; his repatriation was scheduled for June 1948. 
Olive told a Daily Mail reporter that they were expecting another child in August and 
since they were married last September, Vetter had been the 
  
[…] perfect husband. I would not change him for any Englishman. We have had 
only evenings together—when he arrived at five and had to leave two hours later 
to be back at camp by 11. […]. He was told by a fellow prisoner that he was to 
be sent back to Germany and last Saturday he was so upset that he would have 
to go and leave Janet and me that he risked everything and stayed with us over 
Sunday. The police came for him yesterday. His home in Germany is in the 
Russian zone and I doubt if we shall every see him again. He is just the type the 
Russians want to work for them.  
 
Vetter had made repeated application to stay in Britain to work as a waiter or painter 
and Olive had been to the War Office several times attempting to get him civilian 
status.116 His application was initially rejected and Vetter was informed that he would 
be repatriated in June 1948.117  After public and parliamentary pressure, Vetter was 
permitted to stay in Britain.118 He was, however, deported a few months later after being 
sentenced for housebreaking.119 On 2 February 1949, Vetter pleaded guilty at Essex 
Quarter Sessions to three charges of housebreaking at Buckhurst Hill and Woodford 
Green, and theft of £218 of property. He was bound over until 9 March and the bench 
recommended that he be deported to Germany.120 Consequently, Werner, Olive and 
their daughter Janet left Britain for Germany.  
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Image 10 Daily Mail, 9 July 1947, p. 3. 
 
Image 11 Daily Mail, 27 September 1947, p. 1. 
On 11 July 1947, it was reported that Ebert and Locock had given provisional notice of 
marriage to the Cheltenham Registrar on the day the ban was lifted. As a day had to be 
allowed before the ceremony could take place, it was arranged for two days' time. The 
relationship between Ebert and Locock began four years before when they met at a 
civilian party in Guernsey where Locock was then living. The scenes at the wedding 
were described: Locock stated to an Echo reporter: 
 
When the ban was lifted I really could not believe it was true after waiting so 
long and trying so many times before. […]. I applied last September and they 
said ours was such an isolated case that they couldn't allow it. […]. We cannot 
very well plan the future because we do not know what will happen to my 
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husband, but if we can we will stay in England. […]. If we have to go to 
Germany I shall be quite happy. 
 
Her mother stated that they were 'very happy' about the wedding. Ebert (27) spoke 
English fluently and Locock (23) spoke German. After the ceremony, the wedding party 
left by taxi with the intention of spending the evening at Leckhamption Parish Hall, 
where a party had been arrange in their honour by some of his fellow POWs at 
Leckhampton Court. This was reported as the first marriage to take place in the town 
and one of the first in the country between a POW and a girl of British origin.121 
 The Essex Newsman reported, after interviewing the N.C.O. in charge of a local 
camp, that despite the lifting of the marriage ban, no applications for permission to 
marry had been made in the Chelmsford area. The N.C.O. knew of 'a number of 
romances blossoming since prisoners were stationed in this area', but none had come 
forward so far. Two days before the restrictions were lifted, Canon Wilson, Catholic 
priest of Chelmsford preaching at the evening service, spoke strongly against denying 
German POWs, 'the ordinary human right of marriage'.122  
 The strictness of the regulations regarding marriages between British women 
and German POWs was designed to prevent them from being justifications for the right 
to residency in Britain. Therefore, if a wife was unable to afford the cost of travelling to 
Germany they would be separated from their husbands who were prohibited from 
remaining in Britain. Attempting to remain together, a number of women were charged 
for harbouring POWs who were to be repatriated. 28 year old Gladys Bowden from 
Cornwood in South Devon was fined £25 for concealing a former German POW. A 
fortnight before, Josef Wollny was sentenced in the same court—Plympton—to one 
months imprisonment for having illegally entered the country. Bowden, the wife of a 
Warrant officer in the Royal Engineers, pleaded not guilty. In a statement she said that 
she had met Wollny in September 1946 and as he moved between camps she continued 
to visit him. When Wollny returned to England 'they lived as man and wife'.123 Bowden 
stated defiantly: 
 
No matter the outcome of this, I am prepared to wait for Wollny as we love each 
other very much. I have not had a happy married life and it was not until 
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meeting Wollny that my happiness began. It has been the happiest time of my 
life.124 
 
Wollny went back to Germany. Ernest Orlando Bowden was granted decree nisi on the 
ground of the misconduct of his wife Gladys. The question of the custody of the child 
was referred to chambers.125  
 
9. Conclusions 
With the end of war in Europe, German POWs came into ever closer contact with the 
British public. At a regional level, they became part of the local landscape. Set to work 
in agriculture and on various other employs, they were a common sight for many. The 
government sought to minimise contact between German POW and the public, initially 
as a security matter. With the conclusion of the war, the fraternisation ban continued to 
be inforce. Security remained a concern but the authorities also hoped that the cold-
shoulder treatment would help emphasise the wrongdoings of the German POWs and 
the German people more broadly.  
 The media continued to emphasise that German POWs were adequately fed and 
properly housed. Yet, from early 1946, the continuation of the fraternisation restrictions 
placed on German POWs was increasingly criticised. The government was criticised for 
restricting contact between the public and POWs as it was considered a unique 
opportunity to foster Anglo-German understanding after such a devastating conflict. In 
press and parliament it was argued that continuing to ostracise POWs only served to 
turn them against Britain. As social pariahs, the German POWs, it was believed, would 
harbour hostile attitudes towards the British people, perhaps leading to another war. The 
lifting of the fraternisation ban in December 1946 was welcomed by the media.   
 With the proximity of the German POWs to the public gaze increased, the 
humanity of the captives could be viewed and assessed. They were shown to be keen 
gardeners, musicians, and thespians. This countered the wartime propaganda which had 
emphasised the hyper-masculinity of the German solider. Having been humanised, it 
was only a short time before they were pitied for the position they found themselves in. 
Furthermore, German POWs were eventually considered adequate husbands for British 
women. This display of emotion, such as Vetter's love for Olive, and interest in hobbies 
and pursuits which Britons also enjoyed decreased the cultural differentiation between 
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captor and captive. Some may well have been Nazis, but in the main, the German 
POWs were viewed as ordinary men.  
 During the 1939-45 conflict, the liberal treatment of the captured enemy 
demonstrated the values for which Britain was fighting Germany to defend. There was 
also a desire to retain humanitarian and Christian ideals after such a devastating conflict. 
To undermine these ideals was to undermine the war effort. Fair-play was again central 
in discussions of the treatment of German POWs. If they were to be kept and worked, it 
was only fair that they should enjoy increased freedoms. After all, the war was over and 
they were no longer enemies. The exploitation of defenceless captives had been a 
criticism levelled at the German authorities during the war, and it remained antithetical 
to Britishness in the post-war period. Again, with the marriage ban, it was considered 
unfair that while British soldiers were allowed to marry German women, British women 
were barred from marrying German POWs. There was no solid justification for 
regulating the natural course of human relations.  
 While the values invested in the treatment of POWs remained constant, they 
took on a new significance in the post-war period. Rather than being values to be 
defended against Nazi tyranny, they were to be demonstrated in order to promote 
reconstruction.  
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Chapter 6: Repatriation 
 
1. Introduction 
The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on British attitudes towards the repatriation 
of German POWs. The first section examines British policy in relation to the 
stipulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention. In other words, what the obligations of the 
post-war Labour government in relation to returning German POWs were in the context 
of unconditional surrender. As seen in chapter 4, the continued employment of POW 
labour was considered vital to Britain's post-war economy. Therefore, no plans for a 
progressive scheme of repatriation were considered.  The second section examines the 
concern raised in press and parliament over the lack of a repatriation programme and the 
effect continued detention was having on the POWs in 1946. A notable figure which 
emerges is Richard Rapier Stokes (Lab. Ipswich), and his individual motivations are 
considered. Having already established itself as an influential post-war pressure group, 
Save Europe Now, chaired by the charismatic publisher turned campaigner Victor 
Gollancz, organised a formal protest urging Attlee to draw up a gradual repatriation 
scheme, this is the focus of section three. Understanding the growing public concern, 
symbolised by the SEN Memorial, section four considers the response of the Labour 
government and the beginning of repatriation in September-October 1946. Although 
this was welcomed, pressure continued to hasten repatriation. Criticism continued into 
1947, resulting in a second Memorial sent to Attlee by SEN, this is examined in section 
six, with the final section considering Attlee's dismissal of the demands and the eventual 
completion of repatriation. In their study of German migrants in post-war Britain, 
Weber-Newth and Steinert provide a concise overview of the 'debate over repatriation' 
and 'Government considerations'.1 Expanding on their brief description, this chapter 
takes a more nuanced look at the concerns aired in press and parliament over the 
continued detention of German POWs.  
 
2. International law and repatriation 
As part of the development of international law, the process of repatriation was revised. 
The 1907 Hague Convention stipulated that: 'After the conclusion of peace, the 
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repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible'.2 Considered 
obsolete after the First World War, the wording of the 1929 Geneva Convention took 
into account that wars were usually fought to the bitter end. Given that a ceasefire 
quickly preceded a peace treaty the 1929 Convention acknowledged the necessity of 
quickly repatriating POWs: 
 
When belligerents conclude an armistice convention, they shall normally cause 
to be included therein provisions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war. 
If it has not been possible to insert in that convention such stipulations, the 
belligerents shall, nevertheless, enter into communications with each other on 
the question as soon as possible. In any case, the repatriation of prisoners shall 
be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace.3 
 
While the wording emphasised haste, the Convention offered leverage to delay 
repatriation until a peace treaty was signed. Implicit was the idea that repatriation was 
subject to bilateral agreement rather than unilateral obligation.4 Therefore, international 
law stipulated that POWs should be repatriated as quickly as could be organised by 
belligerents after peace terms had been agreed. There would, however, be no peace 
treaty with Germany until 1990. Fighting the war to unconditional surrender was 
decided at the Casablanca Conference in 1943.5 At the 1945 Potsdam conference, it was 
agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers—established at the conference—would 'be 
utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the 
Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established'.6 
Yet, with the division of Germany into two states in 1949, no peace treaty with 
'Germany' was signed.7 In May 1945, there was no discussion regarding the repatriation 
of German POWs. With the end of the war in Europe, government departments were 
more concerned with utilising the maximum number of German POWs in Britain in 
order to meet labour demands.  Policy towards German POWs was utilitarian rather 
                                            
2International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of 
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than retributive; they were employed out of necessity, not set to work as a form of 
punishment.  
 
3. Protests over the retention of POWs, March 1946 to August 1946 
In the House of Commons, Richard Rapier Stokes, Labour MP for Ipswich and member 
of Save Europe Now, championed the cause of repatriation, as well as the general 
welfare, of German POWs. A peculiar political figure, his political views were based on 
an affinity to fascism, hostility to Bolshevism, and his Roman Catholic faith.8 His initial 
concern was with the supposed secret arrangements made at the Teheran and Yalta 
conferences to supply Russia with two million Germans slave labourers. 9  Stokes 
demanded that a White Paper concerning the decisions taken at the conferences be 
published to alleviate concerns over the fate of the German people; this was dismissed 
by Attlee, which only served to fuel Stokes belief that the victorious powers were 
exploiting POWs.10 Stokes then turned to the treatment of German POWs by the British 
government; during early 1946, in debates over the work conducted by POWs, Stokes 
referred to them as 'slaves' or their employment as tantamount to 'slave labour', 
especially when rates of pay for their labour were discussed.11  
 Late on 27 March, Stokes was given an adjournment when he voiced his anxiety 
over German POWs to the Financial Secretary to the War Office, Frederick Bellenger.12 
Expressing sympathy for the POWs, he stressed the importance of the subject of 
repatriation; there could be nothing 'more dreadful, and nothing more degrading, than 
finding oneself […] detained for an indefinite period'. Stokes argued that the continued 
detention of German POWs made a mockery of the on-going trials in Nuremberg; he 
considered the trials 'bogus' as the charges of 'forcible detention and slave labour' were 
exactly what the British government were perpetrating. Stokes dismissed the 
government's arguments as to why German POWs had not been repatriated. Germany 
had surrendered unconditionally, a policy which Stokes had been an opponent. In turn 
no peace treaty was signed, and, as a result, article 75 of the Convention—calling for 
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the immediate repatriation of POWs—did not have to be upheld. As the war was over, 
the terms of the Convention effectively lapsed. Previously Stokes had asked the Foreign 
Secretary on the matter of the application of the Convention in this situation, the 
response was negative. The Foreign Secretary assured him that POWs would be treated 
'in accordance with the best Socialistic principles'. For Stokes, this was a highly 
unsatisfactory response, treating them 'virtually as slaves' was not in accordance with 
Socialistic principles. The fact that the Convention did not apply and that no peace 
treaty had been negotiated, in Stokes view, increased the onus on Britain 'to see that fair 
treatment is meted out to these people'. He argued that the treatment of German POWs 
was in fact getting worse; they were being treated as slave labourers. Stokes had 
experience of being allocated a group of POW labourers, and noted that as they were 
not credited with proper pay for their labour, the 'consequence was they worked like 
blacks'. He asked the House if they would 'sit here for a moment complacently' if the 
Italian or German governments 'used our people […] as slaves'. After outlining his 
thoughts on slavery and the position of German POWs, Stokes asked Bellenger to reply 
to five points, all of which contributed to the slave status of German POWs. First, that 
some POWs were being 'denied the opportunity for their proper religious observances'. 
Second, that government policy could be clarified regarding the date on which POWs 
would be repatriated. Third, if that was not possible, then at least provide some 
understanding on when they would be. Fourth, that he provided an assurance that 
communications between POWs and their families would be restored as soon as 
possible. Finally, would he see that POWs, if not paid in full at the time, be credited 
with a fair proportion of what employers pay to the government for their labour.  For 
Stokes, the entire issue resonated more widely than just the treatment of POWs; it was 
about upholding human rights. Stokes argued, 'It is human rights for which we stand, 
and we should see to it that human rights must be respected'.   Bellenger's response 
was sympathetic, not only because he himself had nearly been captured at Dunkirk. He 
assured Stokes that POWs would 'undoubtedly' be repatriated. However, a peace treaty 
needed to be concluded, as Germany had no government, it could not be done at the 
present time. In regards to communications, German POWs were free to send mail to 
their families and there were direct mail facilities to all neutral and allied countries as 
well as Germany and Austria. Difficulties persisted, however, sending mail to the 
Russian Zone in Germany and Berlin; mail facilities had only been open to these areas 
since February. Indeed, with the help of the War Office, SEN had established a 
makeshift service to send mail to Germany. Religious observances were being fully 
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respected for POW in Britain and Bellenger dismissed the idea they were not. In regards 
to pay, no agreement had ever been reached with the German government and therefore 
a system was adopted; POWs were credited with pay as soldiers by their own countries 
which they would receive when repatriated.   
 On 16 July 1946 Stokes obtained another Adjournment with Bellenger to raise 
the issue of German POWs. Again, Stokes dismissed the government's argument that 
the principles of the Geneva Convention did not have to be abided. Citing Article 96 of 
the Convention, he argued that Britain could not denounce the stipulations of it as 
signatories.13 The Prime Minister had declared that the German people would be treated 
fairly having surrendered unconditionally; Stokes believed that the government, 
therefore, had the responsibility to uphold the terms of the Convention. However, this 
had not been done.  Stokes again pointed out Article 75 of the Convention and the fact 
that German POWs had not been repatriated. He dismissed the government's argument 
that as no peace treaty had been concluded, German POWs did not have to be 
repatriated. At any rate, Stokes noted, the Allied Control Commission in Germany 
governed the country and therefore acted as a government through which a peace could 
be negotiated.  In his opinion, as an ex-soldier, he believed that the Government were 
'disgracefully' dishonouring the obligations implicit in conditions of unconditional 
surrender. The 'appalling […] moral and spiritual' effect of indefinite captivity was 
stressed; German POWs were 'being detained beyond the intention of any regulation'. 
Stokes believed that this 'evil' was the product of 'the foundations that were laid at 
Tehran and Yalta'. Having received new information, he took back his apology and 
stated that secret agreements to use German slave labour had been made between the 
Powers. Stokes was 'ashamed' that any Labour Government could condone these 
agreements. Britain, however, was not alone in 'treating these men in this tyrannous 
manner'; the 'same beastliness' could also be seen in Belgium, France, and Russia. 
Stokes therefore, once more, pressed Bellenger to clarify the Government's policy of 
repatriation. He also reaffirmed his condemnation of not paying POWs properly. 'Why', 
Stokes asked the House, 'when one gets a fellow into the position of [POW], he should 
be treated as a slave and paid a bob a day, I fail to understand'. 'Surely', he thought, 
'every trade unionist at least on this side of the House will agree […] that if a man has to 
do a job of work he should be paid the rate for the job'. The 'fact' was for Stokes, that 
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the Government were 'making something of the order of £750,000 a week out of slave 
labour'.   
 In addition he brought up the fraternisation ban, which he believed required 
revision. 'Perfectly ridiculous things happen' Stokes recounted a case of a British 
woman who was fined £1 for gifting a POW a piece of cake. Bellenger's response to the 
'onslaught' on the Government was again sympathetic. He noted that the problem was 
delicate from a legal perspective, and although the Government did not base policy 
entirely on the Convention, they were entitled to treat POWs as POWs. Bellegner 
denied that the Government was making a profit and pointed out that Stokes had not 
provided any 'conclusive evidence' of what would be a 'very immoral' practice. He also 
outlined that German POWs were being sent back, with 2,000, having been screened as 
'anti-Nazis', being sent home this month. 14  Over the course of the year, Stokes 
sporadically brought up the issue in the Commons, especially when labour was 
discussed; he often referred to 'traffic in slave labour' or German POWs as 'slaves'.15 
In May 1946, commenting on the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris, 
Harold Nicolson was one of the first to draw attention to the German POWs still held by 
Britain in his Spectator column. The failure to reach an agreement at Paris demonstrated 
that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had deeply conflicting ambitions for 
post-war Europe. 16  Nicolson argued that Britain, although skilfully represented by 
Bevin, could never match the 'unity of command' backed the 'formidable physical 
power' of the Soviet Union. However, as the foremost representative of democracy in 
Europe, Britain could draw upon an 'enormous moral power' which would gain the co-
operation of the 'millions' in Europe. The people of Europe were exhausted after the 
recent war and would, Nicholson feared, 'prefer the certainties even of a harsh 
totalitarian system'. It was essential that Britain demonstrated a coherent political 
formula, practising the democratic principles it preached. However, the chief example 
of the British hypocrisy which played into the hands of the Soviet Union was the 
absence of a policy of repatriation towards the increasing number of German POWs 
held in Britain. There was, as the conference had demonstrated, little chance of a peace 
treaty being signed with Germany any time soon, and the retention of German POWs 
was therefore in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Although permitted by 
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international law, indefinitely retaining POWs was a flagrant violation of the 'human' 
values for which Britain stood, damaging Britain's image and future relations with 
Germany. Instead of sending German POWs home as friends, they would return as 
enemies:  
 
It is not to be expected that these men, when they eventually return to Germany, 
will be convinced or convincing missionaries of the democratic faith. But a little 
prudence, a slight effort of prevision, the faintest touch of ordinary human 
compassion, might prevent them from returning as living witnesses against our 
cause. Such prudence, such foresight, such compassion are not apparent in the 
policy of His Majesty's Government. No statement has ever been vouchsafed to 
them as to the date at which they may reasonably expect release.17 
 
Treating human beings in this way, Nicholson argued, was 'more than wrong, it [was] 
blind and stupid'. In July 1946, the Economist similarly examined the subject of 
Britain's 'Peacetime Prisoners', criticising the government's treatment of them. 
'Personally and unofficially, they are anything but ill-treated; but their official treatment 
has been so unsatisfactory that their morale is rapidly falling, their willingness to work 
is disappearing, and friendliness towards this country is turning into bitterness'. The 
system of political grading was also pointed towards, 'But the real trouble, from which 
most lesser grievances derive and which colours the prisoners' whole life with dreary 
apathy or complete despair, is the absence of any scheme whatever for gradual 
repatriation'. The Economist attacked the arguments for retaining the POWs. It was 
accepted that under international law the government was not obligated to repatriate 
German POWs as no peace treaty had been signed.   
 
The effect of such complete uncertainty on men who have been separated for 
years from their families, about whose condition they have the scantiest 
information, and with whom they have little communication—apparently even 
the sending of parcels is prohibited—is not difficult to imagine.18 
 
The POWs were certainly 'indispensable to the British economy', without them the 
forthcoming harvest might well not be gathered. However, the dependence of German 
POW labour simply highlighted the permanent shortage of domestic labour willing to 
work in agriculture. Rather than employing forced labour with a nominal wage, the 
recruitment of foreign free labour was advocated as a better solution. Having criticised 
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the arguments for retaining POWs, the Economist called on the government to begin a 
progressive scheme of repatriation.  
  
If any hopes of peaceful co-operation between Germany and the rest of Europe 
are to be salvaged, Britain must cease to wait on international action and remedy 
those injustices within her own power. One step should be taken immediately. 
Any orderly scheme of repatriation—even one extremely slow and whose start is 
delayed—would work wonder with the prisoners. It is over a year now since the 
German war ended. Surely they have the right to know what the Government 
means to do with them?19 
 
On 10 July 1946, the Manchester Guardian welcomed the small cigarette ration 
introduced for German POWs working on British farms. However, far more important 
to the POWs was an answer to the question: 'When are we likely to be sent home?'. The 
Manchester Guardian argued that 'the facts are plain', the notion of justice and the needs 
of the British Zone of Germany, necessitated the speedy return of the German POWs. It 
was considered unjust to retain POWs for so long while their fellow countrymen who 
had fought for far longer against Britain, having been captured on the Continent towards 
the end of the war, were already home. While the Nuremberg Court would decide the 
punishment of Germans who were criminals and had committed atrocities, the German 
POWs in Britain were ordinary soldiers and retaining them here only hampered the 
reconstruction of Germany, where men were needed far more.20 The editorial pointed 
towards a letter published in the same issue written by a German POW who had spent 
five years in captivity. The writer drew attention to the attitude of his fellow POWs 
towards their position. Although anxious to return home, they were instead held in 
camps, preventing them from participating in reconstruction. As a result, the writer 
argued, re-education efforts were being wasted. Sending German POWs home to help 
reconstruct their country politically and economic was far more productive them 
keeping them in captivity.21 Another letter appeared a few days later, written by Tom 
Fernley, a former British POW who had spent time in captivity in Germany. He 
sympathised with the German POW correspondent, knowing 'only too well the feeling 
of spiritual degradation at being behind barbed wire', and advocated their return:  
 
Surely the Government should be making up its mind as to the policy to be 
adopted towards all these able-bodied Germans. Keeping them in England 
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indefinitely, even though they may be bombarded by expert teams of social-
psychologists, economists, and moralists will not make them good democrats. 
Here in England are many thousands of them, nearly all in their full vigour, 
young, restless, good material for tackling the renaissance of Germany. Let them 
be sent home to add their quota of brains and brawn to the common stock. If 
Germany must make reparations let these healthy young men contribute their 
share. Re-education will start at home. I am sure that 99 per cent of former 
P.O.W.s, if asked what to do with these men, would say at once, "Send them 
home." Not even those who, when rotting in prison camps, toyed with the idea 
of revenge would now say anything else. Twelve months after the end of the war 
we should be told why these Germans are still wondering when, or whether, they 
will see the Heimat again. It is about time we put them out of their misery.22  
 
On 21 August 1946, the Daily Mail editorial called on the government to inform 
German POWs when they might expect to return home, their 'indefinite detention' at 
that time 'troubling the consciences of many people'. The German POWs, along with 
their fellow countrymen, were 'guilty of very great crimes against humanity'. Repairing 
the damage which they were responsible for was not unjust. However, retaining German 
POWs indefinitely was vindictive, 'contrary to British ideas of justice'. Those convicted 
of crimes in British courts, no matter how depraved, were told the length of their 
sentence. The same rule, it was argued, had to be applied to German POWs. Leaving 
them in this uncertain state was described as 'cruelty'. The argument that a victorious 
Germany would have treated British men in a similar or even worse way was irrelevant. 
Two reasons were given by the Daily Mail to announce a repatriation policy. First, it 
would combat the growing despair among the POWs which was affecting their work. 
Second, given the desire to re-educate German POWs in British ideals, it was 
imperative that they were not sent home with 'bitterness in their hearts'. The editorial 
pointed towards an article appearing in the same issue. It reported on the deaths of two 
German POWs who were held in Britain. 21 year old Heinrich Holze hanged himself at 
his camp in Guildford. Reporting to the inquest, the corner suggested that the cause 
behind his unstable mental state had been the uncertainty of his future:   
 
The continual confinement may have something to do with this unfortunate boy 
taking this extreme course. It is to be hoped as many of us think, that these 
German prisoners will be returned to their country with the greatest possible 
speed. 
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30 year old Karl Panwitz had also hanged himself at Swanwick camp in Derbyshire. 
Speaking at the inquest, a friend and fellow POW stated that Panwtiz had told him that 
if he remained in Britain for more than two years he would kill himself.  
 In August 1946, The Times also picked up on the public anxiety regarding the 
retention of German POWs over a year after the end of the war. Unlike other papers, 
The Times did not press for reparation, suggesting that the subject was a complex one.  
 
The question bristles with complications, and in any discussion of it a number of 
considerations jostle and conflict. Food production here and in Germany, 
transport, housing space and employment in Germany, reparations, moral 
factors, even the legal position—all these demand a hearing.23  
 
In early August 1946, Noel-Buxton wrote to The Times condemning the delay in 
repatriating German POWs, fearing that   
 
the delay in repatriation is counteracting the admirable efforts made in the 
British Zone towards encouraging a "good behaviour" spirit in the Germany of 
the future. Men who would have gone home keen to work in that direction are 
coming to doubt our humanity and to despise our claim to Christianity. They 
hear of relations and friend in great distress, but may neither go home to them 
nor send them gifts from their own rations or earnings.24 
 
Phoebe Lean expected some comment on the recent incentives offered to German 
POWs to work harder. She thought that the POWs were being treated like children, 
criticising the incentives offered. 'Anyone having occasion to speak to them informally 
will subscribe to my suggestion that the only real incentive would be a definite 
repatriation schedule'.25 A. S. Crawley also welcomed The Times article which drew 
attention to the retention of German POWs. Having served in the British army for 
several years, it was clear to him that 'prolonged exile from home is one of the most 
deadly possible wounds that can be inflicted on the modern citizen solider, one of the 
surest sappers of his morale'. For Crawley it was unfair that reparations were being 
exacted from men who had were in British hands 'through the fortunes of battle'.26 Miss 
Hawkes, writing to the Bristol Mirror in June 1946, argued that there was 'no valid 
reason' for detaining them and in doing so 'we are increasing their hatred of us and 
possibly'—echoing Nicholson's concern—'sowing in their hearts seeds of 
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Communism'.27 Similarly, Mr Carnegie wrote to The Times in August, fearful of future 
conflict arising from treatment German POWs in this manner. Although having fought 
against them and 'seen examples of what horrors they could perpetrate', he argued that 
'it does no good to go on harping on that line' as it would 'make doubly certain of the 
whole business occurring again'. The argument that German POWs deserve such 
treatment was 'not a convincing answer' and was 'surely the attitude [Britain] fought 
against for six years', retaining them Mr Carnegie thought, was a method that was 
'expect[ed] from the victorious Germans'.28The Lancashire Daily Post, wrote that the 
prolonged detention of German POWs was 'causing serious concern in many minds', 
and were certain that this concern would engender 'stronger and more insistent 
representation', demanding a detailed and definite release plan.29 
 Newsreels broadcast the repatriation issue on screen in early September 1946. 
Reporting for British Movietone, Leslie Mitchell stated that 'the problem of German 
POWs in this country has been in the forefront of discussion'. Over shots of the POWs 
bailing hay in a field, chopping and milling wood at a sawmill, and digging trenches for 
drains on the London-Guilford road, he stated that 'acquired a good reputation as hard 
workers' and were 'usefully employed in a score of ways'. Yet, Mitchell spoke of the 
'strong body of opinion in Britain that they should be repatriated as soon as possible'. 
Although POWs had been 'properly treated' in terms of their employment and general 
welfare, the lack of a repatriation scheme was both a practical and moral problem:  
 
There's no question that they've been properly treated here. No, the problem is 
one of repatriation. It's no use sending them back to Germany until the situation 
there makes it possible to reduce our liabilities in that country. At the same time, 
humanity dictates their release as soon as possible. Besides, even if we are short 
of manpower, we don't want to depend on POW labour.30 
 
German POWs were usefully employed on a variety of work, but at the same time their 
continued captivity—keeping them separated from their families and homes—was 
cruel. Understanding the 'controversy rage[ing] around them', John Parsons of British 
Pathe went into the streets to gauge attitudes over the need to repatriate POWs for 
Pathe's own opinion poll. When asked his opinion, a vicar thought it was 'a great human 
question', and that Britain should not rely on forced labour.  
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This is a considered opinion. It is based on the view that to keep prisoners 
indefinitely is to keep slave labour. That, the churches say is to do ourselves the 
things we fought to destroy in our enemies. We know there are other opinions - 
no less honestly held. These Germans, now looking apathetic and harmless, 
were once confirmed Nazis. They carried German arms over Europe and 
Western Russia. They must take their share of responsibility for German crimes.  
 
Two soldiers understood that the POWs helped with the harvest, but Germany also 
needed men to work on reconstruction. Finally, Parson's asked Mrs Tuffy what she 
thought. Her response was simple: 'What do I think about the Germans? Well, they're 
human beings the same as us. And they should be sent back to their country same as our 
boys should be sent home here'. Although it could be read as slightly xenophobic, Mrs 
Tuffy clearly wished for normality to be restored. She thought that there were no 
fundamental difference between Germans and British and that both German POWs and 
British soldiers occupying Germany should be demobilised and allowed to return home. 
For Pathe, it was for the British public to wrestle with the issue of repatriation, stating 
that it was 'You, the people of Britain must decide these men's fate' and ending the 
segment by asking, 'Meantime, the prisoners wait. What have you decided?'.31  
 
4. Save Europe Now and the first Memorial, August 1946 
The concerns voiced regarding the retention of German POWs would be formally 
brought before the government by Save Europe Now. Set up as a pressure group in 
August 1945, SEN developed out of a concern with the situation in post-war Europe and 
the plight of German civilians.32 The key personality behind the creation and successes 
of SEN was the charismatic publisher turned philanthropist Victor Gollancz who 
chaired the organisation. Between the 1930s to the late 1960s, Gollancz championed 
many campaigns: solidarity with Spain during the civil war, the campaign for nuclear 
disarmament, and the abolition of capital punishment. Although an enthusiastic 
campaigner, his background was rooted in business. His publishing house Victor 
Gollancz Ltd. revolutionised the industry during the inter-war years, particularly 
Gollancz's marketing strategies.33 In turn, he used his lucrative company as a platform 
for promoting his radical causes. In the 1930s, Gollancz attempted to increase the 
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circulation of left-wing literature through the Left Book Club.34 In the post-war world, 
Gollancz's preoccupation was with the treatment of Germans by the victorious Allied 
nations. Like his other campaigns, Gollancz's work for defeated Germany was 
motivated by a 'passion for the moral underdog', and his 'sheer enjoyment of [...] being 
seen to take up an unpopular cause'.35 As the end of the war was in sight, Gollancz 
increasingly focused on the question of morality, redemption, and international 
understanding. His views were controversial, above all his thought on German 
collective guilt. Throughout the war, Gollancz never ceased to push an anti-Vansittart 
message, refusing to believe that Germans were predisposed towards aggression, and 
were all, in turn, to blame for the cruelties inflicted by Nazism. The liberation of 
Buchenwald by Allied forces in spring 1945 provided pictures of the most barbaric 
element of the Nazi regime, reinforcing the argument advocated by Vansittart. For large 
sections of the British press and public graphic images of concentration camps provided 
proof that the German people had to be collectively punished for supporting the Nazi 
regime. However, Gollancz argued, the reverse was true. In his pamphlet, What 
Buchenwald Really Means, Gollancz pointed out that evidence of thousands of Germans 
suffering under the Nazis highlighted that millions of Germans had been terrorized into 
silent compliance.36 Gollancz attacked those who condemned the entire German people, 
and believed the treatment of Germans stemmed from what he perceived to be the 'new 
morality' victorious powers.  
 Writing to his longstanding colleague Kingsley Martin at the New Statesman, 
Gollancz presented a moral critique of post-war Europe, in which the treatment of 
Germans was pivotal. Gollancz compiled and publicised four letters he wrote to the 
press criticising the self-interest of victorious nations entitled The New Morality in 
September 1945. As Matthew Frank explains, 'The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans 
was but one symptom of a malaise which Gollancz believed was spreading throughout 
Europe, where the 'Nazi spirit' had infected the victors'.37 Although Britain and its allies 
had won the war, Gollancz wondered whether they had lost it morally. This critique of 
post-war morality shaped the initial SEN campaign, which would successfully lobby the 
Labour government to increase aid to German civilians.  
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 By mid-1946 SEN had gained momentum, and in conjunction with organised 
aid to European civilians, a parallel SEN campaign was established on behalf of 
German POWs in Britain and the Middle East. The same rhetoric of morality applied, 
and the indefinite captivity and continued employment of Germans POWs was seen to 
evidence further the self-interested 'new morality' of  victorious government. On 5 July 
1946, Gollancz sent a circular to influential public figures and organisations, inviting 
them to a conference to discuss the issue of German POWs held in Britain and the 
Middle East. Enclosed with the invitation were two memoranda, which provided 
information on the situation regarding German POWs. The key issue raised in both was 
the lack of a coherent repatriation policy and the adverse effect this had on the attitude 
and morale of the captives. The first document enclosed was a paper on German POWs 
in British hands, it presented facts on: the numbers of POWs in Britain and the Middle 
East; the work they performed and their wage; the screening process and results; and, 
how many POWs had been repatriated so far. It noted the 'growing unrest' of POWs in 
Britain regarding their repatriation, which had been recently aggravated by the arrival of 
German POWs from camps in the US and Canada; these POWs believed they were 
being repatriated, only to be sent to camps in Britain. It stated that the repatriation of 
German POWs was 'highly unsatisfactory', and required a 'thorough overhaul'.  
 The second document had been compiled by camp visitors and ministers. It 
warned that the 'uncertainty about the date of repatriation' was having 'political and 
moral effects which may be described without exaggeration as disastrous'. Across 
British camps, POWs believed that the British authorities were deliberately preventing 
the establishment of a German government in order to retain POWs beyond the end of 
hostilities. While the stipulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention were not being 
broken, the POWs maintained that the spirit of it was. As a result, some did not consider 
themselves POWs, 'but slaves working by duress for the victor'. The POWs reasoned, if 
reparations were to be paid by physical labour then it should be a cost levied on the 
whole German people, not just POWs who were in their situation 'by a mere accident'. 
The British government had informed POWs of the situation in Germany, and argued 
that conditions were far more favourable in Britain. However, this did not convince 
them, they found it 'unbearable to reflect that their families may be starving' while they 
were 'shut away and prevented from doing anything to help'. Camp visitors and 
ministers had noted a 'rapid change' in the atmosphere of camps from the beginning of 
the year. Not only was there 'a growing feeling of helplessness' among POWs, they 
were also 'bitterness and resentment'. In turn, educational activities had been 'paralysed'. 
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The most worrying effect of the situation was that the 'growing acceptance of the 
principles of Christianity and democracy' was 'now being reversed', as POWs 
considered 'indefinite incarceration [...] wholly opposed to those principles'. Many were 
'becoming extremist and nihilistic'. 'At best' there was apathy, and 'at worst [...] moral 
degradation and superstition [...] to a disastrous degree'. In thirteen camps, nine suicides 
and five attempts had recently occurred. All this amounted to resentment towards the 
British, which 'jeopardised' future friendships with Germans: the 'movement of 
sentiment' towards 'friendship' was now 'towards hatred'. Both memoranda sought to 
persuade the reader that a lack of a definite policy of repatriation was having a severe 
effect on German POWs. Threatening to make enemies of them and reverse re-
education efforts, it was suggested that a repatriation policy should be created and 
announced to the POWs as soon as possible.  
 The conference, organised by SEN in conjunction with a group of Labour and 
Liberal MPs, was at Livingstone Hall in Westminster.38 Several religious and welfare 
organisations attended or sent representatives to the meeting, including: personal 
representatives of the Archbishop of Canterbury and Archbishop of Westminster, 
Commissioner A. G. Cunningham of the Salvation Army, the British Council of 
Churches, and the Society of Friends.39 Discussion was opened by Pastor Forell at 11 
am.40 Forell, a Swedish pastor, was a key figure in the spiritual welfare of POWs. Since 
1944, he had visited some two hundred POW camps in England, working for the World 
Alliance of the YMCA, and visited post-war Germany to co-ordinate POW welfare; 
Gollancz had met the Swede a year before in Scotland.41 Both Forell and Professor J. 
Courvoisier — Dean of the Theological Faculty at Geneva and chairman of the 
Oecumenical Commission for Chaplains Serving Prisoners of War respectively — 
'stressed the appalling moral effects of indefinite captivity'.42 In addition to the concern 
over the effects of indefinite detention on POWs, the ensuing discussion raised other 
difficulties relating to their position. First, 'strong remarks' were made about the 
employment of German POWs. Labour MP Richard Stokes considered it tantamount to 
'slave trading' by the government. He pointed out that while the Exchequer received 
around £700,000 a week in money paid by employers of POW labour, the POWs 
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themselves received only a fraction of the wages for personal expenditure. Second, the 
'illogicality' of allowing British soldiers in Germany to fraternize with Germans, but 
forbidding German POWs in Britain to make friends was criticised; Clarence Tritton 
spoke of openly defining the ban. Third, Reverend Henry Carter discussed the 
degeneration of family life in Germany with fathers, husbands, and brothers away. 
Finally, the need for allowing POWs to send parcels to their families was urged.43 
Reginald Paget argued that it was an infringement on human liberty not to allow POWs 
to send parcels home. However, the views put forward were not unanimously agreed; a 
Methodist at the conference warned not to forget what the Germans had done, stressing 
that POWs required re-educating before they returned. Two refugees believed that Nazi 
and non-Nazi POWs should be treated differently. Moreover, the British Council of 
Churches was somewhat dubious of the meeting; Archibald Campbell Craig, the 
General Secretary, disagreed with the idea of lifting the fraternisation ban.  The result of 
the conference was the adoption of a resolution; it was unanimously agreed that: a letter 
would be sent to the press, a deputation would wait on, and a Memorial sent to, Prime 
Minister Attlee. The conscious of a Christian and liberal minded Britain addressed itself 
to a socialist government. 
 The first Memorial to the Prime Minister would encourage the government to 
hasten the speed of repatriation. The Memorial had 875 signatories, including, three 
Roman Catholic Archbishops, fifty five Anglican Bishops and other Church Leader, 
118 MPs, 76 members of the Royal Society, a large number of heads of colleges and 
schools, as well as prominent figures in public life and the arts.44 The Memorial began 
by outlining the serious concern towards the continued captivity of German POWs in 
Britain. They had been prisoners more than a year since victory; it stated that there was 
'a point at which men cannot live without hope'. The Memorial asked the government 
to: devise a definite policy of repatriation for German POWs held in Britain as soon as 
possible; and, to announce this scheme to the prisoners without delay, 'since the 
certainty of release even at a relatively distant date would be less intolerable than the 
present uncertainty'. 45  In the letter to the press, SEN expanded upon the issue of 
repatriation of German POWs, outlining the effect their continued captivity was having 
their moral and views on Britain. Religious figures which had visited POWs in camps 
had reported 'a very rapid spiritual deterioration'. German prisoners, 'who might have 
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gone back […] full of determination to build a more liberal society' were 'becoming 
hard and cynical'. They believed that British values — liberalism and Christianity — 
were a façade, and the prisoners' respect for British institutions was being quickly 
'replaced by indifference and even hatred'. Overall the 'uncertainty about their fate' was 
demoralising them; they 'felt that convicts are better off, for at any rate they know when 
their imprisonment will end'. Tied to the uncertainty of repatriation, other factors added 
to their dejection: the pay POWs received for their labour; the restrictions governing 
POWs sending parcels to their relatives; and, the non-fraternisation rule. In regards to 
the payment of POWs, it was noted that while employers paid the government the full 
trade union rate for their services, the POWs received only a nominal wage for personal 
expenditure. While POWs received letters for relatives at home in grave distress, they 
were prohibited from sending gifts, even their own rations. Finally, the non-
fraternisation rule was felt to be turning German POWs into 'pariahs'. It was considered 
'an offence to Christian principles', and was taken by the POWs in this way. In the letter 
to the press, SEN suggested that: prisoners be paid the rate for the job, part of the 
money perhaps being paid on a weekly basis and part being credited to them upon their 
release; POWs be permitted to send food parcels to relatives; and, the non-fraternisation 
rule be relaxed. The question of the treatment of German POWs, however, was not only 
tied to the welfare of the POWs themselves. It was also a matter of the spiritual and 
moral welfare of the British people. As the Memorial made clear, the drawing up of a 
definite scheme of repatriation was for the sake of 'both our common humanity and of 
the British good name'.46  
 
5. Attlee's response, September 1946 
The effect of the Memorial was immediate: Attlee ordered an inter-departmental review 
of the prisoner situation, and a Cabinet discussion was held on 4 September. The 
'substantial public support for the memorial' and criticism of the government's 
behaviour worried the Cabinet. 47  Attlee, keen to placate the public's humanitarian 
concerns, announced in early October that prisoners would be repatriated at a rate of 
15,000 per month: this figure was agreed with the Ministry of Transport, taking into 
account the estimated capacity of British shipping in 1946 and 1947. However, this was 
not solely motivated by altruism.  It was also considered a politically and economically 
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opportune moment to begin the progressive repatriation of German prisoners. Local 
elections were soon being held in Germany, and priority was given to the repatriation of 
2,000 'white' prisoners—politically screened as anti-Nazi/pro-democrat—so they could 
participate. Moreover, coal mines in the British occupation zone were near operational. 
With a shortage of skilled labour in the British zone, prisoners with mining experience 
were also considered a priority repatriation category. Subject to those priorities, the 
length of captivity was the main factor which governed which prisoners would be 
repatriated. 'Black' prisoners—pro-Nazi—would not be repatriated as they represented 
an ideological threat to the reconstruction of Germany. Regarding a definite date by 
which all prisoners might expect to return home, Attlee did not consider it expedient to 
announce one. The Ministry of Agriculture had made it clear that prisoner labour would 
be required for the 1947 harvest: the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the MAF was 
'anxious' to point the implications of repatriation on the agricultural workforce out in his 
report.48 Furthermore, departmental demands for prisoner labour showed no tendency of 
diminishing in 1947 and 1948: it was estimated that, after the seasonal fall in demand 
over the 1946 winter, 433,000 would be required in October 1947. POWs were 
employed in industries which had found it difficult to attract labour. Any policy of 
repatriation must not risk the 1947 harvest, a point which the MAG agreed. Yet, the 
MOL recognised the recent fall in POW productivity was likely to intensify unless 
prisoners were given the prospect of release. 49  POWs had to be repatriated, but 
contingency plans in turn had to be implemented to recruit labour to replace POWs. The 
Cabinet agreed that while prisoner labour was to be progressively reduced and replaced 
by the recruitment of displaced persons from Europe and demobilised Polish 
servicemen,  and Attlee conceded that prisoners would have to be retained during 1947, 
and perhaps 1948. At the same time the government allowed POWs to send parcels to 
their families through SEN agencies. Yet, on fraternisation the response was slow; it 
would not be discussed until November.  Eventually, however, the fraternisation ban 
was lifted on 12 December. Moreover, no statement was made over the working 
conditions of POWs. The implementation of a repatriation scheme for German prisoners 
of war in October 1946 was therefore a compromise between public opinion anxious 
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regarding the fate of German prisoners and politico-economic considerations. However, 
while the scheme was welcomed in the press, it was not considered to go far enough. 
 
6. Protests continue, March 1947 to August 1947  
While the scheme was applauded, criticism of the government continued. The lack of a 
fixed date when the repatriation process would be completed left German POWs in 
doubt of when they would return home. Writing to the Spectator in December 1946, 
Dorothy Buxton, founding member of Save the Children, asserted that the 
announcement of a repatriation scheme was merely a 'concession to the uneasiness of a 
public disturbed by the sight of "slave labour" in our land of freedom—a sad 
incongruity in the headquarters of democracy […]'. The hypocrisy of lecturing the 
prisoners in democracy while continuing to exploit them was endangering future 
relations between Britain and Germany.50 
 Stokes again raised the subject on 24 March 1947. Researching into the legality 
of retaining these POWs, Stokes had been passed from one Ministry to the next, all had 
provided, 'increasingly indefinite and confusing replies'. He contended that the 
Nuremberg Trials were based on the recognition of the Control Commission for 
Germany being the legal Government of that country. In turn, the Commission had to be 
recognised as the legal government in relation to article 75 of the Geneva Convention 
for the purposes of repatriating POWs. 'The situation is that', Stokes argued,  
 
the Control Commission is the legal Government of Germany, and we refuse to 
enter into negotiations with it, we are nowhere. I would ask, where are we? Are 
we at war with ourselves? I suggest that it will mean that His Majesty's Address 
from the Throne next autumn may well read: 'My relations with Foreign Powers 
continue friendly except with the Control Commission for Germany.' I wish I 
could get some definite answer […].51 
 
Here, as before, Stokes continued to attack the government's adherence to the Geneva 
Convention; suggesting that if the Control Commission was the legal government of 
Germany then it was the British government's duty to negotiate the repatriation of 
POWs, if it was not, then, the Nuremberg Trials were defunct. In conjunction with the 
legal aspect of the problem Stokes raised the question of morality in keeping POWs 
detained. The suffering of German families, exacerbated by the influx of refugees, was 
made worse as husbands, fathers, and sons were kept from them. Moreover, 
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marriageable German women outnumbered men some six to one. On the question of 
labour, Stokes believed that if slave labour was to be extracted from defeated enemies it 
should be 'levied on the nation as a whole' not just those 'who accidentally found 
themselves [POWs] when hostiles ceased'. Stokes again pointed towards the agreements 
at Yalta, were something, 'pretty fishy' had gone on. While the government had denied 
that it would use Germans at slaves, Molotov had 'spilled the beans' recently at a 
meeting of Foreign Secretaries in Moscow; using German labour as reparations had 
been agreed, and it was exactly what the Belgian, French, and British governments were 
doing. Stokes returned to the issue of paying POWs 'properly', and considered it 'an 
abomination' that they were paid 6d. for a full days labour. Treating German POWs in 
this manner would turn them into enemies of Britain, what the government should be 
attempting to do, in Stokes view, was to 'make them good ambassadors', which was 
'honest-to-goodness common sense'. While the government had recently improved their 
conditions — allowing them to visit British homes at Christmas and 'stray' from the 
confines of the camp — there was much more to be done; particularly improving their 
wages. Stokes also criticised the lack of clarity regarding POWs communicating with 
MPs, while there were allowed, they were not told they could. In addition, the method 
of screening German POWs was 'ridiculous'. Stokes spoke of his experience at a camp 
in East Anglia, where a German POW had been asked personal questions relating to his 
sexuality. This was hardly the sort of question that needed to be asked in his view. 
Stokes concluded his speech by assuring Bellenger that he would continue to press the 
subject of repatriation until the government clearly defined its policy. As the year wore 
on he continued to press the government on paying POWs the full rate for their services; 
especially those still in Egypt.52 
 Stokes restated his argument in March 1947, that the government had a moral 
obligation to repatriate all prisoners without delay.53  As well as individuals, several 
organisations continued to protest against the government's retention of German 
prisoners. In May 1947, a conference was organised at Kingsway Hall in London 
bringing together Methodists and Quakers as well as The Prisoner of War Aid Society, 
run by Mary Foss. The conference passed a resolution appealing for the Government to 
return German prisoners without further delay. 54  In June 1947, the national 
administrative council of the Independent Labour Party passed a resolution urging the 
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immediate repatriation of all German prisoners. The resolution stated: 'That this present 
Government above all others, should tolerate the kind of treatment these men are 
receiving is a denial of the moral principles inherent in the Socialist faith on which it 
raised itself to power'.55 
 Gollancz and SEN were similarly dissatisfied and organised another Memorial 
to increase the speed of repatriation. In July 1947, another Memorial was circulated to 
the Prime Minister, which outlined the continued concern over repatriation and the 
spiritual welfare of both POWs and the British public. SEN believed that there was a 
'great deal of evidence that the public' was 'ready, and the more responsible part of it 
painfully anxious, for another step forward'. It was noted that there had been no increase 
in the number of German POWs repatriated since September 1946—when the 
government had fixed it at 15,000 per month, with an additional 500 per month for 
compassionate cases. While this was welcomed, there were, as of 1 June 1947, still 
282,431 prisoners in this country and 81,988 in the Middle East — more than two years 
after the end of the war with Germany. Moreover, the recent negotiations in Moscow at 
the Council of Foreign Ministers were not considered to have solved the issue. 
 
Our anxiety has been increased by the agreement reached recently as Moscow, 
providing that the repatriation of prisoners from all countries should be 
completed by the end of 1948. While we are grateful to Mr. Bevin for securing 
even this agreement, we contemplate with shame the fact that, unless this 
decision is revised, there will still be a considerable number of prisoners in this 
country more than three years after the termination of the war.56 
 
SEN did not let up the pressure on the government's repatriation policy. Furthermore, a 
new rhetorical device was introduced to heighten the importance of the issue regarding 
the employment of POWs in Britain. Their continued employment was considered akin 
to slavery. Despite, 'the recent most welcome concession, the labour of these prisoners', 
the Memorial read, 'is still in effect slave labour'. A particular point was the payment of 
POWs, the Memorial continued, 'we find it impossible to be easy in our minds when we 
note the immense discrepancy between the rate at which they on the one hand, and free 
Englishmen on the other, are paid for precisely the same services'. As in 1946, SEN also 
reiterated the issue of German families being separated from their husbands and fathers. 
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In terms of the humanity for which we sacrificed so many lives and so much 
treasure, the importance of repatriation cannot be exaggerated. Every day 
despairing letters reach this country from German women, who, amidst the 
terrible conditions now prevailing in their country, are deprived of the support, 
physical and spiritual, of a husband, a father, or a son. When women write to say 
that they can bear everything, even semi-starvation, expect the continued 
absence of their men, we cannot but feel that we are committing an offence 
wholly unworthy of "our customs and our nature".57 
 
The Memorial begged the Prime Minister to again increase the speed of repatriation; at 
least announcing the date for the last POW to leave Britain as December 1948. An 
immediate announcement of this effect would, the Memorial read, ' do something to 
mitigate the cynicism and despair now so prevalent throughout Germany, and thus to 
prevent a further collapse of the values in which, without distinction of party or creed, 
all Englishmen presumably believe'. In regards to the policies of other countries, SEN 
believed that if Bevin failed to secure an agreement regarding the release of other 
POWs, 'that should not deter us from acting, so far as our own prisoners are concerned, 
in accordance with the principles which we hold in trust, and which, whatever others 
may do, we at least cannot lightly betray'.58 
 In August 1947, Lindon Laing, news editor of the Daily Mail, accused his 
readers: 'You are now charged with conspiracy to murder'. The article introduced 
readers to Werner X, a German POW acquaintance of Laing who was 'ready to go home 
and destroy his wife and his two children, and then himself'.59 Laing asked, 'How do 
you plead, reader? Guilty or Not Guilty?' In response to Laing's accusation, Daily Mail 
journalist Guy Ramsey pleaded 'Not Guilty'.  
 
We, the British people, are responsible for neither for his threats, the hysteria 
which produced them, nor the fulfilment of those threats if ever they be fulfilled. 
We are responsible not even for his family's shortage of food, fuel, or film. We 
are not even responsible for his retention in Britain. For that he—in the past—is 
responsible; not we.60 
 
Antony Hunter pleaded 'guilty' to Laing's charge. 'If you could understand the tragedy 
played out in the war prisoner's brain, you too would plead guilty on the count of mental 
murder. In that I have not spoken, I stand convicted now'.61 The Daily Mail received '76 
                                            
57
 ibid.  
58
 ibid.  
59
 Lindon Laing, 'The PoW said: 'It is better to die'', Daily Mail, 20 August 1947, p. 2. 
60
 Guy Ramsey, 'Not Guilty', Daily Mail, 21 August 1947, p. 2. 
61
 Anthony Hunter, ''If you prick us, do we not bleed?', Daily Mail, 26 August 1947, p. 2. 
192 
 
forcefully expressed opinions' regarding Laing's accusation; 'The total score: Guilty, 24; 
Not Guilty, 52'.62 
 
7. The completion of repatriation, September 1947 to June 1948 
In September 1946, Attlee and his Cabinet were aware that public opinion had to be 
placated. A year later, his response to the second SEN Memorial was sensitive to the 
position of the POWs still held in Britain but dismissive of any ideas in increasing the 
rate of repatriation at that time. In a letter to Gollancz, published in the press, Attlee 
stated: 'I sympathise with the human considerations which are put forward in the 
Memorial, but I cannot share the view that the retention of German prisoners-of-war is 
inequitable'. He maintained that it fair that Germany compensated for 'the loss and 
destruction which German aggression had brought on so many countries of Europe'. 
One of the 'only practical means' by which Germany could do this was through POW 
labour. The work performed by German POWs was of significant importance, no more 
so than in agriculture. Therefore, in his opinion, the continued employment of German 
POWs was a fair method to extract reparations from Germany. Furthermore, he argued 
that POWs were being treated decently. Not only were their 'material conditions [...] 
entirely adequate', POWs were given 'all reasonable freedom and amenities'. Not only 
were POWs being treated acceptably by the British government, any change to the 
repatriation programme—which would be completed by the end of 1948 at the latest—
would only serve to complicate and even hold up the return of German POWs.63 Attlee's 
response outlined the practicalities of repatriation, emphasising that the POWs were 
required to work—this not being unjust given that Germany had caused the war—and 
that plans were already in place to ensure they returned home. Although Attlee did not 
rule out the hastening of repatriation after the completion of the 1947 harvest, this was 
not considered a satisfactory response to the SEN Memorial.  
 This explanation did not convince. The Bishop of Sheffield thought retaining 
such a large number of POWs two years after the end of the war was 'morally 
indefensible and could not be politically wise'. 64  Published in Germany Revisited, 
Gollancz's reply was critical. He considered Attlee's letter 'a profoundly disturbing 
document' as it admitted that German POWs were being retained for 'the selfish needs 
of our own economy'. For Gollancz, the continued use of POW was unfair:  
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Mr. Attlee excuses our action by saying that prisoner-of-war labour is one of the 
only practical means by which "Germany" can make any practical reparation for 
the havoc she has wrought in so many parts of Europe. The question of 
reparation is an admittedly difficult one. For my own part I deprecate forced 
reparation of any kind: the only reparation worth having - and, incidentally, the 
only reparation which a conquered country, treated with justice and mercy by its 
conqueror, willingly makes out of its reviving prosperity. It is also, if Mr. Attlee 
will forgive me for saying so, nonsense to suggest that little reparation has been, 
is being, or will be made except by the labour of these prisoners. Has he 
forgotten, for instance, the German industrial processes and trade secrets which 
have been forcibly acquired under the "T-force" procedure, or the factories 
which have been or are being dismantled, or the many hundreds of others the 
imminent dismantling of which may have been announced before this pamphlet 
appears? If Mr. Attlee has forgotten these things, I can assure him that no 
German has. But even on Mr. Attlee's own ground, shaky as it is, how can our 
action be defended? If "Germany" has sinned, then "Germany", on the current 
theory which is not mine, must be forced to make reparation. You cannot have it 
both ways: you cannot make use of the collective theory when it suits you, and 
abandon it when it does not. I say nothing of mercy: but the forced retention of 
these men sins lamentably against an earlier and more commonly regarded law, 
the law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. How, as a matter of the most 
primitive justice, can it be right specially to penalize a man for the wholly 
irrelevant reason that we happened to capture him? Mr. Attlee knows the answer 
every bit as well as I do: but there is something in the modern political climate - 
is this Hitler's victory? - that corrupts a man even as good as he.65  
 
In his letter, Gollancz argued that if Germany as a collective was to pay for the war then 
it was unfair to extract reparations through German POW labour alone. The Spectator 
similarly thought Attlee's argument was flawed: 
 
The Prime Minister's statement on the repatriation of German prisoners rests on 
legality, rather than equity, and indeed on the stretching of legality to something 
very near dishonesty. It is true that under the Geneva Convention we are entitled to 
hold prisoners of war until a treaty of peace is signed, but no one ever contemplated, 
when that convention was drafted, that more than two years after the end of a war 
the treaty of peace would not even be in sight. Mr. Attlee's claim that the retention 
of these prisoners, as one of the only ways in which Germany can make reparation 
for the damage she has caused, is not inequitable will not stand examination. Even 
assuming that it is equitable to impose this form of reparation unilaterally, in the 
absence of any treaty provision regarding it, it is obviously inequitable to the point 
of inhumanity to hold in this country month after month and year after year 
particular individuals whom the accident of capture befell. Why should they bear 
vicariously for the German nation the whole burden of this form of reparation? If 
reparation through forced labour can be legitimately insisted on—and there is 
something to be said for the contention that it can—then at least let the Germans 
now here go home and others be brought over to take their place. But forced labour 
of any kind is repugnant to British ideas. The right course is to let Germans, here or 
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in Germany, work in Britain, like other foreigners, as volunteers at proper rates of 
pay.66 
 
Despite the unsuccessful second Memorial, repatriation was increased in December 
1947 from 15,000 to 20,000 per month, and, on 12 July 1948, the repatriation of 
German POWs was completed.67 
 
8. Conclusions  
In tandem with the fraternisation ban, the issue of when German POWs might expect to 
be repatriated was discussed in newspapers and newsreels from early 1946. The media 
noted that Britain was still upholding international law, in that it was permitted to retain 
POWs until a peace treaty was signed. That Britain was not technically breaking the 
1929 Geneva Convention was not tested. Retaining POWs for so long after the war, 
however, was not considered justified no matter what the law stated. Newspapers and 
newsreels continued, as ever, to depict the contentedness of POWs with their 
surroundings in terms of accommodation and subsistence. It was not this that was the 
issue. Rather, it was a matter of time. While all material comforts were provided POWs, 
it was clear that few could stand to live in captivity for this length of time.  
 Ex-POWs who had been in German hands shared their views and explained that 
the separation from home and the routine of captivity was difficult to face. In doing so 
they were highly critical of the lack of any announcement regarding the expected 
release of German POWs. As with the fraternisation ban, others feared that indefinitely 
detaining POWs served only to turn them against Britain. Philanthropic and religious 
organisations, journalists and individuals writing in the columns and letters to national 
and regional newspapers, and liberal and labour MPs, lobbied the post-war Labour 
government to draw up a scheme of repatriation for German POWs still held in Britain a 
year after the end of the war, as their indefinite retention and continued employment 
was considered antithetical to the values for which Britain had fought for in the recent 
war. Among the voices which were critical of the government's treatment of German 
POWs, Save Europe Now led by Victor Gollancz was the most influential, formally 
presenting public anxiety direct to Attlee in two petitions. The presentation of the first 
memorial in August 1946 marks a significant shift in public opinion towards German 
POWs. In the wake of the liberation of Belsen and the repatriation of half-starved 
British POWs from German camps, attitudes towards German POWs in Britain were at 
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their lowest ebb; their employment was called for as a legitimate form of reparations for 
the war which they had caused. In less than a year, voices critical of the indefinite 
retention of German POWs were heard in press and parliament, leading to SEN's first 
petition. Public opinion had swung from calls for reparation to repatriation.  
 The exploitation of subjugated people as slave labour was a method 
characteristically ascribed totalitarian regimes, an abhorrent sight in democracies such 
as Britain. Interning defeated soldiers indefinitely and forcing them to work as slaves 
was expected of a victories Nazi enemy not Britain who was supposedly a liberator of 
Europe and defender of democracy and freedom. There was an evident fear, expressed 
by Gollancz and in the Memorials sent Attlee, that the British had been infected by the 
evil they had sought to defeat, adopting a fascistic outlook toward their captured POWs. 
Having gone to war to fight fascism, it seemed that Britain was now adopting the 
methods of the enemy, undermining the image of Britain as a representative of 
democracy. The use of slave labour was also considered a betrayal of the socialistic 
values of the Labour party, which, during the 1930s, had endeavoured to highlight the 
oppression of the concentration camps.  
 The values invested in the treatment of POWs during the war—fair-play in 
particular—continued to be after 1945. In fact, it may be argued that they were given 
increased importance. Certainly, the POWs issue became far more vexing in the post-
war years, particular in regards to repatriation. The hypocrisy of preaches the virtues of 
democracy, championing human rights—according to Stokes—and having liberated 
Europe only to intern human being for an indefinite amount of time while making them 
work was considered antithetical to the values for which Britain had fought the war.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Chapter 7: Concluding remarks 
 
1. The contribution to knowledge 
 
This thesis has explored attitudes expressed towards the treatment of German POWs 
held in Britain between the outbreak of war in 1939 and the completion of repatriation 
in 1948. Newspaper and newsreel content was examined in order to understand how the 
captivity of German POWs was represented to the British public. The events covered by 
the media shaped the structure of the thesis. Letters to the editor, Mass-Observation 
material and other sources also provided insight, if fragmentary, into the reactions of the 
public to coverage of issues regarding the treatment of POWs in Britain, and at relevant 
times Germany. The focus of this thesis was not actual events, but rather how 
representation of them in the media. Undoubtedly the material which was published 
during the war was censored. Nonetheless, whether the representations of POW 
treatment were accurate or not did not deduct from their power to evoke notions of 
British national identity. The purpose of this thesis was not to interrogate the 'truth' 
behind the treatment of POWs but to demonstrate the power of it as a representational 
force. Charting the ebb and flow of attitudes circulating British society towards German 
POWs and their treatment during and after the Second World War, this thesis 
investigated how this particular subject intersected with wider debates taking place in 
wartime and post-war Britain. The specific contribution to knowledge this thesis has 
made is by establishing the link between the treatment of enemy POWs and notions of 
national identity in Britain between 1939 and 1948. In other words, through the 
treatment of German POWs, Britain could practically demonstrate the values for which 
it stood, aiding the construction of national identity in war and peacetime. The 
behaviour towards captured enemy servicemen was emblematic of characteristics 
considered central to Britishenss. The findings of this thesis therefore substantiate 
Konwer's suggestion that the treatment of POWs is a valuable lens through which to 
investigate the self-image of the captor, the identity ascribed the captive, and the aim 
and ambitions of the captor in wartime.  
 The Second World War was a highpoint of expressions of British national 
identity; the values considered central to Britishness were invested in the treatment of 
German POWs. This relationship between the treatment of enemy captives and 
expressions of national identity has been uncovered in other contexts elsewhere. For 
instance, David Dzurec argues that narratives of the callous treatment of POWs in 
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British charge during the American Revolution aided the construction of a patriot 
identity amongst the revolutionaries. Published accounts of British POW abuse helped 
define the American's cause to overthrow their corrupt colonial masters. 1  This 
argument, that there was relationship between conceptions of national identity and the 
treatment of captured and incarcerated enemies, is further highlighted in studies which 
examine civilian internment in Britain during the Second World War.  
  Civilian and military internment has rarely been studied in unison due to the 
chronological distance between the two episodes.2 At the highpoint of internment in 
April-June 1940, there were few German POWs held in Britain. By August that year, 
after public and parliamentary pressure, policy was reviewed and the first releases of 
internees began. By the time of Brune's declaration at the York Convocation, the 
internment episode of spring 1940 was largely forgotten, with many of the internees 
having served on the Home Front or in the armed forces. On the one hand, the refugees, 
Kushner and Cesarani suggest, 'did not want to dwell on the episode'. On the other, the 
reactionary measure sat awkwardly with the image of Britain standing alone in 1940, 
fighting 'for democracy and freedom against totalitarianism'.3 Yet, the statements above 
indicate there was a clear degree of overlap in the socio-political and cultural themes 
aired in discussion of both civilian and military internment, centring on how the 
treatment of captives reflected, or rather did not reflect, the British values. In regards to 
civilian internment in 1940, Kushner argues that the 'ideological factors have not 
received sufficient attention, specifically the debate about Englishness'.4 As the titles of 
studies of the subject indicate—"Totally Un-English, A Bespattered Page? , In the 
Highest Degree Odious—examinations of the internment episode have questioned the 
British liberal self-image.5  
 Calling for a review of civilian internment policy on 10 July 1940, Eleanor 
Rathbone, the independent MP and long-term campaigner for women's rights, stated in 
parliament that: 'This is a question which affects our prestige as a nation, and we do not 
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want to let it go out that our land is a land of oppression and not a land of the free'.6 On 
the same day, Major Victor Cazalet, another fervent opponent of internment, declared it 
to be 'a totally un-English attitude to adopt towards a problem of this kind'.7 Rathbone 
and Cazalet opposed the indiscriminate mass imprisonment of enemy aliens as it was 
antithetical to British values and tarnished the tolerant image of the nation.8 Just over 
seven years later, the Archdeacon of Chester, The Venerable R. V. H. Burne, asserted at 
the full synod of York Convocation that 'It is a blot on our fair name to keep these men, 
and it is contrary to the instincts of the ordinary Englishmen's idea of fair play'.9 In 
October 1947, Burne was not speaking in relation to civilian internees but German 
POWs. Like Rathbone and Cazalet, Burne drew upon national ideals in his criticism of 
the treatment of these captives. Although purely speculative, had that not died before 
the July 1946 SEN conference, Rathbone and Cazalet may well have joined Stokes and 
Gollancz in the campaign to repatriate German POWs. 10  Notwithstanding the 
differences between the two categories of captives, the rhetorical overlap in discussions 
and criticism of the internment of enemy aliens in the summer of 1940 and the retention 
of German POWs after 1945. This thesis has demonstrated if the civilian internment 
issue was a matter of national identity, so too was the treatment of German POWs held 
in Britain between 1939 and 1948, which suggests a deep cultural abhorrence towards 
treating enemy internees, be they civilian or military, unjustly or cruelly.    
 The first objective of this thesis was to investigate how the media represented 
the captivity of German POWs in Britain and to examine the responses of the British 
public to this representation.  Through an analysis of newspaper and newsreel content 
this thesis has provided a robust outline of what the average Briton read and viewed in 
relation to the German POWs held in their country as well as an indication of reactions 
to reportage of their treatment.  
 Chapters two and three concentrated on the wartime period, with the capture of 
substantial numbers of German POWs during and after the Normandy invasion being a 
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logical point of departure between the 1939-42 and 1944-45 periods. Sporadically, the 
fate of POWs in Britain and Germany was considered a newsworthy subject. As this 
thesis has shown, several incidents brought the treatment of POWs was reported in 
newspapers and newsreels from the outbreak of war in September 1939 to the 
unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. Throughout this period news 
coverage underlined that Britain dealt with enemy POWs correctly, at certain time 
going above and beyond the standard of treatment set in intentional law. Certainly, on 
occasion, the surprise among German POWs at the standard of treatment afforded them 
was highlighted. Having assessed wartime reportage, the thesis then moved onto the 
post-war period in chapters four, five, and six. Here it proved logical to assess attitudes 
in relation to the three main themes regarding the captivity of German POWs: their 
employment; the regulations governing their contact with the British public; and the 
subject of their repatriation. These issues were interrelated. While it was by and large 
accepted that German POWs were needed for labour, their continued post-war captivity 
raised questions of how much freedom they should be allowed and when they might 
expect to return home. While the media championed the treatment of German POWs 
during the war, and continued to emphasise their material and physical wellbeing, the 
government's handling of them post-war was increasingly criticised.   
 Through a reading of letters to the editor and M-O material, this thesis has 
revealed that individuals questioned how the authorities reacted to events and handled 
POWs.  It is clear they the British public were not easily swayed by what they believed 
to be propaganda. They compared the position of the POWs—their rations and 
accommodation in particular—to their own. What was emphasised as the fair treatment 
of enemy POWs, highlighting the sportsmanship of the British nation in wartime, was 
conversely deemed unfair towards other groups such as refugees, evacuees, and British 
servicemen. In other words, it was thought highly unfair when the standard of treatment 
afforded the enemy POW exceeded that of the average Briton. For example, signed 
'Well Stung', a correspondent from Fife registered their annoyance over the two ounces 
of cigarettes German POWs received per week. 'Here am I with 54s a week, 10s of 
which goes to pay the rent, and I am taxed to supply Germans of all people with a 
luxury I can't afford myself. It’s a great war this for the enemy'.11 While the German 
POW was granted a tobacco allowance, the upset writer could not find the money in 
their weekly wage to buy it themselves. In the case of rationing of food and sundry 
items, as the letter points out above, it was thought that the German POWs were, in 
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some cases, better off than British citizens. In discussions of the treatment of POWs 
such (in)justice was a recurring theme. That it was disputed whether or not the treatment 
of enemy POWs was fair/unfair only strengthens the argument that it was a central 
notion in popular contemplations towards the POW issue. In other words, the difference 
of opinion over whether or not the treatment of enemy POWs was fair indicates that it 
was crucial to the debate.  
 The British authorities as well as individuals were criticised for being too 
compassionate towards the captives. Yet, it is important to note that, generally those 
who disparaged the leniency would also indicate that they were not in favour or any sort 
of brutality or physical harm towards POWs. There were instances, however, when 
more punitive treatment was implied. The argument that German POWs should be 
given a taste of their own medicine was put forward. These attitudes intensified towards 
the end of the war. It can be suggested that after the shocking revelations following the 
liberation of Belsen there was a short period of cultural forgetfulness when it came to 
attitudes towards German POWs. In light of the shocking news of concentration camps 
and the death marches British POWs were forced to endure, the fate of German POWs 
in Britain seemed unimportant. Overtime, the significance of treating enemy POWs 
correctly was recalled. 
 Some noted that they were uncomfortable with being told to 'love thine enemy'. 
As noted by Matthew Sullivan there was a great 'Christian response' towards POWs in 
post-war Britain. Clergymen and religious organisations, such as the Quakers, actively 
encouraged the reaching out to POWs. Letters analysed in this thesis has shown that 
individuals were at times offended by such calls. Although they were Christian, they 
reserved their right to hate Germans and detest the inhuman acts Germany had 
committed during the war(s). This attitude is exemplified in Reverend H. G. Green's 
donation to the appeal of his counterpart, J. C. Chamberlain, for comforts on behalf of 
ailing German POWs (see, chapter two).  
 This thesis has demonstrated that the period before 1944 is worthy of 
consideration. The concern expressed over the treatment of German POWs did not 
suddenly materialise in post-war Britain. Rather, as this thesis has indicated, POWs 
were a cause of angst from September 1939. It is clear, however, that the significance of 
the issue was amplified post-45. Practically, there were far more German POWs in 
Britain and therefore the issue of their welfare was accordingly enlarged. In contrast to 
the few thousand of POWs placed in secluded areas, by 1946 there were hundreds of 
thousands camped at sites stretching the length and breadth of the UK.  
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 While the government underscored that they were performing useful work, 
individuals wrote of workshy groups of German POWs employed in their local area. 
The enduring stereotypes of the lazy Italian and hardworking German supported by 
quantitative analysis are accurate generalisations, but accounts contrary to this view are 
not difficult to find. Again, the suggestion was that the government was too soft towards 
the ex-enemy.  The POWs, it was argued, should be made to work. Although the 
government was careful to assuage their concerns—introducing safeguards to protect 
domestic labour from being displaced—the trade union movement, particularly the 
NUAW, were anxious over the employment of POWs.  
 During the war, the media emphasised that German POWs were treated fairly. 
Their treatment was criticised when it was considered excessively lenient or if it was 
revealed that the captives were indulged. The opulent surroundings afforded captives at 
Grizedale Hall were thought to exceed what was called for. Rather than POWs, the 
German captives were treated as holidaymakers. So then, there was an apparent limit to 
what was considered fair.  Expressing themselves in letters to the editor, individuals 
certainly considered this unfair.    
 This thesis suggests that post-war British policy towards German POWs lagged 
doggedly behind public opinion in regards to fraternisation and repatriation. The 
authorities wished to minimise contact between public and POWs for several reasons—
maintaining discipline and safeguarding POWs from hostility, in particular—while 
repatriating the Germans was not an immediate priority for the newly elected Attlee 
administration. As chapters five and six suggest, overtime the restrictions governing the 
freedoms of German POWs and their indefinite captivity were considered needlessly 
petty and overly punitive.  
 The second objective of this thesis was the determine the extent to which the 
treatment of POWs encouraged an awareness of cultural difference between Britain and 
the German enemy.  Reportage of the Altmark incident, the mooted exchange of POWs, 
the Shackling Crisis, and the Stalag Luft III executions emphasised the inherent 
fairness, chivalry, and honesty of the British in contrast to the bigotry, incivility, and 
treachery of the German enemy when dealing with POWs in their care. The revelation 
of Belsen and stories of forced marches told by liberated British POWs stressed the 
inherent cruelty of the average German. In so doing, the reporting of these events 
accentuated the cultural differences between Britain and Germany and signified the 
values which the British people were fighting to defend. 
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 The third objective of this thesis was to identify the values invested in the 
treatment of POWs and whether or not the British treatment of POWs was thought to 
reflect the values for which the nation stood. This thesis suggest that the reason why the 
treatment of POWs was such a vexing and newsworthy issue was due to its power to 
reflect the values self-ascribed the captor and projected on the captive. This thesis has 
made visible that cultural significance was invested in the treatment of captured 
enemies. Having unpicked the meaning attached to the handling of enemy captives, this 
thesis suggests four principle values which continually reoccurred in debates over their 
treatment: fairness, democracy, justice, and a Christian ethic.  In all the issues discussed 
in regarding the treatment of POWs, this thesis suggests that fair-play was explicit or 
implicit in them. With the arrival of German POWs in September 1939, newspapers and 
newsreels emphasised that Britain treated them in accordance with the stipulations of 
the 1929 Geneva Convention. They were provided decent food, leisure time, and 
comfortable accommodation. In so doing, the inherent sportsmanship of the British was 
clearly demonstrated. At the same time, individuals who viewed the German people as 
undeserving of such treatment. It was deemed far too lenient a way to the treat Germans 
who had proved to be a barbaric people, and unfair that while German POWs were 
provided comforts, British soldiers manning defences and refugees were not given the 
same consideration. While there was disagreement over the standard of treatment, both 
views emphasised the notion of fair play. In October 1942, while it was somewhat 
accepted that there was little recourse for Churchill and the government, the news that 
German POWs had been manacled in response to Germany do so caused discomfort. 
The POWs, whatever their character, were not to blame for Hitler's decision and 
therefore it was unfair to mete out reprisal on them. There was a similar feeling towards 
the bombing of German civilians in late 1942. In regards to employment, it was 
considered unfair that German POWs were not remunerated for their work, while the 
trade union movement considered their availability at a cheaper rate an unfair advantage 
to employers who preferred to hire them over British workers. In post-war Britain, it 
was considered unfair to retrain POWs and keep them locked up in camps, unable to 
participate in normal activities and relations. Men as well as women calling for the right 
to marry German POWs pointed out the gendered inequality whereby British men could 
marry German women, a state of affairs also considered unfair. In discussions of 
repatriation, it was considered unfair that German POWs were given no indication when 
they might expect to return home. When tensions emerged, it was not due to conflicting 
attitudes towards the centrality of these characteristics. Instead, debate arose due to the 
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applicability of these characteristics towards the German enemy. Certainly, the British 
observed a Christian ethic, but was the German POW deserving of it?  
 The final objective of this thesis was to contemplate how attitudes towards the 
treatment of POWs and the values invested in it remained constant or changed over time 
in relation to the shifting wartime, post-war, and emergent Cold War context.  It can be 
suggested that the notion of fair-play remained of central importance throughout the war 
and post-war period. It seems, however, that the disclosure of the horrors of Belsen had 
a profound effect on attitudes towards German POWs. This was relatively short lived. 
In the context of the emergent Cold War it was important that Anglo-German 
understanding was promoted. Reflecting on the German POWs who had been held in 
Britain, the Sunday Express summarised the changing attitudes of the British public 
towards them: 'At the beginning bus conductors refused to carry Germans, Councillors 
would not have them in libraries, ex-soldiers fought them in dance halls, but all gave 
way to public opinion. The Germans are all right'.12 Attitudes had changed and there 
was a political impetus in them doing so. In the emerging context of the Cold War it 
became important to find the 'good German'. The centrality of these themes to 
discussions of the treatment of German POWs suggests that while the Second World 
War witnessed changes to British society and culture, exemplified by Labour's 1945 
landslide victory, there were also continuities. The values expressed towards the 
treatment of POWs during the Great War remerged in the Second World War and also 
overlapped with the internment of civilians. Something which did change is the enemy 
to which the treatment of POWs was contrasted with. During wartime it was Nazi 
Germany, but in the post-war it became the Soviet Union. Despite the emergence of the 
new principal post-war enemy the need to treat POWs was invested with the same 
values. While this thesis has sought to correct the idea that the period 1939-44 was 
unimportant as there were few held in Britain, it is clear that the post-war issues of 
employment, fraternisation, and repatriation were more vexing and complicated. 
Furthermore, the need to maintain standards in the treatment of POWs took on new 
significance in the post-war world. In the context of the emerging Cold War, it became, 
as Harold Nicholson observed, important to demonstrate British qualities in contrast to 
the Soviet Union. Voices concerned by the retention and continued employment of 
German POWs in post-war Britain, notably Gollancz, were worried by the image of 
Britain it presented. Fearful of Soviet influence over Europe, it was paramount that 
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Britain did not act hypocritically and demonstrated democratic ideals practically in the 
treatment of German POWs.  
  
2. Memory 
 
This thesis concluded in 1948 with the repatriation of the last German POWs. Their 
story does not of course end here, 25,252 elected to stay on in Britain, taking up the 
offer to continue working in agriculture, their status akin to indentured labour. Around 
12,000 stayed on beyond their short term contracts. Almost all German servicemen 
experienced a form of captivity as POWs or Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and those 
which were held in Britain represented only a fraction of the total number. Some eleven 
million Wehrmacht soldiers became captives in one way or another in May 1945. While 
they shared this status, their journeys varied significantly. In June 1945, around 20,000 
German soldiers were employed as guards at food dumps and other stores in Germany 
to relieve British troops.13  While their continued detention in post-war Britain was 
decried, it was a comparably short time to their counterparts in Soviet captivity, the 
finally cohort permitted to make their journey home in 1956.14 Near the same time, Bert 
Trautmann received his FA cup winner's medal from Prince Philip—having played the 
last 15 minute of the game with a broken neck. Aside from Rudolf Hess, Trautmann is 
perhaps the most famous ex-German POW to have been captive in Britain.15 Born in 
Bremen, Truatmann severed as a Fallschirmejäger on the Eastern Front earning the Iron 
Cross. Transferred to the Western Front he was captured by British forces towards the 
end of the war.  Trautmann found himself in a camp at Ashton-in-Makerfield, 
Lancashire. Refusing an offer of repatriation in 1948, he stayed in Britain working in 
agriculture. While playing for St. Helens Town, Trautmann gained a reputation as a 
goalkeeper, and in 1949 he signed for Manchester City who then played in the First 
Division of the Football League.  Like the Second World War, Trautmann's story has 
engendered its own mythology. It is thought that as an archetype 'good German', 
Trautmann won over a hostile Manchester populace—a supposed 20,000 strong 
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demonstration protested at the decision to sign a former German paratrooper—and 
through his impressive displays on the pitch was a forceful personality in post-war 
Anglo-German reconciliation. Stephen Wagg has scrutinised these myths, finding that 
Trautmann was 'already integrated into working class life in the areas by the time he 
came to Manchester', and 'that the reconciliation myth was fashioned retrospectively to 
celebrate a purportedly special British captivity for tolerance'.16 Whatever the realities 
of Trautmann's story the contrast with the German POWs released from Soviet captivity 
is clear. While Trautmann was receiving his FA cup winner's medal, his contemporaries 
were only just beginning to wrestle with the problems of homecoming.   
 While for the Soviet Union the subject of war criminals remained important, in 
Britain, the ongoing Nuremberg trials were viewed as ever more tedious. There was 
'some light revival of interest' in the trials as they approached conclusion in September 
1946, M-O reported. Two out of five people asked the previous March stated that they 
were had no interest in the trials. It was considered a waste of time and money given the 
obvious guilt of the defendants. Yet, some believed the trials were thought of as 
historically significant and a good measure of British justice. 17  Out of 20 people 
interviewed by M-O, although regretful he had not faced trial, few were concerned that 
Himmler had committed suicide.18 The sentencing of General Erich von Manstein and 
Albert Kesselring unleashed a wave of criticism in Britain. In reaction, Manstein's 
sentence was reduced to 12 years from 18 in February 1950 and Kesselring's death 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in July 1947.19 Reginald Paget, having 
been involved with SEN and the protest over the continued retention of POWs in 
Britain, was on Manstein's defence during his trial and went on to publish a bestselling 
book on him exonerating his character.20 Taking The Times to task over their view that 
all German field-marshals had violated the laws of war and deserved punishment, 
Algernon Sidney, 4th Baron De L'isle and Dudley, was dismayed: 
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The detention of prisoners of war in rigorous confinement for three years after 
the end of hostiles, the proposed "demilitarisation" and trial of leading 
commanders of a defeated enemy, upon charges so long delayed and not yet 
announced, fill me, Sir, with dismay. I fear for the reputation of our country, and 
I fear for a precedent which is likely to prove not a deterrent but an incitement to 
further barbarity in war.21 
 
Of the plethora of films produced concerning the Second World War, two centred on 
German POWs held in Britain.22 Based on the book of the same name published near 
the same time, the film The One That Got Away (1957), told the story of von Werra's 
continued efforts to escape captivity in Britain and his success in returning home via the 
United State–at that time neutral in the war—having escaped the train transporting him 
to a camp in Canada. By the time it was released the genre of POW film based on 
daring escapes was still popular. Yet, this story was from the perspective of a German. 
The director, Baker, was irritated by the stereotypical portrayal of Germans and wanted 
to present the German in a different light. Rank Organisation preferred a British actor to 
play von Werra but after fighting hard and persuading Rank, Baker cast Hardy Kruger. 
Controversy surrounded Kruger's Nazi background and after an awkward press 
conference the press refused to cover the film.23 It was almost pulled from production. 
Despite this, it was a great commercial success, especially in Germany. Von Werra was 
portrayed as a 'good German'. The One that Got Away was one of several films which 
sought to build Anglo-German understanding through sympathetic, if not entirely 
forgiving, portrayals of the 'good German'. It was important to find the good among 
Germans as Germany was now the buffer between the West and the much expanded 
Soviet empire. Film historians have often analysed Kruger's portrayal of von Werra. In 
regards to this thesis it is important to note that the British captors in the film conform 
to stereotype: unfaltering polite and fair, offering cigarettes and a comfortable chair to 
von Werra. Britain's reputation as a captor state is left unquestioned.  The German 
officer in The McKenzie Break (1970), Willi Schlüter, is problematic in contrast to von 
Werra. He is definitely not a 'good German'. Whereas von Werra was depoliticised, the 
German officer in The McKenzie Break, like his men, is a committed Nazi. The German 
POWs in the film are shown singing SS marching songs, and brutally beating others 
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thought to be non-Nazis. Yet, while Schlüter might not be a 'good German', he is 
perhaps a somewhat 'likable Nazi', as Robert Murphy notes, commanding the respect of 
his men who, in turn, admire him, the officer demonstrates similar characteristics to 
Michael Caine's Steiner in The Eagle has Landed.24 Beyond these two films, and an 
uncritical TV documentary, The Germans We Kept, based on Taylor's book, the 
memory of German POWs held in Britain is dislocated from the collective memory of 
the war.25  
 In her recent work, Returning Memories: Former Prisoners of War in Divided 
and Reunited Germany, Christiane Wienand explores the complexities of individual and 
collective memories of German POW returnees in East and West Germany.26 Despite 
much of the physical presence of the camps across Britain having disappeared, at a 
regional and individual level the memory of German POWs held in Britain is clearly 
alive. In 2003, English Heritage published a report on the effort to record the POW 
camps established in Britain between 1939 and 1948. For the 370 known 'Standard' 
camps, 17 per cent survived in 'complete or near complete form'.27 Memories of German 
POWs often emerge in unusual places. In the oral histories drawn upon for a research 
project into Lincolnshire coastal grazing marches, Mr Clarke shared his wartime 
memories as a farmer in Burgh-le-Marsh:  
 
We had quite a few (prisoners of war). We had Italians to start with and later it 
was Germans. We had a prisoner of war Camp – well, there was two in Burgh. 
One was in Orby on Boothby Hall and the other one was on station road. Ay – 
they filled a gap in. Germans wasn’t bad workers. They wasn’t very strict with 
them. They all had to wear trousers with a patch on, patch on the back of the 
jacket so you could easily see them. At first there used to be a soldier guarding 
them. In the end they used to come on a bike. We had one chap and he used to 
play in a symphony concert in Bremen. I think we had one letter from him (after 
the war) but it was in German. Anyway we used to have musical evenings with 
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the German prisoners playing […] So I learnt that Germans didn’t have two 
heads with horns on. They made us some toys for us kids at Christmas.28 
 
While the material is fragmentary and uneven in local archives it is perhaps here where 
the local and individual significance of captivity needs further exploration. For some 
individuals who contributed to the BBC People's War online archive, the memories they 
submitted revolved entirely around the German POWs they met and befriended. At an 
individual level German POWs were the most important part of their war memory.29 
Contacting local history groups—some of which have published accounts on the POWs 
residing in their respective localities—and recovering local memories will perhaps 
further highlight the impact and significance of captivity beyond the desks of 
policymakers. Furthermore, this thesis has focused on the content of newspapers and 
newsreels to explore how the captivity of German POWs was communicated to the 
public. In hindsight, the role of radio and how this medium communicated the narrative 
of captivity was also worthy of exploration. Established in 1922, the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC) played a central role in maintaining civilian morale 
during the Second World War.30 As a fundamental institution in the nation building 
project according the Thomas Hajikowisk, the BBC promoted a multi-national/racial 
British identity centring much of its programmes on the empire during the 1939-45 
conflict. 31  The importance of radio was not lost on Germany. Broadcast over the 
medium wave station Reichssender Hamburg, Lord Haw-Haw aimed to demoralise the 
British people with English language propaganda.32 Despite the importance of radio 
being highlighted in these studies, the radio coverage of German POWs remains to be 
evaluated.  
 Captivity is an experience which millions were subjected to during and after the 
Second World War. During the conflict, ensuring the welfare of captured soldiers in 
enemy hands required tactful diplomacy, at least in the western theatre, and despite 
lapses in the standard of treatment the 1929 Geneva Convention worked reasonably 
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well. Handling enemy captives required the cooperation of several departments which 
drew up policies. Notwithstanding captivity being an experience, a diplomatic issue, 
and a set of policies to handle them, this thesis has shown that it was a subject of public 
debate and individual contemplation intertwined with issues of British national identity, 
images of the German people, and Britain's position in the Europe. Through the 
treatment of POWs the values for which Britain stood for during and after the Second 
World War were expressed, fairness being of central importance in discussions of the 
handling of German POWs. This is not to suggest a consensus that German POWs were 
treated fairly. Yet, despite much debate over their conditions, freedoms, and 
employment, it is clear that there was an underlying cultural commitment to the decent 
treatment of them. This was not solely borne out of a moral and humanitarian 
commitment to ensure their welfare but what doing so represented. 
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